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Showing posts with label lebanon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label lebanon. Show all posts

Saturday, March 21, 2015

Al Qaeda forces Druze of Idlib Syria to destroy their shrines and convert

The Jabal al-Summaq region in the Idlib province of northern Syria is home to nearly 18,000 Druze spread out amongst 18 villages, all of whom have been living under the control of  Jabhat a-Nusra (JAN), (the  Syrian Al Qaeda  branch)   for nearly two years.
An offshoot of  Islam, hardline Sunni groups such as JAN consider the Druze faith a form of heresy. Nusra gave the Druze in Idlib a choice: Convert or fight. They converted. Publicly, at least.
“They claimed they were fighting infidels, and that we had to decide our own fate and our identity, to either be with the Muslims, or the infidels,” Abdul Majid Sherif, a resident and retired math teacher who currently works as the head of the Media Office of the Free Democrats Party of Idlib, tells Syria Direct’s Moatassim Jamal.
“They forced us to accept their interpretation of Sunni Islam, or else we’d be punished,” Sherif says. “We reject their laws in principle, but follow them in public.”
This past February 1, JAN released a statement spelling out a series of obligations agreed to by Druze and JAN leaders in Jabal al-Summaq: The Druze would destroy their holy shrines, convert to Sunni Islam, force women to clothing Nusra believes to be in line with sharia law, among others.
The Druze agreed to Nusra’s conditions to ensure their own survival, Sherif says. “Jabhat a-Nusra is strong, so our leaders preferred that we remain under their protection. The FSA is weak, and with them we might end up being left on our own.”
Q: How does Jabhat a-Nusra treat the Druze in Jabal a-Summaq?
They treat us fairly for now. However don’t misinterpret what I’m saying as some form of propaganda; they only do so because we’ve agreed, at least on the surface, to comply with all their rules and regulations. We follow their orders so that they treat us well.
After JN kicked the Islamic State (IS) out of Idlib, they told us that they wouldn’t protect us unless we converted to Sunni Islam, prayed and issued an official statement saying that we’ve left the Druze faith. As of now they have yet to attack us. As long as we appear to be following their rules, they consider us ‘brothers’ in Islam.
Q: Did they ask that you destroy Druze shrines?
Yes. They’ve forced us to comply with a number of orders and decrees, including the destruction of our shrines. They dug up the tombs of a number of our saints, however we didn’t protest. They forced our women to wear strict orthodox Islamic garb, and to give up their traditional Druze clothing.
They’ve also threatened us saying that if the al-Hisbeh (sharia law) police found anyone on the street during prayer time, that that person be punished. Same for women who don’t follow the mandatory clothing requirements.
The worst is what they’ve done in schools. On Monday, they arrived in our village and separated all the male and female students, insisting that they be taught separately, and only by teachers of the same gender.
This has caused problems as we don’t have enough teachers to effectively accommodate these changes. For example we only had one math teacher, who was a female. There was no qualified male teacher that could replace her, so now the boys don’t study math. The opposite occurred with English classes. Our only English teacher is male, so now the girls don’t study English.
Q: On March 2, Walid Jumblatt, a prominent Lebanese Druze politician and leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, engaged in negotiations with JAN in the hopes of easing some of these strict laws imposed by JAN. Allegedly JAN agreed to do so as long as the Druze continued to adhere to Sunni Islam. Did anything come of that?
None of the terms of that agreement have been applied in practice, as far as we can tell. JAN continues to impose their strict interpretation of Islam upon us, forcing women to cover their faces, preventing men and women from mixing in public, and so forth.
When describing his position regarding JAN’s meeting with Jumblatt to Druze leaders in Jabal al-Summaq, Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Tunisi, a Tunisian and JAN’s emir in Jabal al-Sumaq, reportedly recited a well-known saying of the Prophet Mohammed, which he thought justified his position. The saying goes, “Even with the moon on my right shoulder and the sun on my left, I will not abandon my duty, or die without having it fulfilled.”
[The saying occurred when Mohammed sought to spread the word of Islam amongst non-believers in Mecca, some of whom supposedly offered him large sums of silver and gold to abandon his mission. In the above saying, the moon is representative of silver, and the sun of gold. It essentially means that Mohammad would not abandon his quest to proselytize for all the money in the world].
 Q: What do the Druze in Idlib think about Jabhat a-Nusra and the laws they impose?
We reject their laws in principle, but follow them in public. When it comes to solving disputes amongst ourselves we don’t bring our problems to Jabhat a-Nusra, we go to our sheikhs.
Q: If you reject their rules, why have you decided to continue living under their protection?
There’s nothing we can do. Those Druze who have left our villages had their property seized and confiscated, now they can never return. That’s why we’ve decided to stay here.
Q: What was Jabhat a-Nusra’s justification for imposing their laws on the Druze?
They claimed they were fighting infidels, and that we had to decide our own fate and our identity, to either be with the Muslims, or the infidels.
Q: What is it the Druze fear most about Jabhat a-Nusra?
There’s a lot that we fear. We fear that they might force our young men and women to marry outside the Druze faith. This could lead to the eventual destruction of our religion. They’re also attempting to promote polygamy among our young men, a practice we don’t support in our faith.
We also fear their ideas about jihad. They believe that jihad is mandatory for all Muslims, and that as such those of us who have converted to the Sunni sect must take up arms and fight. Many of their local leaders (Syrians) are less strict about this.
They appreciate the position we’re in, the fact that we’re neutral and don’t want to fight, and they often times exempt us from having to do so. However the foreign leaders are very strict. Abd al-Rahman al-Tunisi constantly issues laws and decrees of this nature. The local members serving underneath him make exceptions and exempt us from having to take part the fighting.
Q: How do the FSA and other battalions treat the Druze in Jabal al-Summaq?
FSA brigades also treated us well in the past, and tried to convince us to join with them previously saying they would protect us. However Jabhat a-Nusra is strong, so our leaders preferred that we remain under their protection. The FSA is weak, and with them we might end up being left on our own.
Q: What is the future of your relationship with Jabhat a-Nusra?
Despite everything we don’t believe that Jabhat a-Nusra will be around long. We can live with them for now until God frees us from their grasp. However if their rule were to last a long time, then all the previous things I mentioned would take effect permanently, that we wouldn’t be able to accept.
Q: How do Druze leaders and sheikhs deal with this situation?
Our leaders and sheikhs engage in negotiations with Nusra. Everything is done publicly, nothing is hidden. At the end of the day all they do is receive orders from Nusra and relay them to those in the villages.
Syria Direct

Monday, February 23, 2015

Private sponsors of international terrorism

Posted on June 29, 2014 by 

Voltaire Network
The Arab press is abuzz over a list of the major private donors to terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq. It was reportedly gleaned from an internal U.S. Department of State document.
1. Awad Ibrahim Bin Hamad, former university professor and businessman/Saudi Arabia
2. Sheikh Ibrahim Bin Abdul Rahman Ibrahim, head of the charity society Balouikilih/Saudi Arabia
3. Sheikh Ibrahim Bin Mohammad Al-Jarallah, university professor and businessman/Saudi Arabia
4. Dr. Ibrahim Bin Nasser Nasser, islamic preacher/Saudi Arabia
5. Dr. Ibrahim, director of studies at the university of Dakar/Senegal
6. Dr. Ahmad Abu Halabiya, president of the Association of islamic studies/Gaza-Palestine
7. Dr. Ahmed Raissouni, head of the unification and reform movement/Morocco
8. Sheikh Ahmed, islamist preacher/Mauritania
9. Dr. Ahmed bin Rashid bin Saeed, professor/Saudi Arabia
10. Dr. Ahmed Hussein Daddash, islamic preacher/Iraq
11. Mr. Ahmed Rateb, director of publishing house/Lebanon
12. Sheikh Adam, Noah, Adam, islamic preacher/Ghana
13. Sheikh Ejaz Afzal Khan, emir of the islamic community in Kashmir/Pakistan
14. Sheikh Amin khudair al-Janabi, islamic preacher/Iraq
15. Dr. Djillali Bozoinh, university professor/Algeria
16. Dr. Habib Adami, professor/Algeria
17. Sheikh Sadeq Abdallah Abdel Majid, islamic preacher/Sudan
18. Sheik Qazi Hussain Ahmed, emir of Jamaat-e-Islami/Pakistan
19. Prof. Boudjemaa Ayad, businessman/Algeria
20. Mr. Tawfiq, businessman/Lebanon
21. Dr. Jassem bin Mohammed bin Muslim Al-Yassin/Kuwait
22. Dr. Gamal Sultan, editor-in-Chief of Al-Manar news/Egypt
23. Mr. Jameel Mohammed Ali, businessman/Saudi Arabia
24. Dr. Harith Al-Dhari, islamic preacher, Solomon/Iraq
25. Sheikh Hafiz Abdul Rahman Makki, islamic preacher/Pakistan
26. Shaykh Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, emir of Jama’at-ud-Da’wah/Pakistan
27. Mr. Nader, Secretary General of the Salafi movement/Kuwait
28. Sheikh Hamed Al-Ali, university professor/Kuwait
29. Sheik Hijazi Al Wadia, islamic activist/Palestine
30. Sheikh Hassan Moussa, head of the Swedish Council of imams/Sweden
31. Mr. Hussein Rawashdeh, writer and journalist/Jordan
32. Dr. Hussein Bin Mohammad Machhour Al-Hazmi, university professor/Saudi Arabia
33. Sheikh Hussein Omar Mahfouz bin Shuaib, editor-in-Chief of Forum/Yemen
34. Sheikh Hussein Mousa Hussein, islamic preacher/Eritrea
35. Sheikh Hamdi Arslan, teacher at Fatih Mosque/Turkey
36. Sheikh Hamoud bin Abdul Aziz Al-tuwaijri, islamic preacher/Saudi Arabia
37. Dr. Khalid Bin Ibrahim Al-Daweesh, professor/Saudi Arabia
38. Sheikh Khader Habib, islamic preacher, Palestine
39. Sheikh Khalifa Bin Mohammad, islamic preacher/Qatar
40. Mr. Abdel Wahab, member of Derbal Renaissance movement/Algeria
41. Mr. Rabah, businessman/Algeria
42. Mr. Rashid Misfer Al Zahrani, islamic preacher/Saudi Arabia
43. Sheikh Rashid Haj, emir JI/Sri Lanka
44. Shaykh Reda Ahmed Hamdy, islamic preacher/Thailand
45. Sheik Ramadan Mohammed Nur, islamic preacher/Eritrea
46. Sheikh Zakaria Cisse, preacher and lecturer/Senegal
47. Mr. Zaki Saleh Al Nahdi, islamic preacher/Indonesia
48. Sheikh Sajid Ali, leader of the Islamic movement/Pakistan
49. Dr. Salem Al-Sagaf jiffri, head of the Indonesian Commission for the defence of the Afghan people – Director of the Advisory Board of Sharia/Indonesia
50. Sheikh Salim Abdel Rahim al-Barhian, islamic preacher/Kenya
51. Dr. Sami Rashid al-Janabi, islamic preacher/Iraq
52. Dr. Saud bin Hassan Mukhtar, university professor/Saudi Arabia
53. Mr. Saeed Morsi/Algeria
54. Dr. Saeed, president of the College of Imam Shafi’i/Comoros
55. Dr. bin Abdul Rahman Al-Hawali, islamic preacher/Saudi Arabia
56. Shaikh Salman Bin Fahd, islamic preacher/Saudi Arabia
57. Dr. Sulaiman bin Saleh Al-Rashudi, businessman/Saudi Arabia
58. Mr. Sulaiman bin Abdullah Al-Issa, businessman/Saudi Arabia
59. Sheikh Aurally, leader of Jui (Special)/Pakistan
60. Mr. Boutros-Ghali, islamic preacher/Senegal
61. Shaykh Shah Ahmed Noorani, leader of the Jamiat Ulema Pakistan, Senator/Pakistan
62. Mr. Shaher bin Abdul Raof Batterjee, businessman/Saudi Arabia
63. Sheikh Sharif Hussein, imam and preacher of the mosque of Omar Ibn Al-Khattab/Australia
64. Sheikh Imran bin Abdul Rahman Manai, islamic preacher/Bahrain
65. Dr. Sheikh Ahmed Limo, chairman of the Coordinating Council of Muslim organizations/Nigeria
66. Prof. Sheikh, islamic activist, PMP/Senegal
67. Sheikh Saleh bin Othman Al-Ghamdi, businessman/Saudi Arabia
68. Mr. Saleh Ali Saleh, islamic preacher/Eritrea
69. Dr. Tarek Saleh Jamal, professor/Saudi Arabia
70. Dr. Tarek Abdel Halim, director of Dar Al-Arqam/Canada
71. Dr. Taher Ahmed Loulou, islamic preacher, Palestine
72. Sheikh Taher Mahmoud Guelleh, director of radio Koran/Somalia
73. Sheikh Adel Al-Sheikh, islamic preacher/Bahrain
74. Dr. Adel Junaidi, islamic preacher, Hebron, Palestine
75. Dr. Ayesh Al-Kubaisi, islamic preacher/Iraq
76. Sheikh Abd El bare Zamzami, islamic preacher/Morocco
77. Sheikh Abdel Hay Amor, islamic preacher/Morocco
78. Mr. Azzedine, businessmen/Algeria
79. Dr. Ali, professor/Yemen
80. Sheikh, Chairman of the Council of Ulama Indonesia/Indonesia
81. Mr. Solomon Abu Mustafa, islamic preacher, Palestine
82. Dr. Awad al-Qarni, former university professor and attorney/Saudi Arabia
83. Shaikh Salahuddin Akendili, islamic preacher/Nigeria
84. Mr. Issa, islamic preacher/Senegal
85. Dr. Ghulam Azam, emir of Jamaat-e-Islami/Bangladesh
86. Sheikh Ghulam Rasool Dani, president of the islamic organization/Nepal
87. Sheikh Fatih, islamic preacher/pinyin
88. Dr. Fatima Barash, professor/Algeria
89. Dr. Fatma Al-Kunaifis, professor/Saudi Arabia
90. Mr. Fayez Saleh Jamal, writer and businessman/Saudi Arabia
91. Sheikh Freih bin Ali bin Turki, islamic activist and editor, attorney/Saudi Arabia
92. Sheikh Farid Al-Habib, islamic preacher/Saudi Arabia
93. Shaykh Fazlur Rahman, leader of the Jamiat Ulema Islam/Pakistan
94. Sheikh Fahad Ahmed Mubarak Al-Thani, islamic preacher/Qatar
95. Mr. Muhammad Muslim/Indonesia
96. Dr. Mohamed Habib Altgkani, university professor/Morocco
97. Mr. Mohammad Rasheed Al Rasheed, businessman/Saudi Arabia
98. Sheikh Mohammed, professor/Morocco
99. Judge Mohamed Sadiq Maglis, university professor and judge/Yemen
100. Sheikh Mohammed Al-Awadi, islamic preacher/Kuwait
101. Dr. Mohammad bin Syamsuddin, chairman of Muhammadiyah/Indonesia
102. Sheikh Mohammed, president of the Association for islamic unity/Indonesia
103. Dr. Mohammed Sajid Mir Abdul Gayoom Mir, leader of Assembly of Ahl al-hadeeth/Pakistan
104. Sheikh Mohammed Saeed Abdullah, islamic preacher, Pavel/Saudi Arabia
105. Mohammad Suleiman, thinker, writer/United Kingdom
106. Sheikh Mohammed Abdou Ibrahim Ali, Al-Azhar scholars/Egypt
107. Dr. Mohammed Ayash Al-Kubaisi, islamic preacher/Iraq
108. Mr. Mohammad Kazem Al-Sawalha, president of the Muslim Association/United Kingdom
109. Dr. Mohammed Kurd, president of the League of Europe/Netherlands
110. Mr. Mohammed Mbeki Alejandro/Senegal
111. Sheikh Mohammed, islamist writer/Morocco
112. Sheikh Mahmud Idris, islamic preacher/Eritrea
113. Sheikh Murad Yasha, islamic preacher/Turkey
114. Dr. Musa bin Mohammed Al-Qarni, university professor and attorney/Saudi Arabia
115. Dr. Nasser Al-sane, islamist preacher/Kuwait
116. Dr. Nasser Bin Suleiman, islamic preacher/Saudi Arabia
117. Shaykh Nizamuddin/Pakistan
118. Sheikh Noor bin Yildiz, islamic preacher/Turkey
119. Dr. Hashem Ali al-Ahdal, university professor/Saudi Arabia

Thursday, February 19, 2015

The struggle for Kobane: an example of selective solidarity


comrades from DAF join the struggle to defend Kobane
The heroic resistance of the people of Kobane in fighting the onslaught of the Daesh (ISIS) fascists since mid-September, has led to a surge of international solidarity. A multitude of articles andstatements have been written and protests have been held in cities across the world. Kurds have flooded across the Turkish border to help their compatriots in the fight despite being brutallypushed back by Turkish forces, and others includingTurkish comrades from DAF (Revolutionary Anarchist Action) have gone to the border to support in keeping it open to help the flood of refugees escaping to Turkey. There have been calls to arm Kurdish forces and calls to support DAF and send aid for refugees.  Yet this solidarity with Syria’s Kurds has not been extended to non-Kurdish groups in the country that have been fighting, and dying, to rid themselves of fascism and violent repression and for freedom and self-determination. It’s often said incorrectly, that sectarianism lies at the heart of the Syrian conflict. It’s necessary to understand to what extent sectarianism plays a role in our response too.
The protest movement that erupted against Bashar Al Assad in 2011 united people across Syria’s diverse ethnic and religious spectrum in a common struggle for freedom.  Kobane was no exception. The Kurds who are the majority in the town had long suffered under the Arabization policies of the Baathist regime, and were amongst the first to rise up when the Syrian revolution began. In this protest from mid-2012 Kurds and Arabs in Kobane jointly call for the downfall of the regime and chant in support of the Free Syrian Army, raising the Kurdish flag at a time when this was a dangerous act of defiance. But from its earliest days the Syrian protest movement in Kobane and elsewhere failed to gain international support. Had it done so the country would not have been destroyed to such a degree that ISIS could have taken control of large areas.
Over the past three years, relations between Syria’s Arabs and Kurds have been fragile and changeable, subject to both the Assad regime’s manipulation of ethnic divisions, and to the misguided political machinations of opposition politicians from both groups who have put their own interests and agendas above the people’s vision of freedom. Yet, in spite of this activists on the ground have continued to stress the importance of Kurdish-Arab popular unity and to resist ethnic and sectarian divisions. Few international solidarity statements have mirrored these calls.
The absence of Sunni Arabs from narratives of the struggle against Daesh is notable. Few articles have mentioned that fighters from Free Syrian Army (FSA) battalions are also risking their lives to join their Kurdish compatriots in defending Kobane from religious extremists or that recent weeks have seen greater coordination between Kurdish and Arab military formations.  On 10 September 2014, local FSA brigades joined forces with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) to create a joint operation to fight Daesh called Burkan Al Firat (Euphrates Volcano). The battalions involved include Liwa Thuwar Al Raqqa (Raqqa Revolutionary Brigade), Shams Al Shamal, Al-Tawhid (East), Saraya Jarablus and other smaller groups. This strategic alliance not only strengthens Kurdish-Arab unity at this critical time but also brings valuable experience to the Kobane resistance as the FSA has been fighting Daesh since the beginning of this year. In a 19 October statementthe PYD affirmed that “This resistance shown by our units YPG and the factions of the free Syrian army is a guarantee for defeating ISIS terrorism in the region. Counter-terrorism and building a free and democratic Syria was the basis for the agreements signed with factions of the free Syrian Army. As we can see that the success of the revolution are subject to the development of this relationship between all factions and the forces of good in this country.” [sic]
Like their Kurdish compatriots, Free Syrian Army battalions have been resisting Daesh in Kobane with greatly inferior weapons.  Whilst Daesh possesses the heavy US weaponary it seized in Iraq, Syrian fighters (both Kurds and Arabs) have only light arms and limited ammunition. Both the YPG and the FSA have been calling on the international community to supply them with heavy weaponary. Supporting the call for weapons to the resistance is imperative to allow the people of the region to defend themselves from annihilation. It also reduces the perceived need for direct military intervention from external powers which operate according to their own agendas, ones diametrically opposed to the interests of the popular struggle. In supporting such calls we should distinguish between 1) support for a broad coalition of local forces against fascism and for a popular struggle which seeks to destroy as much of the old regime as possible, as well as supporting the right of self-defense of all people against mass slaughter (including their right to take arms from wherever they are offered as necessity demands), and 2) support for any political project or group claiming power in the post-revolutionary phase which will necessarily reverse the achievements of the revolution. The later must be resisted.
Much of the international solidarity for the Kurdish struggle stems from support for Rojava’s inspiring social revolution.  Kurdish majority areas of Afrin, Jazira and Kobane were able to establish the Autonomous Region following the withdrawal of Assad’s forces in July 2012. A Social Contract was developed which stresses the desire to “build a society free from authoritarianism, militarism, centralism and the intervention of religious authority in public affairs”. It  affirms the principle of local self-government for all cantons of the region where governing councils and public institutions would be established through direct elections in a decentralized confederation. The charter enshrines unity and coexistence amongst the regions diverse ethnic and religious groups, a respect for human rights and an end to gender discrimination, and affirms people’s right to self determination. In a radical reorganization of society towards democratic confederalism the people of Rojava have established councils and communes throughout Western Kurdistan to self-manage their communities in areas such as health, education and trade and address the issues facing society. This provides a powerful example of alternative forms of social organization as a counterpoint to centralized, authoritarian control. Whilst such developments in radical democracy are a beacon of light in what’s fast becoming a region of darkness, anti-authoritarians should not romanticize the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD). Talking about the establishment of the Autonomous Region, Syrian-Kurdish anarchist Shiar Neyo states:
“From the PYD’s point of view, this was a golden opportunity to impose its authority and expand its sphere of influence in the Kurdish areas in Syria. This political pragmatism and thirst for power are two important factors in understanding the party’s dealings with the regime, the revolution, the FSA, and even the Kurds themselves. They also help explain many phenomena that seem to bewilder some commentators and analysts, such as the suppression by PYD forces of independent activists and those critical of the party’s policies, in much the same vein as the Baathist regime did. By way of example, one can cite in this regard the Amuda massacre in July 2013, in which the People’s Protection Units (YPG) opened fire on unarmed demonstrators, or the closure of the new independent radio station Arta in February 2014, under the pretext that it was not ‘licensed’. The PYD’s forces have also assaulted members of other Kurdish political parties and arrested some of them under a variety of excuses; they have been controlling food and financial resources in the Kurdish areas and distributing them in an unjust manner on the basis of partisan favouritism, and so on and so forth. Such practices remind people, rightly, of the oppressive practices of the Assad regime.”
An obvious tension therefore exists between the authoritarianism of the old guard of the PYD which maintains a top down vision, and the thousands of Kurds who believe in, and are trying to realize, radical democracy from below and should be supported in that aim.  But the Kurdish region of Syria is not the only place where a social revolution is putting into place radically new ways of organizing, although it has benefited from greater space and stability, relatively speaking when compared with other areas of the country. Experiments in local, autonomous, self organization have been a defining feature of the Syrian revolution, and hundreds of local committees and local councils have been established to administer basic services and coordinate revolutionary activities.  Yet these people are not seen to be deserving of international solidarity because they have no leader who has converted to libertarian municipalism. The fact simply is that they have no leader at all and these forms of horizontal organization arose spontaneously from below as a response to the destruction of the State.
Furthermore, as the world’s attention focuses on Kobane, struggles elsewhere have failed to gain the media spotlight. In August, the people of Deir Al Zour, mainly from Al-Sheitat tribe, led a brave resistance against Daesh.  In the following days, facing the fascists alone, the resistance was almost defeated and some 700 people from the al-Sheitat tribe were executed by Daesh causing little global outrage. But the people of Deir Al Zour didn’t abandon their struggle against the ISIS extremists. In recent weeks theWhite Shroud (Kufn Al Abyaad) has killed some 100 Daesh fighters through guerrilla style attacks. This secretive popular resistance group is made up of around 300 locals, the majority of whom have never fought before but have taken up what arms they can raise to protect their families and communities from fascist onslaught.
As the world focuses on Daesh’s advances in northern Syria, communities elsewhere are continuing to resist the genocidal maniac Bashar Al Assad and his sectarian militias which have increased their assault on liberated areas since US airstrikes freed up the regime’s resources elsewhere. There’s been little solidarity shown with the people of Al Waer district of Homs, the last rebel stronghold in a city which was once the soul of the revolution. Al Waer is home to some 400,000 people, half of them displaced civilians who have fled conflict elsewhere in the country. The area has been under regime siege for months and in the past couple of weeks the Assad regime has intensified its shelling causing a massive humanitarian crisis. Syrian activists’ calls for solidarity with Al Waer have fallen on deaf ears.
The question that remains is whether international solidarity for Kobane arises from the Kurdish ethnicity of its defenders  (i.e. they’re not Sunni Arabs), from support for the political position of a party (the PYD/PKK), or from the principle that all people have the right to defend themselves from terror, whether in the form of religious or nationalist fascism and to determine for themselves how to organize their lives and communities. If it arises from the latter principle, then the same solidarity extended to the Kurds must be extended to all revolutionary Syrians.

Tuesday, February 17, 2015

Hezbollah leader denounces mass beheading of Copts

BEIRUT (AP) — The leader of Lebanon’s Hezbollah group has strongly denounced the Islamic State group’s beheading of a group of Egyptian Christian hostages in Libya.
In a speech to hundreds of his supporters in southern Beirut Monday, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah says the CIA and Israel’s Mossad are behind the extremist group, which serves their interests.
He claims Israel is the only country which has not been affected and does not consider the group a threat.
The Iranian-backed Shiite Hezbollah group, which has sent thousands of its fighters to Syria to help shore up President Bashar Assad’s forces, has positioned itself as a vanguard against Sunni extremists such as the Islamic State group.
Nasrallah called on regional governments to work together to confront IS, whose crimes “are a threat to the entire universe.”

Wednesday, December 3, 2014

Reporting from the frontline - Tracey Shelton

#TraceyShelton reporting on the front lines

I found this Australian photo journalist she has done a lot of photo journalism in Iraq Syria Lebanon, Libya, and more..... So this is a new source I am going to enjoy I think.
The previous post I did of hers was Yazidi who fled #ISIS to get to the Kurdish areas. 
 - Ian bach

Saturday, March 1, 2014

The Case For And Against Intervening In Syria

The Case For And Against Intervening In Syria

FOR:
•It’s the right thing to do, maybe
•Let American people finally sleep at night after years of being 
tormented by thoughts of innocent Syrians dying
•Will put thousands of honest, diligent American Tomahawk cruise 
missiles back to work
•We’re the good guys
•Syrian people deserve to be free of a psychotic, oppressive dictator 
for a few weeks
•Moral obligation to our defense industry
•Footage of missiles being launched off decks of ships, green
night-vision images, aerial shots of explosions—all that good stuff
•We have plenty of money, a fresh, rested military—why not?
•Be nice to throw Kathryn Bigelow* a bone
•Chance for Obama to put an exclamation point on an already great year
•It’s been a while since we did one of these things

AGAINST:
•Someone might be hurt, or even die
•Could turn Russia and Iran against U.S.
•History
•Fear of setting a precedent of military action without U.N. approval
•Slight, really almost infinitesimal chance that intervention might be a
completely ineffectual act that even further destabilizes the region,
touching off massive anti-American sentiment while allowing jihadist
radicals to take power
•Painful memories of intervening in Rwandan genocide (Hah!)
•It’s hard
•Bashar al-Assad just had a baby. A baby!
•Bush invaded a foreign country. If Obama invades a foreign country, he
will be like Bush. It is not good to be like Bush.
•If we ever want to patch things up with Assad, this won’t exactly make
that conversation a cake walk
•Situation might work itself out









Read More about the Syrian photographer here:


https://www.facebook.com/ashraf.zeinah.photography

https://www.facebook.com/ashraf.zeinah

https://www.facebook.com/ianbachusa/posts/10200407886827514?stream_ref=10

Sunday, June 24, 2007

Where are we fighting al-Qaeda?

America is at war with al Qaeda — on that surely we can agree — and we know that al Qaeda has bases in Pakistan. In fact, it is probable that Osama bin Laden resides at one of those bases. But we can’t fight al Qaeda in Pakistan because Pakistan is an ally, and America does not violate the territorial integrity of its allies.

Al Qaeda is active in Gaza, according to Egyptian and Jordanian intelligence. Al Qaeda supports Hamas which has just waged a bloody — and successful — civil war against Fatah, its Palestinian rival. But we’re not about to invade Gaza in pursuit of al Qaeda. Even Israel, which withdrew from Gaza two years ago, is not eager to return there. In Lebanon, Fatah al-Islam, which is fighting the Lebanese government, is believed to be linked to al Qaeda. But the last time U.S. troops were in Lebanon, they were attacked by suicide bombers dispatched by Hezbollah, a terrorist organization directed by the regime in Tehran. There is no way the U.S. is going to send troops into Lebanon again.

Groups linked to al Qaeda are in Somalia. We have supported Ethiopian troops fighting there. But a serious effort by Americans against al Qaeda in Somalia seems unlikely.Al Qaeda cells operate in Europe. But it is problematic for American operatives to kill or capture terrorists there: To do so sparks allegations from the “human rights community” and the media about violations of international law, torture and secret prisons. Also, as has happened in Italy, it can lead to criminal prosecutions of Americans thought to be involved. So America’s ability to fight al Qaeda in Europe is limited.
There are probably al Qaeda cells in the U.S. too. One hopes the FBI is monitoring them. But until the members of these cells commit crimes, there is not much that can be done. On what basis could Mohammed Atta, ringmaster of the 9/11/01 hijackers, have been arrested on 9/10/01? What’s more, some judges and legal activists are now insisting that even combatants illegally in the U.S. are entitled to all the rights enjoyed by American citizens. If this view prevails, fighting al Qaeda within the U.S. will become even harder.