Ramadi = Evidence Iraq Needs to Develope Rapid deployment force

by Ian Bach June 5, 2015 Quick Reaction Force ww2
A couple months News Orgs were reporting G2 involved in Iraq strategy to retake Mosul - outlining the units needed, their make-up, and it looked good, 8 or 10 Brigades 5 general army 2 counter insurgent / counter terrorist 1 or 3 i forget policing & other local forces, maybe a couple Sunni Militias would be best. But it also said Coalition "was not going to rush in without a good plan." My fear was they would drag their feet, and not do the correct thing = "Go for the Jugular".

So they did nothing but target retakes and some defensive lines. But like in World War 2 with Norway the allies didn't lose that battle, it was given away.

Mosul could have been attacked a month or 2 ago - "Cut the head of the Serpent" even if it meant U.N. Units........... but I would not use U.S. Units.

ISIS has been moving around doing stabbing attacks then fall back to ISIS held areas. These pin pricks have at times been more than pin pricks, and end up like Tikrit, Mosul, Raqqa, each city fell because there was no effective quick deployment strategies. At least not an effective one. If the American Generals wont help put it together, than Iraq needs to find a partner who can assist in the implementation of a effective response. For best effect America can make good use of the Air Force, look back at the "Berlin Airlift". Humanitarian aide and Troop transport, & aerial attacks on forces that follow suicide attacks, It must be a large scale endeavor, as told in every COIN (counterinsurgency)  story book, but almost never implemented.

I saw one ISIS post bragging that a ethnic Sunni tribe of 9 million has signed on with ISIS, eeeeerrrr NOT !....

More like a peace treaty that reads "We won't kill your Sheiks if you let us run everything". also if their is 9 million in that tribe I bet only 1-3 million in Iraq (rest in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, & elsewhere.) of 3 million how many soldiers can you get?

The answer is about 20,000 to 40,000 by my estimates another 10-20k accidental guerrillas, but you also  get a 10 x that in people who they can tax and control who works and who doesn't, they get into everything, people hate these guys, for good reason. People flee towns when ISIS comes knocking they don't cheer.. As long as that metric remains true, than the enemy has not only lost the battle, but they have lost the War.

I am not sure who is running the Overall Military "show" in Iraq, but they should be fired. If we don't even attempt to effectively counter the enemies abilities, strategies, and tactics, then we have lost the Battle, and the enemy will continue to gain ground, loot, kill rape, destroy history, etc.

ISIS strategy = Piss off non Muslims and non Sunni Arabs get into a fight for land and politics and minerals, make Money (prob #1 on their list) tax, tax, tax, also they sell electricity, gas, &water to Syrian Gov. Now in Iraq they can sell water to Iraqi Gov.with their Dam at Ramadi, of course looting is another activity they love to do, rape pillage etc etc, Their online strategy is mostly aimed at requirement, indoctrinator (making it look cool to some disenfranchised youth or some psycho
ISIS Tactics = Fast attacks on Mass, lots of very large suicide tanker bombs, at start of battle many other various suicide Attucks to target individuals sheiks and communities,, kill scholars, any highly educated and looked up to figures kill or their possessions, kill any brave outspken people asap, after that the remaining citizens will pretty much do what you say and pay your tax, they know they will be punished if they don't. The money is used to fun "Global JIhad". This was a strategy that al Qaeda had been pursuing long before ISIS.

Coalitions Strategy = Sit wait and think of a really cool plan !!! (while the walls fall in)
Coalition Tactics = Wait until the enemy has had time to piss off the locals and find some really cool hiding places !!! they will tunnel and they love to set up lots of IEDs. SO expect Huge loses - because you waited till the enemy had time to dig in, also higley restrict your air force from even thinking about hitting any targets, unless Some overworked guy okays it. I say over worked guy. Because from the number of strikes I see it must be a one man show. We need thousands of people in that endeavor alone. hundreds of eyes in the skies, and thousands of eyes on the ground. If we do have that, then someone onm top must be sitting on his hands. - by Ian Bach June 5, 2015
Quick Reaction Force ww2
Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G.S By Richard W. Harrison

Syria shoots down a US drone

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Damascus (AFP) - Syria's military shot down a US drone over the coastal province of Latakia, a stronghold of President Bashar al-Assad, state media said on Tuesday.

If confirmed, it would be the first time that Syrian forces have attacked a US aircraft since the coalition fighting the Islamic State began raids against the jihadist group in Syria in September.The US military confirmed that it had lost communication with an unarmed Predator drone over northwest Syria on Tuesday and was looking into the claims it was brought down.

The claim came as activists said Syrian regime forces had carried out an attack using chlorine gas that killed six people, including three children.

Syrian state news agency SANA reported the apparent downing of a US drone in a breaking news alert.

"Syrian air defences brought down a hostile US surveillance aircraft over north Latakia," it said, without providing further details.

While Syria is not participating in the air strikes against the IS, it has so far refrained from taking action against aircraft involved in the US-led coalition's operations to take out the extremist group.

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A Syrian man breathes with an oxygen mask following an alleged regime gas attack on the village of S …

Damascus has said it was given prior warning before the coalition began the strikes, and Foreign Minister Walid Muallem said last year that Washington had pledged its raids would not hit the Syrian army.

The strikes in Syria have largely been focused on Aleppo and Raqa provinces, where the Islamic State has strongholds.

But the campaign has also targeted the group elsewhere, and hit positions believed to belong to fighters affiliated with Al-Nusra Front, the feared Syrian wing of Al-Qaeda.

IS fighters have been largely absent from the northwestern province of Latakia, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a Britain-based monitor.

But Al-Nusra fighters are active in the province, which is home to the Assad family's ancestral village and is a bastion of the Alawite sect of Shiite Islam to which the president belongs.

According to the Observatory, the strikes have killed more than 1,600 people, most of them jihadists.

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A young man sits on a bed on March 17, 2015 at a clinic in the village of Sarmin, southeast of Idlib …

- Gas attacks 'war crimes' -

Elsewhere in war-ravaged Syria, activists and the Observatory reported at least six people had been killed in an alleged regime gas attack.

The overnight incident in Idlib, in the northwest, prompted outrage from rights group Amnesty International, which said it was further evidence of government "war crimes."

"Three children, their mother and father, and their grandmother suffocated to death after regime barrel bomb attacks," the Observatory said.

The monitor said doctors in the village of Sarmin, southeast of Idlib city, concluded that the manner of death indicated a gas, possibly chlorine, had emitted from the barrel bombs.

Activists in Sarmin said chlorine gas had been used and posted videos of a chaotic field hospital where disoriented victims coughed and held gas masks over their faces as children cried in the background.

A paramedic interviewed by an AFP journalist said first responders rushed to the scene unprepared.

"This is the first time we've experienced a poison gas attack," Motea Jalal said.

"We grabbed the masks we had. They are for fires, not for gas attacks, but that's what is available."

He told AFP paramedics retrieved the wounded and tried to wash the chemicals from the bodies, adding that more than 100 people were in need of treatment.

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons said in January it had "confidence" that chlorine gas had been used in attacks on three villages in 2014.

It did not assign responsibility, but its report noted that witnesses heard helicopters before the attack, which only government forces possess.

Bombs Away! War In Iraq Could Mean $1.5 Billion Windfall for Defense Contractors

Wars are expensive, and America’s war against ISIS is no exception.

When we last looked at the cost of U.S. support for the fight against ISIS n Iraq and Syria, in early October 2014, I estimated that the U.S. had spent about $800 million, and was on track to spend billions of dollars more as the war dragged on. The latest numbers quoted by The Atlantic, relying on data reported by Reuters and estimates from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, confirm this.

From Aug. 8 through Dec. 11, the U.S. spent $1.02 billion on combat operations against ISIS, and is spending at the rate of $8.1 million per day, according to The Atlantic. Much of that money was spent on weapons being drawn down from existing Pentagon inventory. A new report from Defense One, though, suggests the cost of the war is about to more than double.

I’ll see your $1 billion, and raise you $1.5 billionOver the past six months, the U.S. military and its allies have struck nearly 2,700 targets in Iraq, deploying more than 3,000 bombs and missiles in the process — primarily Joint Direct Attack Munitions manufactured by Boeing  (NYSE: BA  ) , and Hellfire missiles built by Lockheed Martin  (NYSE: LMT  ) . Sounding the alarm that the U.S. might not have “enough bombs and missiles to continue striking Islamic State strongholds in Iraq and Syria,”Defense One reported last week that not only the “U.S. military,” but also those of our allies, are “re-evaluating the size of their bomb stockpiles.”

Over six months’ time, the Pentagon has dropped thousands of JDAMs on ISIS targets. Photo: Boeing.

According to Lt. Gen. James Holmes, Air Force deputy chief of staff for strategic plans and requirements, while the U.S. isn’t yet “running out of weapons,” it is “using weapons at a pretty good rate in northern Iraq and in Syria.” Pretty soon, it will be necessary to replenish the stockpiles. In fact, Pentagon acquisitions chief Frank Kendall went so far as to say that “obviously they have to be replaced.”

At last report, the U.S. Air Force had requested $559 million in funding to purchase nearly 13,000 Joint Direct Attack Munitions, and a further $700 million to buy 5,567 Hellfire missiles — and that’s just one military branch. Last month, the U.S. Army awarded Lockheed a $144 million contract to build 2,060 Hellfiresfor U.S. allies Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Australia — several of which are assisting with the fight against ISIS.

The month before that, the Navy placed a $139 million order with Raytheon (NYSE:RTN  ) to supply it with 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles. (Which we can use up pretty quick. On the first day of combat operations against ISIS in Syria, for example, the Navy expended 47 Tomahawks — at $1.4 million a pop).

Tally up all these costs, and the price of replacing ordnance expended already tops $1.5 billion — and this isn’t even a complete list. For example, word has it Navy fighter jets also use bombs and missiles on occasion.

What it means for investorsIf this cost helps to save innocent lives in countries threatened by ISIS, to protect world cultural heritage sites from ISIS bulldozers, and to defend U.S. interests in the region, it may be worth the money.

From an investor’s perspective, though, news of the massive increase in weapons purchases needed to keep the bombs dropping on ISIS means just one thing: additional revenue streams pouring into munitions makers Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon. But how much additional revenue are we talking about here?

Well, crunching the data from S&P Capital IQ, we come up with combined annual revenue of $159.2 billion annually for Boeing, Lockheed, and Raytheon. Just the weapons purchases that we know about amount to about a 1% increase in overall revenue at these defense contractors. When you consider that analysts only project about 10%-ish annual growth from these companies going forward, a 1% increase is already enough to move the needle on these businesses.

What’s more, Pentagon acquisitions chief Kendall said, in his view at least, “We’re engaged in a conflict now that will probably go on for some time.” So $1.5 billion could be just the beginning.

For investors in these companies, it could be a very profitable beginning indeed.

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That’s why on April 1st, Motley Fool co-founder and CEO Tom Gardner will commit to back one of three “Outsider-esque” stocks in his personal Everlasting Portfolio (a portfolio that consists of the only public stocks he currently owns… and the only stocks he will ever own in the future) that he manages within The Motley Fool’s premier, all-access service – Motley Fool ONE.

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One single Hellfire missile can give ISIS a very bad day. So what will 5,567 Hellfires will do? Photo:Wikimedia Commons.

Rich Smith owns shares of Raytheon Company. You can find him on CAPS, publicly pontificating under the handle TMFDitty, where he’s currently ranked No. 293 out of more than 75,000 rated members.

COIN US Army Manual – Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations

from The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be Counterinsurgency (COIN) presents a complex and often unfamiliar set of missions and considerations. In many ways, the conduct of COIN is counterintuitive to the traditional U.S. view of war—although COIN operations have actually formed a substantial part of the U.S. military experience. Some representative paradoxes of COIN are presented here as examples of the different mindset required. These paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit it. The applicability of the thoughts behind the paradoxes depends on a sense of the local situation and, in particular, the state of the insurgency. For example, the admonition “Sometimes, the More Force Used, the Less Effective It Is” does not apply when the enemy is “coming over the barricades”; however, that thought is applicable when increased security is achieved in an area. In short, these paradoxes should not be reduced to a checklist; rather, they should be used with considerable thought. Ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations must be conducted, risk shared with the populace, and contact maintained. The effectiveness of establishing patrol bases and operational support bases should be weighed against the effectiveness of using larger unit bases. (FM 90-8 discusses saturation patrolling and operational support bases.) These practices ensure access to the intelligence needed to drive operations. Following them reinforces the connections with the populace that help establish real legitimacy. Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is Any use offeree produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. The more force applied, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. In contrast, using force precisely and discriminately strengthens the rule of law that needs to be established. As noted above, the key for counterinsurgents is knowing when more force is needed—and when it might be counterproductive. This judgment involves constant assessment of the security situation and a sense of timing regarding insurgents’ actions. The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted This paradox is really a corollary to the previous one. As the level of insurgent violence drops, the requirements of international law and the expectations of the populace lead to a reduction in direct military actions by counterinsurgents. More reliance is placed on police work, rules of engagement may be tightened, and troops may have to exercise increased restraint. Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more risk to maintain involvement with the people. Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction Often insurgents carry out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose of enticing counterinsurgents to overreact, or at least to react in a way that insurgents can exploit—for example, opening fire on a crowd or executing a clearing operation that creates more enemies than it takes off the streets. If an assessment of the effects of a course of action determines that more negative than positive effects may result, an alternative should be considered—potentially including not acting. Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot Counterinsurgents often achieve the most meaningful success in garnering public support and legitimacy for the HN government with activities that do not involve killing insurgents (though, again, killing clearly will often be necessary). Arguably, the decisive battle is for the people’s minds; hence synchronizing IO with efforts along the other LLOs is critical. Every action, including uses of force, must be “wrapped in a bodyguard of information.” While security is essential to setting the stage for overall progress, lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation, and restored hope. Particularly after security has been achieved, dollars and ballots will have more important effects than bombs and bullets. This is a time when “money is ammunition.” Depending on the state of the insurgency, therefore, Soldiers and Marines should prepare to execute many nonmilitary missions to support COIN efforts. Everyone has a role in nation building, not just Department of State and civil affairs personnel. The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than us doing it well It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done. Where the United States is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable HN leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant U.S. support. The longer that process takes, the more U.S. public support will wane and the more the local populace will question the legitimacy of their own forces and government. General Creighton Abrams, the U.S. commander in Vietnam in 1971, recognized this fact when he said, “There’s very clear evidence, … in some things, that we helped too much. And we retarded the Vietnamese by doing it. … We can’t run this thing. … They ’ve got to run it. The nearer we get to that the better off they are and the better off we are.” T.E. Lawrence made a similar observation while leading the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1917: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.” However, a key word in Lawrence’s advice is “tolerably.” If the host nation cannot perform tolerably, counterinsurgents supporting it may have to act. Experience, knowledge of the AO, and cultural sensitivity are essential to deciding when such action is necessary. If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next Competent insurgents are adaptive. They are often part of a widespread network that communicates constantly and instantly. Insurgents quickly adjust to successful COIN practices and rapidly disseminate information throughout the insurgency. Indeed, the more effective a COIN tactic is, the faster it may become out of date because insurgents have a greater need to counter it. Effective leaders at all levels avoid complacency and are at least as adaptive as their enemies. There is no “silver bullet” set of COIN procedures. Constantly developing new practices is essential. Tactical success guarantees nothing As important as they are in achieving security, military actions by themselves cannot achieve success in COIN. Insurgents that never defeat counterinsurgents in combat still may achieve their strategic objectives. Tactical actions thus must be linked not only to strategic and operational military objectives but also to the host nation’s essential political goals. Without those connections, lives and resources may be wasted for no real gain. Many important decisions are not made by generals Successful COIN operations require competence and judgment by Soldiers and Marines at all levels. Indeed, young leaders—so-called “strategic corporals”—often make decisions at the tactical level that have strategic consequences. Senior leaders set the proper direction and climate with thorough training and clear guidance; then they trust their subordinates to do the right thing. Preparation for tactical-level leaders requires more than just mastering Service doctrine; they must also be trained and educated to adapt to their local situations, understand the legal and ethical implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and sound judgment in accordance with their senior commanders’ intent.

Copyright notice: Excerpt from pages 47-51 of The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual by the United States Army and United States Marine Corps, published by the University of Chicago Press. (Footnotes and other references included in the book may have been removed from this online version of the text.) United States Army and United States Marine Corps The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual With Forewords by General David H. Petraeus and Lt. General James F. Amos and by Lt. Colonel John A. Nagl. With a New Introduction by Sarah Sewall. ©2007, 472 pages, 30 figures, 33 tables Paper $15.00 ISBN: 978-0-226-84151-9 (ISBN-10: 0-226-84151-0) For information on purchasing the book—from bookstores or here online—please go to the webpage for The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. See also: John A. Nagl’s foreword to the University of Chicago Press edition of The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam by John A. Nagl Instructions for American Servicemen in Iraq during World War II with a foreword by John A. Nagl Our catalog of history titles Our catalog of books about war and remembrance Other excerpts and online essays from University of Chicago Press titles Sign up for e-mail notification of new books in this and other subjects Read the Chicago Blog

Kobani: The City That Stood Up To ISIS | msnbc

This video shows Kobani and proves the ISIL claims to be false. Kobane is alive and well and it is pushing the ISIL militants back and out of their dear city. I was a little ticked off at the reporter when he said that the Kobani will prove the US strategy is working. That is BS the US Turkey saudi Arabia all could not care less if Kobani fell. The thing that saved this city was the fact people could sit in safety across the boarder in Turkey and watch the fight close up. Turkey got to the point they actually kicked everyone out of the area. Apparently Turkey was hoping to stop all the reports and reporters. But that didn't work, eventually people saw how brave these people are and realized we need to help. While dropping one or two bombs here and there ( 2 months too late) may kill a couple ISIL fighters once in a while. The real heros are the Kurds and those who have gone there and are there on the ground doing the real work. - Ian Bach


Long live the Kurdish Nation, long live ayn al Arab

Photos of the Kobani defense against ISIL

Here is a good link for some photos from the front lines.

http://www.voanews.com/media/photogallery/syria-turkey-islamic-state-october-26-2014/2496944.html

and here is another

In pictures: Fighting between Kurds and ISIS intensifies in Kobani

 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-in-kobani-us-loses-patience-with-turkey-and-resupplies-kurdish-fighters-by-plane--then-ankara-allows-reinforcements-through-9807183.html

INSURGENCY: VIET-NAM 1962-1963

http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD422952&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
INSURGENCY: VIET-NAM 1962-1963
* James Farmer - Rand Corp.
August 1963
Unclassified

Serbia and Kosovo

While all this is going on the U.N. has continued its efforts to help secure an independent state in Kosovo. This is causing tensions between the U.N., E.U., U.S., and Russia. Russia is backing Serbia in its goal for Kosovo to remain a part of Serbia. While Kosovo’s 90% majority Albanian population want an independent state (nation). This is likely to be a hot spot for some time now. Also if Serbia and Russia continue on their path battles are likely to occur. At the least this is a tense situation, with both sides rolling dice. – Ian Bach

Click here for History of Kosovo

Click here for CIA World Factbook - Serbia

Serbia PM, Kosovo President Get Green Light To Address UN

UNITED NATIONS (AP)--Serbia's prime minister and Kosovo's president got a green light Friday to present their opposing views on the future status of Kosovo to the U.N. Security Council next week.

The council's 15 members agreed that Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica would speak as the representative of his country and Kosovo's president, Fatmir Sejdiu, would speak in his private capacity at a closed council meeting, said Italy's U.N. Ambassador Marcello Spatafora, the current council president.

Since last week, the council has been discussing the format for the Dec. 19 meeting behind closed doors. The key issue has been whether to allow Sejdiu, who doesn't represent a country, to speak, and if so under what conditions.

The council meeting will focus on a report by U.S., European Union and Russian mediators in two-year talks between Belgrade and Kosovo on resolving the status of the Serbian province. The talks ended in late November without an agreement. (Click here for entire article)

Turkey's Air Stikes in Iraq

I have included some mainstream media Links and excerpts below. For a brief background on the problem one must look back in history.

History - Ancient period

Recognition of the existence of a Kurdish land goes back even as far as Sumerian Cuneiform Tablets, dating from about 3000 BC, which speak of the land of the Kurds.^[10]

Much of Kurdistan corresponds roughly with the ancient Kingdom of Gutium (Qurti), which is mentioned in cuneiform records about 2400 BC, and had its capital at Arraphkha (modern Kirkuk).^{[11] (wikipedia)}

^{Modern period}

^{In the 16th century, the Kurdish-inhabited areas were split between Safavid Iran and the Ottoman Empire after prolonged wars. The first important division of Kurdistan occurred in the aftermath of the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514. This division was formalized in the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639.[17] Before World War I, most Kurds lived within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire in the province of Kurdistan. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Allies agreed and planned to create several countries within its former boundaries. Originally Kurdistan, along with Armenia, was to be one of them, according to the never-ratified Treaty of Sèvres. However, the reconquest of these areas by Kemal Atatürk and other pressing issues caused the Allies to accept the renegotiated Treaty of Lausanne, accepting the border of the modern Republic of Turkey and leaving the Kurds without a self-ruled region. Other Kurdish areas were assigned to the new British and French mandated states of Iraq and Syria under both treaties.}

^{The Kurdish delegation made a proposal at the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1945, showing the geographical extent of Kurdistan as claimed by the Kurds. This proposal encompasses an area extending from the Mediterranean shores near Adana to the shores of the Persian Gulf near Bushehr, and it includes the Lur inhabited areas of southern Zagros.[18][19]}

^{Since World War I, Kurdistan has been divided between several states, in each of which Kurds are minorities. At the end of the First Gulf War, the Allies established a safe haven in northern Iraq. Amid the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from three northern provinces, Iraqi Kurdistan emerged as an autonomous entity inside Iraq, with its own local government and parliament in 1992.}

^{Current Events}

^{Given the historical events it is likely there are many (including me) who are sympathetic to the thought of a re-united Kurdish Nation. Yet one must concede that in present time this would create a weakened Iraq and unstable environment in Turkey and the region. Also the PKK has been identified as a militant terrorist organization, not a political movement. It is the action the PKK uses that gives it this designation as a terrorist organization. Therefore we are not likely to see anyone other than the PKK backing any such military moves.}

^{The only way a re-united Kurdistan could occur is through a politic movement, not a military one. The main host countries that now occupy once Kurdish lands include Syria, Iran, and Turkey. These host countries are not likely to give up valuable lands of strategic economic and political importance. Some estimates I have read estimate approximately 75% of the Kurdish population in the host countries live not in the Kurdish areas, but rather in the cities and capitals of the host countries. - Ian Bach}

^{Turkey's air strikes in Iraq Kurdish Areas.}

^{Time Magazine writes:
(by Andrew Purvis)}

^{"The official U.S. line is that Washington did not approve Turkey's Sunday air strike on Kurdish targets in northern Iraq. But the U.S. does control the skies over Iraq and the Pentagon did open airspace over Iraq for at least three hours to Turkish warplanes. It was also informed of the raids beforehand, according to an American spokesperson in Ankara. "By opening its airspace, America gave its approval to the operation," Turkish General Yasar Buyukanit said"……..(Click here for the entire article)}

“The Turkish government had been threatening to send its own troops across the border to crack down on PKK bases inside Iraq since last October's attacks on Turkish troops. Washington and Baghdad at the time urged restraint, fearing that a large-scale incursion into Iraq by Turkish troops would trigger a broader clash not with the PKK but with soldiers under the command of the Iraqi Kurdish administration, thus destabilizing the one part of Iraq that has managed to avoid civil conflict so far.”

“The PKK has been waging a separatist campaign against Turkish security forces since the 1970s, most recently attacking Turkish targets from bases within Iraq. On Sunday, the PKK said five of its militants were killed; according to Iraqi officials, at least one woman civilian was killed as well. Meanwhile, hundreds have been forced to flee their homes.”