Various PDF files. Insightful and relative to Counterinsurgency and Counter Terrorism
Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of
Company-Level Counterinsurgency
by Dr. David Kilcullen, Lieutenant Colonel, Australian Army
Editorial Abstract: The author presents a tactical-level preparatory guide, based on lessons learned from personal campaign experience. He emphasizes the necessity of proper mental and situational preparation, and offers a series of recommendations for applying concepts and ideas in the real world of personal-level influence operations.
Victory Has a Thousand Fathers
Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency - RAND Corp.
Christopher Paul • Colin P. Clarke • Beth Grill
This research grew out of the sponsor’s desire to be able to evidence the historical contribution (or lack of contribution) of activities concordant with what is now referred to as strategic communication to the outcomes of counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. The method that the RAND Corporation proposed to answer this question—a combination of historical case studies and the qualitative comparative approach—was capable of answering a much broader set of questions about the contributions of a wider range of approaches to COIN with minimal additional effort. This research, then, reports on the demonstrated effectiveness of a variety of approaches to COIN (including strategic communication) through case studies of the world’s 30 most recent resolved insurgencies.
Corporations and Counterinsurgency - Rand Corp
Like nongovernmental organizations and private military companies, large multinational corporations (MNCs) can play significant roles in zones of violent conflict. Any comprehensive conflict analysis needs to understand these roles, especially as they relate to counterinsurgency. Using a set of three case studies, the authors explore MNC operations in Liberia, Papua New Guinea, and the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The case studies.......... An Evaluation of counterinsurgency as a Strategy for Fighting the Long War
Baucum Fulk
ABSTRACT - The single greatest national security question currently facing the U.S. National
Command Authority is how best to counter violent extremism. The National Command
Authority has four broad strategies through which it may employ military forces to
counter violent extremism: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, support to insurgency,
and antiterrorism. The Long War is anticipated to continue for decades, perhaps
generations. Thus, it is imperative to select the best strategy or strategies for employing
military forces. Based on historical lessons in combating terrorism, the best strategy is
efficient and sustainable and avoids overreacting, acting incompetently, or appearing to
be either over reactive or incompetent.
Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare
ROBERT R. TOMES
© 2004 Robert R. Tomes
Thirty years after the signing of the January 1973 Paris peace agreement
ending the Vietnam War, the United States finds itself leading a broad coalition
of military forces engaged in peacemaking, nation-building, and now
counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq. A turning point appeared in mid-October
2003 when US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s memo on the future
of Iraqi operations surfaced. His musings about whether US forces were
ready for protracted guerrilla warfare sparked widespread debate about US
planning for counterinsurgency operations.
Justin Lynch
It has been a challenging year for the Department of Defense. For more than a decade, Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan highlighted the need for a modern military to be able to operate in complex human terrain. But even as the military continued to fight in Afghanistan, it also faced the budgetary uncertainties of sequestration. In this fiscally constrained environment, even given current events, counterinsurgency may return to a low priority. The DoD has reached a decision point; it is undergoing a paradigm shift, deciding what its capabilities will be in the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It has been a challenging year for the Department of Defense. For more than a decade, Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan highlighted the need for a modern military to be able to operate in complex human terrain. But even as the military continued to fight in Afghanistan, it also faced the budgetary uncertainties of sequestration. In this fiscally constrained environment, even given current events, counterinsurgency may return to a low priority. The DoD has reached a decision point; it is undergoing a paradigm shift, deciding what its capabilities will be in the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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