Life under ISIS In Mosul Takes A Turn For The Bleak

Thousands of Sunni Arabs from Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, escaped to Erbil at the end of the summer when the militants of the self-proclaimed Islamic State first overran the city and imposed a draconian social code.

Among them is a man we'll call the professor -- he, his wife and their children fled Mosul in August. He doesn't want his name published because his extended family still lives there under ISIS control.

The professor now lives in Erbil, at the Motel Delicious, a seedy place despite the enticing name, with parakeets in the lobby and every room packed with his neighbors from Mosul.

"I think ISIS is losing now," says the professor.

He and others from Mosul are all watching for signs that their city will be the next target of an Iraqi government assault to oust ISIS from major urban areas seized by the militants last summer. The professor says that ISIS is more paranoid than they were when the militant group first entered the city in June. Six months ago, they blew up the cell phone towers around the city. Now, his relatives can only call late at night, standing on roof tops to catch distant signals. Recently, ISIS shut down all the escape routes out of the city.

"So dangerous to try to get of Mosul now," he says, based on reports from his sisters still in Mosul.

Getting out was never easy. Residents could go for hospital treatments and education, but they had to pledge to return, handing over documents for cars and houses as a guarantee. These days, even that deal has been called off.

"Nowadays, they forbid everything. No one can get out of Mosul," he says.

The only way is by paying a smuggler, but even those routes are dangerous due to coalition bombings.

It's a city where beheadings and floggings became routine, and people believed to be heretics, like the Yazidis, a religious minority in Iraq, could be sold as slaves. Smoking is forbidden and women must be completely covered from head to toe. Lately, even their eyes must be covered. Despite the harsh social rules, the markets remain full. Produce is brought in from Syria and sellers set up shop from the back of the trucks, he says.

"Everything is available there, and people are still taking salaries from the government," he says. "Maybe at least 30, 40 percent of people are still taking salaries." Iraqi officials confirm Baghdad spends up to $16 million a month on the government payroll in Mosul. But ISIS taxes the wages and takes a cut, say Western diplomats.

Daily life is increasingly grim. Fighters are on edge as coalition airstrikes hit ISIS military bases and convoys. Some ISIS fighters have retreated to Mosul from the nearby battlefront in Tikrit, where the government launched the first major assault against ISIS. Other fighters are pulling out of Mosul to head for the relative safety of Syria.

Other ISIS fighters are pulling out of Mosul to head for the relative safety of Syria. The professor's relatives report there is tension between the local Iraqis and the foreign fighters. "I saw them fighting -- Iraqi's local and the foreigners," he says. "Some of the foreigners started to take their families and travel outside -- and the local fighters reject."

On Tuesday, across Mosul, Iraqi government planes dropped 2 million leaflets promising liberation soon.

"Your armed forces are close to you, and they are ready to participate with you in defeating ISIS," was the message on the floating papers. But that seems unlikely. The Iraqi army is far from ready for an assault on Iraqi's second largest city. The first assault on ISIS in Tikrit has stalled for more than a week. The forces leading that military campaign are primarily Iraq's Shiite militias, backed and trained by Iran.

And if they succeed?

"You bring in the military force, and you fight the terrorist there, you evict them. And then what?" asks Qubad Talabani, vice president of the Kurdish regional government. In other words, Iraq's militia may be able to take Tikrit, but it's unclear they will be able to hold it. Mosul will be even a more difficult and sensitive operation, Talabani says. The city is five times larger than Tikrit, with more than 1 million civilians, mostly Sunni Arabs, who welcomed ISIS when they first arrived, relieved to be rid of an oppressive Shiite-dominated government and army. Now, the Sunnis of Mosul are watching Shiite forces battling ISIS in Tikrit.

"That's the problem with the Tikrit operation, that it is a purely Shiite-led military operation against a heavily Sunni place of the country," Talabani says. "This is Saddam's birthplace here, with no political endgame anywhere in sight. Not for the people of Tikrit, not for the Sunnis of Iraq." The professor says attitudes in Mosul have changed after eight months of ISIS rule. Compared to those early months, ISIS is beginning to lose support day by day. "Every day, rejection is increasing," he says. But it's still not clear if a loss for ISIS is a win for the government of Baghdad. There is no political plan for broad reconciliation between Iraqi's Sunnis and Shiites as the push against ISIS #daeshbags in Tikrit and Mosul is on hold.

Iraqi, allied forces try to win back Tikrit, win over hearts and minds of residents

Tikrit, Iraq (CNN)While Iraqi government and allied forces were on the defensive Friday in Ramadi, they remained on the offensive in Tirkit — trying to win over not only the strategic city, but the hearts and minds of its nearby residents.

Iraqi forces steadily bombarded the last part of Tikrit still controlled by ISIS, with fighting described by one wounded man as intense. Still, even as it fends off this assault, the militant group continues with its barbaric tactics.

“Yesterday, bodies floated down the (Tigris) River from the hospital,” said Saber Kraidi, an eight-year Iraqi military veteran. “They were people from Tikrit executed by ISIS.”

The Iraqi military is joined by some Sunni fighters and a predominantly Shiite militia, working together to retake the city best known to most Westerners as the hometown of former dictator Saddam Hussein.

Sunni fighter: Tikrit will be ISIS’ graveyard 02:38

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They are working on not just winning the battle, but securing the peace. Members of the Badr organization, a powerful Shiite armed group, handed out food and supplies Friday to residents of the Sunni village of Albu Safah, whose 30 families have been holed up the last 10 months amid the fighting.

The village’s leader, Haji Jamid, said the Shiite fighters’ efforts were working.

“They’re good,” Jamid said. “If someone is sick, they’ll take them to the doctor, even at 2 or 3 in the morning.

“If it weren’t for them, ISIS would have slaughtered us.”

After Tikrit, will Mosul be next?

In June, Tikrit fell to ISIS, which has conquered large areas of Iraq and Syria and claimed them as part of its Islamic caliphate. There have several attempts to take it back since then, all of them failures.

The latest push began this month, involving around 30,000 fighters.

By Thursday, the government controlled about 75% of the besieged city, with about 150 holdout ISIS fighters controlling the rest, said Main Al-Kadhimi, commander of the Hashd Al-Shaabi militia.

There was no independent confirmation of such a significant advance by the Iraqi forces. But they have been making progress in recent days.

That includes gaining control of Tikrit Military Hospital, a few blocks south of the presidential palace, on Wednesday.

The goal is that, if Iraqi and allied forces can take Tikrit, then they’ll have more realistic hope of similarly winning back Mosul — a city that’s nearly 10 times bigger.

ISIS assaults Ramadi

Yet, even if ISIS is losing ground in Tikrit, that doesn’t mean it’s not a dangerous, destructive force elsewhere.

Case in point is happening about 100 miles south of Tikrit in Ramadi, which the extremist group began assaulting on Wednesday. Faleh al-Issawi, deputy head of the Anbar provincial council, has said officials believe the Ramadi assault “is an ISIS response to the Tikrit operation.”

Terror’s middle-class jihadists02:31

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More than 40 Iraqi soldiers died when ISIS blew up the Iraqi army headquarters near Ramadi in Iraq’s western Anbar province, an Anbar provincial leader told CNN on Friday.

ISIS fighters there dug a tunnel underneath the army headquarters and detonated hundreds of homemade bombs, Sabah Al-Karhout, the head of the Anbar Provincial Council, said Thursday. The headquarters are located in the Albu Diab area, just 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) north of Ramadi.

Al-Karhout denied reports that the U.S.-led coalition had bombed the headquarters. So, too, did the U.S. government, with its Baghdad embassy stating Friday that no coalition aircraft were even in the area

A statement released early Friday by the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS said the Iraqi security forces had successfully repelled the ISIS attack on Ramadi, despite coming under attack from several directions.

“The successful defense of Ramadi by Iraqi Security Forces is another example of their increasing ability to defeat Daesh in multiple locations and prevent the terrorist group from gaining ground,” said Lt. Gen. James L. Terry, the coalition force’s commander, using another name for ISIS.

“The ISF continues to hold terrain in some locations while making gains in others.”

In an audio message posted Thursday, ISIS spokesman Abu Mohammed al Adnani called reports of victories by coalition members against the extremist group “delusional and fake.”

He spoke of the coalition’s use of fighter jets, heavy artillery and tanks, saying it is a “nightmare and will go eventually.”

CNN’s Ben Wedeman reported near Tikrit in Iraq. CNN’s Kareem Khadder and Jamie Crawford contributed to this report.

Iraq militia leader hails Iran’s support

 In a battlefield interview near Tikrit, where Iraqi forces are fighting to retake Saddam Hussein’s hometown from the militants of the so-called Islamic State, commander Hadi al-Amiri criticized those who “kiss the hands of the Americans and get nothing in return.”

Iraqi forces entered Tikrit for the first time Wednesday from the north and south. On Friday, they waged fierce battles to secure the neighborhood of Qadisiyya and lobbed mortar shells and rockets into the city center, still in the hands of IS militants. Iraqi military officials have said they expect to reach central Tikrit in two to three days.

The Iranian-backed Shiite militias have played a crucial role in regaining territory from the Sunni extremists of the Islamic State group, supporting Iraq’s embattled military and police forces.

An Iraqi government official told The Associated Press that Iran has sold Baghdad nearly $10 billion in arms and hardware, mostly weapons for urban warfare like assault rifles, heavy machine-guns and rocket launchers. The official spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to brief the media.

In November, President Barack Obama authorized the deployment of up to 1,500 more U.S. troops to bolster Iraqi forces, which could more than double the total of American forces in Iraq to 3,100. The Pentagon has made a spending request to Congress of $1.6 billion, focusing on training and arming Kurdish and Iraqi forces. According to a Pentagon document prepared in November, the U.S. is looking to provide an estimated $89.3 million in weapons and equipment to each of the nine Iraqi brigades.

The U.S.-led coalition of eight countries has launched more than 2,000 airstrikes in Iraq alone since August 2014, and the U.S. is also hitting the militant group from the air in Syria. Iraqi and U.S. officials have acknowledged the role airstrikes have played in rolling back the militants, saying the air campaign was an essential component in victories at the Mosul Dam, in Amirli, and more recently, in the crucial oil refining town of Beiji.

But the U.S. is not taking part in the operation in Tikrit, with U.S. officials saying they were not asked by Iraq to participate.

Al-Amiri, the Shiite militia commander who also is head of the Badr Organization political party, said that “help from Iran is unconditional.”

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The battle for Tikrut

Jubbour rejected ISIS calls for them to Join ISIS

The Jabbour Tribe has been in battles with ISIS ever since. Now they are a key player in the Iraqi Governments battle to retake Tikrit i Northern Iraq. – I.B.

The only way for civilians to get to the town of Dhuluiya is by boat across the river Tigris, since the so-called Islamic State blew up the main bridge here and tribesmen battling them commandeered the other.

Steering through long reeds, we pull into a little dirt harbor. Here, about 60 miles north of Baghdad, is the home of a branch of the Jubbour tribe. They’re a big Sunni group in this agricultural area and they want to tell me how they’ve halted the advance of the Islamic State.

At first glance, the village seems lush. We bump along backstreets — “It’s safer,” they tell me — past houses with gardens full of pomegranate trees.

It’s really beautiful here, I say. But the men giving me a ride into town reply that it’s not all that beautiful right now, actually. We’re about two miles from the front line. The Islamic State fires maybe a dozen mortars a day at the town, and at the little boats chugging across the river.

 i

An Iraqi Sunni fighter holds a position during clashes with Islamic State group fighters in October the town of Dhuluiyah.

Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP/Getty Images

The nearest hospital is behind that front line, so they’ve converted a school into a makeshift clinic. It’s there that I meet senior men from the Jubbour tribe.

They crowd into a disused classroom and tell me how the Islamic State blazed down from the north in mid-June. The villages north of here are Sunni, where many feel oppressed by the Shiite-led government. Some allied with the Sunni militants. Others fought, and fell.

Until those militants reached Dhuluiya.

“Since that time, the fighting started, and everyone from third-grade students to sheikhs took part in it,” says Barzan Ahmad, a Jubbouri and a university professor. “Everyone raised their weapons.”

He says that after the fighting had been going on for two days, the militants proposed negotiations. So a delegation from the Jubbour tribe went to meet an Islamic State leader.

He ordered the Jubbouri to join them and to kill 30 members of their tribe — army officers and doctors — as punishment for working with the Shiite-dominated government of former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, which many Sunnis despised.

“They said, ‘We came to liberate you from this injustice and oppression caused by Maliki’s rule,’ ” says Ahmed.

The Jubbouris were outraged. Sheikh Mawloud Awad Hassoun says the tribe believes in peaceful co-existence. A lot of them are educated — engineers and lawyers.

Iraqi Sunni fighters secure an area during clashes with ISIS fighters in Dhuluiyah.

Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP/Getty Images

“We don’t see ourselves as slaughterers,” he says. So the tribe declined the offer to join the extremists and began fighting against them again.

In the chaotic hallway of this makeshift hospital, I meet Ahmed Issa, who joined the fight against the extremists — and lost his leg.

“They’re criminals,” he says. “They’re killers. If they enter your house, they are going to kill you.”

The war here is often deeply sectarian. The Shiite-led government recruits Shiite militias. Sunni tribes join with the Islamic State. But here, Shiite fighters from Balad, a town across the river, came to help out.

“We’ve become more than brothers,” says Issa. “What hurts them, hurts us, and what hurts us, hurts them.”

Fighting together, they pushed the militants back. It helped when Iraqi army helicopters hit some Islamic State positions. But they say they need more help from the government.

re captured by the Islamic State.

Muqdadiyah operations] section (2) Resistance League of the Righteous and the Iraqi army

#Iraq; More footage of ISF & Shia paramilitaries during the recent ops in Muqdadiya, #Diyala http://t.co/vg3rVRi7rt pic.twitter.com/4EOU8BMKQh

— الزعيم (@SumerRising) January 29, 2015

What about the Iraqi army? Is it possible for it to get it back into any kind of fighting shape?

It is in fighting shape. The problem was its senior leadership. And again, it’s what happens when the United States disengages. If you look at it from former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s perspective, with Iraq’s history of military coups, his own coming of age as a member of a sectarian and persecuted political party, you are going to see an enemy behind every bush.

When he chose his commanders, he didn’t choose them on the basis of their leadership capability or their battlefield experience. It was loyalty. Could he be absolutely certain that they would never turn against him?

[Maliki] put individuals with no command ability [and who] were not a threat to him into command positions—when you look at what happened in June, it wasn’t the rank and file that broke first, it was the leadership. Division commanders suddenly decided they needed to be in Baghdad before they ever engaged with ISIS.

Iraqis have a strong military tradition. They’ve got good soldiers. They need good leadership. And clearly, the current government is aware of that. We’re in a position to help to get the right commanders in the right places, to serve their troops and their country well.

The Iraqi military is not rotten to the core. It was rotten at the top. - Ryan Croker

(Read More: Fight the Islamic State in Iraq? Sure. In Syria? Not So Much)

Syria residents Surveyed - Know the Facts !

Full Article is HERE

The report was developed by interviewing citizens in Aleppo, Syria on a monthly basis. It is a street block by street block analysis.

The citizens were asked a variety of questions such as:
Who do you think is the legitimate representative of the Syrian people?
Who provides security?
Where do people turn to settle their disputes, or in the event of a crime or theft?
Who controls the checkpoints?
How restrictive are the checkpoints?
How often do you let your children out of the home?
How frequent are crimes?

The report also focuses on:
Location of check points and road blocks
Location of bakeries
Price of bread
Access to electricity

I am currently still reviewing the report, and I will be writing several articles/blog posts with summaries, findings, and links to additional sources of reliable information/data regarding Syria.

So far I can state a few things in regards to Aleppo and Syria:

1. The center of Aleppo was not rebelling against the regime, so the rebels took the fight to those areas. The center of the city is now the most fought over and the residents movement is now very restrictive.
2. Regime forces control about 45% of Aleppo. The Syrian Air Force Intelligence oversees regime-controlled areas away from the front lines. The Republican Guard is deployed to protect some of Aleppo’s most tense front lines.
3. Bread in regime held areas is about 1/3rd to 1/5th the cost compared to rebel held areas.
4. 40% of the people feel that “no one” represents them,
5. Al Qaeda-affiliates remain strong in Aleppo. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ISIS controls 1/3rd of all opposition held neighborhoods. Their checkpoints are the most restrictive and........ READ MORE HERE 

Dr. David Kilcullen and Mr. Nate Rosenblatt of Caerus Associates who will provide a briefing on findings from what may be the most detailed, publicly available assessment of the ongoing conflict in Syria to date.

Findings are based on four months of in-depth, time-series research from within Aleppo, Syria’s largest, most diverse, and most economically relevant city. Today, Aleppo is one of the most divided cities in the country. Tomorrow, its future may resemble that of other, large, non-capital cities in post-conflict Middle Eastern states such as Libya’s Benghazi or Iraq’s Mosul.

Video Link HERE

'The Accidental Guerrilla': Dr David Kilcullen at ANU, June 09

Uploaded on Mar 14, 2010

The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One - recorded at The Australian National University, 1 June 2009.

In the first few years of the post-9/11 era, the established models for fighting small wars proved distressingly ineffective against resilient insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the insurgents fought Western armies to a stalemate, it was clear that a new approach was necessary. Dr David Kilcullen, a former Australian army officer, and one of the worlds most influential experts on guerrilla warfare, became a key architect of the Wests revamped military strategy. As the senior advisor to General David Patraeus in Iraq, Kilcullens revolutionary approach to counterinsurgency was an intellectual foundation for the Surge of 2007.

Kilcullen will uncover the face of modern warfare, illuminating both the global challenge, the War on Terrorism, and small wars across the world in Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia, Thailand, East Timor, and Pakistan. He will explain that todays conflicts are a complex hybrid of contrasting trends that America has tended to conflate, blurring the distinction between local and global struggles, and thereby enormously complicating our challenges. The West has continually misidentified insurgents with limited aims and legitimate grievances—accidental guerrillas—as members of a unified worldwide terror network. We must learn how to disentangle these strands, develop strategies that deal with global threats, avoid local conflicts where possible, and win them where necessary.

David Kilcullen is one of the worlds leading experts on guerrilla warfare and, rarely among his kind, has a PhD (UNSW) in political anthropology. He has served in every theatre of the War on Terror since 9/11 as special advisor for counterinsurgency to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, senior counterinsurgency advisor to General David Petraeus in Iraq, and chief counterterrorism strategist for the US State Department. He is a former Australian army officer with combat experience in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

Presented by the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (The Middle East and Central Asia).

Iyad Allawi

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Allawi at a ceremony for the transfer of governmental authority to the Iraqi Interim Government.

Dr. Iyad Allawi (Arabic: اياد علاوي Iyād `Allāwī) (born 1945) is an Iraqi politician, and was the interim Prime Minister of Iraq prior to Iraq's 2005 legislative elections. A prominent Iraqi political activist who lived in exile for almost 30 years, the politically secular Shia Muslim became a member of the Iraq Interim Governing Council, which was established by U.S.-led coalition authorities following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He became Iraq's first head of government since Saddam Hussein when the council dissolved on June 1, 2004 and named him Prime Minister of the Iraqi Interim Government. His term as Prime Minister ended on April 7, 2005, after the selection of Islamic Dawa Party leader Ibrahim al-Jaafari by the newly-elected transitional Iraqi National Assembly. As of January 2007, he appears to have left Iraq for the relative security of Amman and London, according to the New York Times' Damien Cave.

He continues to lead his Iraqi National Accord's party in the new Assembly, though its support was weak during legislative elections, and only polled 14 per cent of the vote.

A former Ba'athist, Allawi set up the Iraqi National Accord is today an active political party. In the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq the INA provided intelligence about alleged weapons of mass destruction to MI6. Allawi has lived about half of his life in the UK and retains British citizenship. His wife and children still live in Britain for their security. He survived an assassination attempt on April 20, 2005.

Allawi's name is sometimes rendered as Ayad Allawi the Iraqi pronunciation for Iyad.

Contents

Allawi's early life

Allawi was born in 1945 to a prominent Shia merchant family; his grandfather helped to negotiate Iraq's independence from Britain, and his father was an Iraqi Member of Parliament. He became involved in Ba'athism at a young age and organized against the government of Abdul Karim Qassim. In the 1960s, he studied at medical school in Baghdad and became friendly with fellow Ba'athist Saddam Hussein. He graduated high school from Baghdad College an American Catholic Jesuit high school, same as Ahmed Chalabi and Adil Abdul Mahdi.

Allawi is related to Ahmed Chalabi, another prominent former exile and now disgraced though somewhat rehabilitated U.S. ally, through his sister. Former minister of trade Ali Allawi is Chalabi's sister's son as well as Iyad Allawi's cousin. The relationship between Chalabi and Allawi has been described as alternating between rivals and allies.^[1] In addition, Nouri Badran, interim Minister of Interior, is married to Iyad Allawi's sister.^[2]

Early political career

In 1971, he moved to London in order to continue his medical education. He resigned from the Baath party in 1975, "having decided that Saddam was exerting too much control over it".^[3][4] Allawi himself states that he remained active in the international Ba'athist movement but had no ties to the Iraqi Ba'atist party.

At first Saddam, then Iraq's deputy president, pressured Allawi, who was in contact with senior military and party officers that were increasingly critical of Saddam, to rejoin the Ba'ath Party. In 1978, friends told Allawi that his name was on a liquidation list. In February 1978 Allawi was awoken in bed one night by an intruder in his Surrey home, who proceeded to attack him with an axe. The intruder left, convinced that Allawi was dead as he lay in a pool of blood. He survived the attempted murder, and spent the next year in hospital recovering from his injuries. His first wife, Athour, was also wounded in the attack and became mentally disturbed. It is presumed that the attack was an assassination attempt ordered by Saddam Hussein. [1] His wife then left him after this in fear of her life would once again be under threat.

The Iraqi National Accord

Iyad Allawi

While still recovering in hospital from the attack, Allawi started organising an opposition network to work against the government of Saddam Hussein. Through the 1980s he built this network, recruiting Iraqis while traveling as a businessman and for the UNDP. It is widely believed that he spent much of this period working for British intelligence.

In December 1990, Allawi announced the formation of the Iraqi National Accord (INA). Allawi's main partner in the INA was Salah Omar Al-Ali, a former member of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council and ambassador to the United Nations. Al-Ali eventually broke off his relations with Allawi when he learned of the latter's relationship with foreign intelligence agencies. The main sponsors of INA were the British, but they received secret backing from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States. The group consisted mainly of former military personnel who had defected from Saddam Hussein's Iraq to instigate a military coup. Allawi was recruited by the CIA in 1992 as a counterpoint to the more well-known CIA asset Ahmed Chalabi, and because of the INA's links in the Ba'athist establishment. Allawi's INA organised terrorist attacks in Iraq. This campaign never posed a threat to Saddam Hussein's rule, but was designed to test INA's capability to effect regime change. It is estimated to have caused up to 100 civilian deaths.^[5]

A military coup was planned for 1996, in which Iraqi generals were to lead their units against Baghdad and remove Saddam Hussein. The CIA supported the plot, code-named DBACHILLES, and added Iraqi officers that were not part of INA. The plan ended in disaster as it had been infiltrated by agents loyal to Saddam. US support was also questionable - requests by the CIA station chief in Amman for American air support were refused by the Clinton administration. Many participants were executed. Lands and factories belonging to the Allawi family were confiscated, even their graveyard in Najaf was demolished. According to Allawi, his family lost $250 million worth of assets. [2] US support for INA continued, receiving $6 million covert aid in 1996 and $5 million in 1995 (according to books by David Wurmser as well as Andrew and Patrick Cockburn).^[6]

Allawi channelled the report from an Iraqi officer claiming that Iraq could deploy its supposed weapons of mass destruction within "45 minutes" to British Intelligence.^[7] This claim featured prominently in the September Dossier which the British government released in 2002 to gain public support for the Iraq invasion. In the aftermath of the war, the "45 minute claim" was also at the heart of the confrontation between the British government and the BBC, and the death of David Kelly later examined by Lord Hutton. Giving evidence to the Hutton Inquiry, the head of MI6 Richard Dearlove suggested that the claim related to battlefield weapons rather than weapons of mass destruction.^[8]

Post-Saddam

Shortly after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (the "CPA") was established by the occupying forces in order to administer the country until sovereignty could be restored to the country. The CPA decided to establish a grouping of senior Iraqi politicians to carry out some administrative responsibilities, with a view to giving the occupation a more "Iraqi face". This grouping was referred to as the Governing Council, and was made up of 25 Iraqis that were appointed by the CPA. Allawi was one of those that were selected to serve on the Governing Council, and occupied the position Minister of Defence (although his real responsibilities in that regard were obviously limited considering Iraq remained under occupation). He held the rotating presidency of the interim governing council during October of 2003. In April 2004, Allawi reportedly resigned as head of the IGC security committee over concerns for US bombing of Fallujah, according to a letter published in INA's newspaper.^[9]

In December 2003, he flew to CIA headquarters in Langley together with fellow INA official Nouri Badran to discuss detailed plans for setting up a domestic secret service. The agency was to be headed by Badran, a former Ba'athist who served Saddam as an ambassador until 1990, and, controversially, recruit many agents of Saddam's Mukhabarat.^[10] When the Iraqi National Intelligence Service was set up in March 2004, its designated director was Mohammed Abdullah Mohammed al-Shehwani, another former Ba'athist exile with ties to INA.

Interim Prime Minister

On May 28, 2004, he was selected to be the Interim Prime Minister of Iraq to govern the country beginning with the United States' handover of sovereignty (June 30, 2004) until national elections, scheduled for early 2005. Although many believe the decision was reached largely on the advice of United Nations special envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, the New York Times reported that Brahimi only endorsed him reluctantly after pressure from U.S. officials. (In response to a question about the role of the U.S. in Allawi's appointment, Brahimi replied: “I sometimes say, I'm sure he doesn't mind me saying that, Bremer is the dictator of Iraq. He has the money. He has the signature. Nothing happens without his agreement in this country.”^[11] Two weeks later, Brahimi announced his resignation, due to "great difficulties and frustration". [3])

At the time of his nomination, Allawi was often described in the US mainstream media as a moderate Shia, a member of Iraq's majority faith, chosen for his secular, pro-American views. Later, as military situation in Iraq worsened and the death toll increased, coveraged became sometimes less flattering and included descriptions suggesting Allawi was Washington's puppet (e.g. Newsweek:"Iraq's New S. O. B." [4], NYT: "Dance of the Marionettes"^[12]). The BBC attributes his nomination to being "equally mistrusted by everyone" in Iraq.^[13] A secret document written in 2002 by the British Overseas and Defence Secretariat reportedly stated that within Iraq, Allawi was seen as "a western stooge" who "lacked domestic credibility". [5]

On June 28, 2004 (two days early), the U.S.-led coalition handed over power to Allawi and the Iraqi Interim Government, who were sworn in later that same day. After his interim government assumed legal custody of Saddam Hussein and re-introduced capital punishment, Allawi gave assurances that he would not interfere with the trial and would accept any court decisions. In an interview with Dubai-based TV station al-Arabiya he said: "As for the execution, that is for the court to decide — so long as a decision is reached impartially and fairly."^[14]

On July 17, two Australian newspapers, the Sydney Morning Herald [6], [7] and The Age [8], published an article alleging that one week before the handover of sovereignty, Allawi himself summarily executed six suspected insurgents at a Baghdad police station. The allegations are backed up by two independent sources^[15] and the execution is said to have taken place in presence of about a dozen Iraqi police, four American security men and Interior Minister Falah al-Naqib. Mr Allawi reportedly said that the execution was to "send a clear message to the police on how to deal with insurgents". Both Allawi's office and Naqib have denied the report. US ambassador John Negroponte did not clearly deny the allegations. Additionally, the allegations made by Sydney Morning Herald journalist Paul McGeough went largely unreported by mainstream American media. Iraq's Human Rights Minister Bakhtiar Amin pledged to investigate the allegations against his PM.[9] The stories were reported to have increased Allawi's reputation in Iraq as they convinced many that he had the fortitude to rule.

On July 18, Iraqi militants offered a $285,000 reward for anyone who could kill Iyad Allawi.^[16]

During the summer of 2004, Allawi made several controversial decisions. Most notably, his decision to support the invasions of both Najaf and Falluja made him extremely unpopular amongst Iraq's Shia and Sunni populations. He also announced the creation of General Security Directorate, a domestic spy agency, whose main role is to counteract terrorist groups and the Iraqi insurgency. He recruited some former agents of Saddam Hussein's secret police to form the General Security Directorate. He gave himself the powers to declare martial law.^[17] He closed the Iraqi office of al Jazeera and nominated Ibrahim Janabi, a former Ba'athist and Mukhabarat officer, to head the newly created media regulator. He also made moves to eliminate Muqtada al-Sadr from the scene.^[18]

Allawi led the Iraqi National Accord during the January 2005 Iraqi election. His campaign was mainly characterised by his attempt to improve his image, which had been seriously damaged as a result of his many unpopular decisions. His campaign reached a low point when he visited the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf on December 4, 2004, where a group of angry shia worshipers hurled their shoes at him. Later on, in a face saving statement, Allawi claimed that it was an assassination attempt, a claim that brought him much ridicule from Iraqis.^[19]

The INA polled a distant third, with 14% of the vote, suggesting a lack of domestic support for Allawi's rule. This was probably due to, among other factors, his past membership in the baath party, numerous allegations of corruption and of financial fraud when he was prime minister (arrest warrants have been issued for ministers in his administration), and a real perception among Iraqis, both Shia and Sunni, that he has a somewhat thuggish character, reminiscent of Saddam Hussain. While he tried to give his bloc influence in the new assembly, at times courting mavericks and independents for support, the INA had almost no impact on subsequent political developments in the country.

In preparation for the next parliamentary elections that took place in Iraq in December 2005, Allawi formed an alliance between many groups, including secular Sunni and Shia groups and the Iraqi communist party under one electoral list, which was referred to as the Iraqi national list. However, despite a slick advertising campaign, and despite high expectations, this list performed extremely poorly in the polls. It only managed to secure 25 seats in the national assembly, a net loss of 15 seats since the January 2005 elections.

Personal life

Allawi's first wife was named Athour. He divorced her in 1981 in the wake of the assassination attempt against him in 1978. He later remarried. His wife lives in London with their two daughters, born around 1988 and 1989, and son, born around 1996.^[20]

When he first came to England years ago he was married to an Iraqi catholic whose father was one of the top pilots in Iraq. He was attacked several times in England.^{[citation needed]}

References

1. ^ http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/05/29/1085641749684.html?from=storyrhs&oneclick=true
2. ^ http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=]
3. ^ http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/050124fa_fact1
4. ^ http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040628fa_fact
5. ^ Andrew Gilligan "The Strongman of Baghdad" in The Spectator 13 November 2004
6. ^ http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000085&sid=agdsULUSsCdo&refer=europe
7. ^ http://politics.guardian.co.uk/kelly/story/0,13747,1131993,00.html
8. ^ http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/09/16/1063625031302.html?from=storyrhs&oneclick=true
9. ^ http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000085&sid=agdsULUSsCdo&refer=europe
10. ^ http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A54518-2003Dec10&notFound=true
11. ^ http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2004/585/585p15.htm
12. ^ http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/26/opinion/26dowd.html?hp
13. ^ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3757923.stm
14. ^ http://www.abcnews.go.com/wire/World/ap20040706_164.html
15. ^ http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2004/s1155990.htm
16. ^ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3904151.stm
17. ^ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33260-2004Jul7.html
18. ^ http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5709446/site/newsweek/
19. ^ http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/12/04/iraq.main/]
20. ^ http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/050124fa_fact1

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to:

Iyad Allawi

• Personal website of Dr. Iyad Allawi - A vision for all
• Website of the National Iraqi List for Dec 15 2005 elections
• Website of the Iraqi National Accord
• Text of Allawi's Speech to U.S. Congress, 23 Septemper 2004
• Dow Jones Newswire, 24 January 2004
• Profile in The Guardian
• Ex-C.I.A. Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90's Attacks - The New York Times
• Profile on al-Jazeera
• Profile in The Times
• Profile in the New Yorker
• Short biography on middleeastreference.org.uk
• Disinfopedia entry
• Al-Sadr: Allawi team worse than Saddam (Aljazeera)
• Iraqi cleric slams war coverage under Allawi (Monday 23 August 2004, Aljazeera)
• The strongman of Baghdad (13. November 2004, The Spectator)
• Michael Howard: Ex-Iraqi defence minister wanted over $1bn fraud Warrant issued after army left with old weapons, Allawi regime blamed for lack of checks on ministry (The Guardian, September 20, 2005)
• Kirk Semple. Najaf mob tries to assassinate Iyad Allawi with shoes, New York Times, December 4, 2005.
• Iyad Allawi at the Notable Names Database