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HPG: Turkish military activity continues increasingly - Kurdish Info

HPG: Turkish military activity continues increasingly

• 29 April 2015
• News, North-Kurdistan, South Kurdistan

People’s Defence Forces (HPG) press and communication center has issued a written statement related to military activity of the Turkish army.

The HPG reported in the statement that Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles performed reconnaissance flights over Xakurke area of Media Defence Zones between 4 pm April 28 and 4 am April 29.

Also, between 4 pm and 5 pm on April 28, an activity of warplanes took place.

Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles performed reconnaissance flights over;

– Mamreş territory of Şemdinli district of Hakkari province between 18.00 and 19.30 on April 28, and

– Şehit (Martyr) Gafur and Şuke areas of Avashin border line between 20.00 pm and 12.00 am on April 28.

Warplanes mobility took place over Şuke, Şehit Gafur and the border between 20.00 and 23.00 on April 28.

According to the statement, Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles performed intensive reconnaissance flights on 28 April over;

– Heftanin area of Media Defence Zones and border line between 14.30 and 16.00,

– Şkefta Bîrîndara, ÇÎyayê Reş, Ertuş, Cîloyê Piçuk areas of Zap region, border line areas between 16.00 and 22.00, and

– Metina area between 21.00 and 00.00.

Warplanes mobility was observed over Zap region between 20.00 and 21.00.

Military activity of the Turkish army continued increasingly far and wide between Çatak, Girê Sor guardhouse and Êzdînan regions of Van province at 09.30 am on April 29.

The Turkish army laid ambushes with armoured vehicles in Hêndiresê, Gewrê, Şêbê, Golik and Meledikê villages of Mazıdağı district of Mardin province between 19.30 on April 28 and 05.00 on April 29 (today).

Turkish state’s unmanned aerial vehicles performed reconnaissance flights over Şehit Baran area of Farqin district of Amed province between 20.00 pm and 23.30 pm on April 28.

In the recent days, Turkish troops have been deployed on a hill in Dêrunê village of Kocaköy (Qaraz) district of Amed province.

Turkish army lunched a military operation in Arel and Çakmaklı areas of Ovacık district of Dersim province in the morning hours on April 26. The operation was retreated after remaining inconclusive in the evening hours.”

Source: Firat News Agency

KURDISTAN REGION TERRITORIES AND NATIONALITIES

If anyone knows Original Poster I just Saw this today but lost the link

32 Years of Struggle: PKK’s fight to defend an “Unknown Language and People”

KurdishMedia.com - By Hadi Elis

09/12/2010 00:00:00 

Introduction

The PKK, as it is known in its Kurdish acronym stands for Partia Karkeren Kurdistan, wrongly translated to English in many studies and official texts as Kurdish Workers’ Party; in fact it is Kurdistan Workers’ Party. For PKK, Kurdistan as a concept is totality of people, language, culture and the history; Kurdistan is the word represents anything and everything about Kurdishness.

For PKK, the establishment of Republic of Turkey, and her denial policies of Kurds & Kurdistan since 1923 is the problem of facing extinction for Kurdish people. Essentially criminalization of usage of Kurdish language is illegitimate and immoral.

Kurdish people as being natives of the land of Kurdistan since the time immemorial, lives in the region called Middle East by Europeans, is the largest nation without a state, and Kurdistan is the most partitioned and longest occupied country in the World, currently between four Nation-states.

Kurdistan Workers’ Party emerged after maturation of Kurdish students’ protests movement into a political movement in late 60s, and intellectual voyage of questioning this reality in the mid 1970s. The earlier Kurdish uprisings studied and discussed intensively, socio-political and socio-economic situation of Kurdistan analyzed for composing political theory of National Liberation. In its Party program, accepted at 27-28 November 1978, in Amed, in North Kurdistan, it presents itself as National Liberation Movement guided with Socialist ideology and aimed at making the Revolution in Kurdistan in order to be able to change the international statuesque, named it as Turkish Colonialism supported by the West, Feudal Social and Economic conditions of Kurdistan. Mr. Abdullah Ocalan was elected as its Chairman in this meeting.
Article Originally Posted at KurdishMedia
http://kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=16554

Hadi Elis Twitter Page here https://twitter.com/hadi_elis

Biden Discusses Fight Against ISIL With Kurdish Leader

Below is some info on the Biden visit with Barzani. For the most part the U.S. continues to drag its feet and not help arm the Kurdish Peshmerga forces fighting the #ISIS #daeshbags in Syria and Iraq. So far the US stance has been to only give the weapons to the Iraqi government and hope they somehow make it to the Peshmerga who need it so desperately. Yet this is not likely to happen anytime soon, as the Iraqi government is not interested in helping to arm the Kurds. Meanwhile the Germans, Italians, and Danes have helped by supplying rifles, bazookas, ammo, and training. The Swedes and Kiwis are set to send troops to help train the Peshmerga. However the amount of Arms and Ammo has been very very limited at best. We can only hope things change soon. The Peshmerga have proved themselves to be the most ethical force fighting ISIS. - Ian Bach 

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Biden meets with Barzani 

The White House stated that US Vice President Joe Biden has spoken with Iraqi Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani following attacks against Kurds carried out by ISIL on Friday.

WASHINGTON (Sputnik) -- US Vice President Joe Biden has spoken with Iraqi Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani following attacks against Kurds carried out by Islamic State (ISIL) extremists on Friday, the White House announced in a statement.

"The Vice President called [on Saturday afternoon] to express condolences for the Kurdish Peshmerga executed by ISIL," the statement, released on Saturday, said.

Biden and Barzani agreed to reinforce the "collective resolve" to defeat ISIL, which has ceased vast areas in Iraq and Syria.

"The Vice President also offered warm wishes to President Barzani, his family and the people of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region as they observe Nowruz," the White House statement said.

Last week, Iraqi Kurdish forces backed by US and coalition airstrikes pushed ISIL militants out of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, taking some 40 square miles of territory, according to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq.

Ocalan brings an end to the 40 year struggle of the PKK in Turkey

Kurds commit to Turkish peace process as PKK leader announces definitive end to '40-year-long armed struggle' with the state

..............Above the jubilant cheers of the hundreds of thousands of Kurds celebrating the festival of Newroz, Kurdish new year, the jailed leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Abudallah Ocalan yesterday called for a definitive end to the “40-year-long armed struggle” against the Turkish state.

As Mr Ocalan’s statement was read to the huge rally, the sun broke through the clouds and the thudding rain eased: even the weather seemed to recognise a momentous occasion. His emphasis on a democratic solution is seen as a pivotal step in a process that many officials from both sides believe is the single most important issue the country faces.

“I see it as historical and necessary to hold a congress to stop the armed struggle which has been carried on by the PKK against the Turkish Republic for nearly 40 years and to determine political and social strategies and tactics which are suitable for a new period,” he said in a two-page letter read out by deputies of the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), first in Kurdish and then in Turkish.

Hillside fires are lit for celebrations marking spring and the new year in Turkey’s Sirnak province last week (AFP)

Mr Ocalan called late last month for the PKK leadership to convene an “extraordinary congress in the coming spring months” to make the decision to definitively relinquish the armed fight............

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Jailed Kurdish chief Ocalan says Turkish insurgency unsustainable

...............Peace efforts

The peace efforts have also revealed tensions between Mr Erdogan, who seeks executive powers as president but does not constitutionally have them, and the government.

In unusually direct criticism, deputy prime minister Bulent Arinc accused Mr Erdogan of being “emotional” and of meddling in government business after he said he did not agree with the establishment of a committee to monitor the peace process, a step agreed with Kurdish politicians.

“It is the government which is running the country,” he told reporters. “The president speaking like this, to the point of criticising our government, may wear out the government.”.................
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Pro-Kurdish party seeks breakthrough in Turkey elections

...........The leader of Turkey’s outlawed Kurdish rebels has redoubled his call for an end to armed conflict, as the political party that draws inspiration from him seeks a breakthrough in coming general elections.

The latest appeal from Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers party (PKK), for the PKK to abandon its armed struggle comes as the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic party attempts to transform itself from an ethnic political grouping into a broader leftwing anti-establishment force................

Insights about Media/News Sources in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan

Research by Broadcasting Board of Governors

Iraq boasts the fourth-largest population of any Arab country (after Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco), and one of the most robust domestic news media markets in the region. With dozens of daily newspapers, radio stations, and TV channels serving the country and home satellite service ubiquitous, most Iraqis and Kurds have a wide range of news options. The fall of Saddam Hussein in
2003 swept away the strict government control over Iraq’s media and ushered in an era of extreme media pluralism, with groups all over the country starting hundreds of newspapers and dozens of radio and television stations. However, ongoing sectarian conflict and political control of many Iraqi media organizations hampers the population’s access to reliable, objective news content.

General Media Environment
As in much of the Arab World, satellite TV is almost ubiquitous in Iraq, present in 97.3% of households (versus 35.1% with radio and 50.4% with the Internet). Ethnic Kurds and those with a college degree are much more likely than other Iraqis to have Internet access at home; those living in Anbar province are less likely than average to have it (21.9%), as are Iraqis with only some intermediate education or less (37.7%). More than nine in 10 Iraqis (92.2%) have their own mobile phone, and 35% have accessed the Internet via mobile device in the past week.

The ongoing conflict has displaced many residents and has hindered their access to TV, radio, and the Internet. More than one-quarter (27.0%) of Iraqis say that they have been “displaced” in the past 12 months due to instability, with larger percentages displaced in ISILcontrolled areas of Anbar and Ninevah and in the disputed area of Salah ad-Din. The instability has disrupted many Iraqis’ access to TV and Internet, in particular, with 31.5% saying instability is hindering their access to TV frequently (12.0%) or occasionally (19.5%); 38% say it is hindering their access to the Internet frequently (19.9%) or occasionally (18.3%) and 15% say it is hindering their access to radio frequently (4.9%) or occasionally (10.1%); Despite the disruptions, Iraqis and Iraqi Kurds remain
frequent news consumers. Half of the respondents to this survey (49.5%) reported following current events in the country “a lot,” while an additional 21.5% follow them “somewhat.” The vast majority of Iraqis (82.8%) indicate they access some type of news at least daily, and a similar proportion (80.3%) say they discuss or share news with others weekly. Most Iraqis (57.0%) access news and share it with others every day. Weekly users of international news media are even more likely to access and share news daily. Trust in news media varies significantly across regions in Iraq. During the survey period, the country was in the grip of a major conflict between central government and
Kurdish forces on one side and ISIL on the other, with ISIL in control of the predominantly Sunni Arab provinces of Anbar and Ninewa, and vying for control of Salah ad-Din, Diyala and the mixed-ethnicity province of Kirkuk. Iraqis living in the predominantly Sunni Arab provinces are more likely to “strongly distrust” news from television or radio than those living in areas consisting mostly of Shia Arabs or Kurds. Those in ISIL-controlled, predominantly Sunni, areas were also more likely to
“strongly trust” news from the Internet than Iraqis in other regions.

Television
TV is the primary source of news in the country with more than nine in 10 (92.1%) adults saying they watch TV news at least weekly. Friends and family is the only other source from which a majority of Iraqis (72.6%) get news weekly or more. About one-third get news from the Internet, social networking sites and text messages at least weekly, while only about one in five Iraqis gets news from radio or print media that often. While the three most popular TV stations nationally in terms of past-week reach are Al Iraqiya (68.8%), Al Sharqiya (65.2%), and Al Sumeria (58.1%), politics and
sect strongly affect TV viewership. Second place Al Sharqiya TV, as well as other top Sunni-oriented
channels Baghdadia TV and Al Arabiya do much better in the ISIL-controlled and disputed areas, which have much higher proportions of Sunni Arabs. Sunni Iraqis have frequently criticized Al Iraqiya, for example, as being biased against them and/or overly friendly to the Shia-led government.

Radio
About one-fourth of respondents (27.7%) report listening to the radio in the past week and 19.7% of Iraqis use it weekly for news. Weekly radio use is most common among men, better-educated Iraqis and Kurds. Most past-week listeners (69.4%) say they tune in via FM, though one in five (20.8%) use AM and 15.4% use shortwave. Those living in the predominantly Shia Arab provinces south of Baghdad are particularly likely to use shortwave on a weekly basis, at 23.0%.

Mobile Phones
Virtually all adults (92.2%) own a mobile phone, and about one-third of the population (34.1%) has used a mobile phone to access the Internet in the past week — almost as many as say they accessed the Internet in the past week at all during that time. Three in 10 mobile phone owners say they have used a mobile phone to download video or audio clips or access social networking sites. More than 25% say they downloaded or used a mobile app in the past week, while only 16.3% say they used a phone to listen to the radio in that time. Men, young adults and the collegeeducated are particularly likely to use mobile phones for all of these activities, except listening to the radio, which skews significantly toward young people alone.

Internet
Two in five (40.3%) adults report having accessed the Internet in the past week. That figure rises to about half among Iraqi men, Kurds and those aged 15 to 24, and more than three-fourths among Iraqis with a college level education. Internet users are heavy video consumers. Three-fourths
of weekly Internet users (73.9%) went online to view videos such as TV programs, news reports, video clips, sports or movies. In contrast, 63.3% went online to find out the latest news and 58.1% did so to access audio news reports, music or radio programs. Weekly Internet users aged 15 to 24 are particularly likely to have watched online videos, at 80.1%. Those with a college education are more likely to have gone online to search for the latest news (75.7%) than are weekly Internet users with less than intermediate education (51.5%). Men, young adults and the better educated are most likely to get news online. Similarly, Kurds are much more likely than Arabs or other Iraqi ethnic groups to access news on the Internet, whether through social networking sites or other websites. Men are also more likely than women to listen to radio news at least weekly. Most of Iraq’s weekly Internet users consume online content in Arabic only. Even Kurdish Iraqis more commonly use content in Arabic (74.1%) than in Kurdish (60.5%). Overall, only 4.9% of past-week Iraqi Internet users do not use Arabic content.

Social Media
Three in 10 respondents report using social networking sites at least weekly. Among those with at least some college education that figure rises to about two-thirds (65.5%); men, younger adults and Kurdish Iraqis are also particularly likely to use social networks weekly or more. Facebook is by far the most popular social networking site, with almost all past-week social media users (94.3%) having accessed it in the past seven days. The next most popular are Google+ at 41.8% and
Twitter at 25.8%.

Methodology
This data is based on 2,735 landline and mobile telephone interviews with adults aged 15 and older living in Iraq with access to a landline or mobile telephone. Trained interviewers conducted the fieldwork Oct. 18 – Dec. 2, 2014, in Arabic and Kurdish with Iraqi adults in all 18 provinces. Results represent approximately 20,245,0001 adults living across Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. Researchers stratified the target population by governorate. Out of a total sample of 2,735 interviews, researchers
proportionally distributed 2,015 across all 18 governorates. Researchers conducted an oversample of
720 interviews in the three governorates where the majority of the Kurdish population lives — Sulaymaniya, Arbil and Dahuk — to ensure at least 1,000 interviews with Kurdish respondents, Researchers weighted all post-stratification results by age, gender and education.

Contact
For any questions or further information on this data, please contact the Broadcasting Board of Governors at publicaffairs@bbg.gov or 202-203-4400. Follow us on twitter at @BBGgov 

On the Front Lines Kurdish Fighters Gain Ground against ISIS

ISIS Morale has hit the ground - They kill 100 of their own for wanting to leave

Both local and foreign fighters in ISIS reports seem to indicate that all is not well in the house of the so called "Islamic State" better name is #daeshbags

"Morale isn't falling – it's hit the ground," the activist said. "Local fighters are frustrated – they feel they're doing most of the work and the dying … foreign fighters who thought they were on an adventure are now exhausted."

Fighters are forced to stay and fight once they join the caliphate because they receive threats from other ISIS members who say they will kill the fighters if they try to leave.

A decline in troop morale is causing even ISIS' local fighters to want to abandon the jihad,

ISIS has established a form of military policing unit designed to crack down on fighters ditching the caliphate. Additionally, new regulations require ISIS fighters to carry proof that they are an ISIS fighter along with documentation showing where they are assigned. ISIS fighters are supposed to report to ISIS offices within 48 hours of receiving the new rules to check in and avoid punishment. The activists said that many ISIS militants' homes were raided and as many as 400 fighters were arrested for not reporting within the 48 hours.

Things have gotten so bad that fighters are no longer allowed to "speak the truth" and are "forced to do useless things."

A former ISIS fighter from Syria, who has since fled to Turkey, told NPR that ISIS wants to kill anyone who says "No!"

"Everyone must be with them," the former ISIS fighter said. "[If] you turn against ISIS, they will kill you."

ISIS, #daeshbags, daeshbags, #ISIS, #TwitterKurds, Syria, Kurdistan, Assad, foreign fighters, FSA, free syrian army, FSA, 

PKK elects new leadership as Iran steps up border presence

Murat Karayilan steps down as acting PKK leader; Tehran increases presence along Kurdistan border

Female members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) are pictured in the northern Iraqi city of Dohuk on May 13, 2013, as the group was preparing for the return of their comrades stationed in Turkey. (AFP PHOTO/SAFIN HAMED)

Erbil, Asharq Al-Awsat—The Kurdistan’s Workers’ Party (PKK) elected two new leaders at a conference held in Mount Qandil last week. The recent change of leadership comes under a scheme adopted by the majority of Turkish-based Kurdish parties where power is jointly assumed by two leaders, a man and a woman.

Replacing acting PKK leader Murat Karayilan, Cemil Bayik and Bese Howat were elected as joint acting leaders for the PKK at the end of the conference.

A senior PKK source, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on the condition of anonymity, revealed that the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), the PKK’s executive council, held a conference from June 30 to July 5 to discuss the party’s political and organizational system on both the local and regional levels.

The conference also agreed to bring the proportion of the party’s female members up to 40 percent.

“The conference also elected Abdullah Öcalan as president and commander of the organization [KCK].”

The KCK was established following the arrest of Öcalan in 1999 to take over the leadership of the PKK, with Karayilan elected as its acting head. It is considered the highest executive body in PKK and the movements and bodies affiliated with it.

Cemil Bayik and Bese Howat are both reported to be co-founders of the PKK. Initial reports claimed that Karayilan will now retire; however, Turkey’s Hurriyet newspaper on Wednesday reported that the former acting leader will head up an armed unit within the PKK called the People’s Defense Forces (HPG). Abdullah Öcalan remains overall head of the Kurdish movement.

In separate news, a senior source in the Party of Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), also speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on the condition of anonymity, claimed that Iran has deployed large military reinforcements, including heavy armor and military vehicle, along the borders with the Kurdistan region in a bid to target the PKK, as well as construct military installations along the border.

“This means that the Iranian army wants to settle in the area by establishing permanent military bases,” the PJAK source said.

The source added: “PJAK’s leadership has declared a truce with the Iranian side since 2012 following the failure of the largest military operation launched by the Iranian army against our bureaus in Mount Qandil.”

“If Iran breaks the truce by targeting our bureaus, we will defend ourselves and even point our weapons toward the Iranian interior,” the source emphasized.

Sherzad Shekhani

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Tagged with: Bese Hozat, Cemil Bayik, Iran, Iraq, Karayilan, KCK, Kurdistan, Ocalan, PJAK, PKK, Tehran

PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) -:DanishSource PKK (Kurdistans Arbejderparti)

Danish News source on PKK - translated with google

Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan), (1978-), north-Kurdish leftist party, best known by its Kurdish acronym PKK. The party was founded in 1978 by about 50 people, and grew since significantly in strength through its armed campaign directed against the Turkish oppression of the Kurds. With a program based on socialism , pro-feminism , anti-feudalism and anti-tribalism developed PKK insurgency in during the 1980s and 1990s to be the largest ever in Kurdistan - both compared to the period and to Turkey efforts to keep the uprising down. Key elements of the PKK's history has been the dominant figure of their leader Abdullah Ocalan , a significant increase, a very high level of ambition, and a tendency to adapt to the political realities of success (with varying success). In the media we often PKK mentioned very simplistic, often characterized by myths. This is not only the bourgeois media, but is altogether a result of that there is very little material on the PKK's history.

Since 1990, the Turkish state burned over 3500 towns and villages in  Northern Kurdistan

The Kurdish problem in Turkey

Half of Kurds living in Turkey. Turkey is also the country where the Kurds are subjected to the worst oppression. Shortly after the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923 issued the new dictator, the Turkish general and national hero Kemal Pasha (Atatürk) a ban on Kurdish schools, newspapers and associations. At the same time introduced Atatürk some stringent laws targeting religious practice. The religious Kurds went in turmoil, but it was turned down militarily. New revolt started, and there was almost permanent rebellion or state of emergency in the Kurdish regions up to World War II.

In an effort to win the battle against the Kurds introduced to Turkey a forced assimilation through the school system. Kurdish language was banned Kurdish names of places and cities were replaced with Turkish, Kurdish even personal names were prohibited. The new generations to grow up as Turks and eventually forget their Kurdish roots.

After World War II so long as it appears that assimilation was about to succeed. There was relatively quiet in the Kurdish areas, and many Kurdish tribal leaders were now working together with the Turkish authorities. By giving tribal leaders were given special privileges Turkey control. During this period, some Kurds education, moved to the richer western parts of Turkey and had successful careers - as Turks. Some were even ministers, generals and prominent businessmen.

Compared to the rest of Turkey remained the Kurdish provinces, however, became poorer and underdeveloped. The proportion of illiterates was great, and the Kurdish tribal leaders ruled with the state's blessing as feudal rulers. Intellectual Kurds who still tried to preserve the memory of the resistance against Turkey, were easily sidelined by the Turkish authorities, imprisoned or exiled. (See also: Kurdistan).

Early 1970s: Before the formation of the PKK

Kurdish nationalists sought in the late 1960s and 1970s to forge links with the Turkish left, who grew up in youth environments in universities - that we in Denmark parallel known as '1968'erne'. At the same time in northern Iraq fought a guerrilla war between Iraqi government forces and the Iraqi Kurdish organization KDP. The Kurds were on the way a familiar theme in the radical left-wing circles. But in general, there was little interest in the Kurds' case - the Turkish students thought that the problems would be solved "by itself" when the total Turkishrevolution was completed. Many Kurds therefore broke and founded their own Kurdish leftist parties.

In the capital Ankara total the politologistuderende Abdullah Ocalan in 1973, a private study group of people who had broken out of a major Turkish student organization. The group met regularly to discuss the Kurdish issue and Marxism , and eventually concluded that state violence could only be stopped by the Kurds organized themselves and led "armed propaganda" (propaganda actions against the civilian population after the consumption of residential or village). A game concept that you took away from the Turkish left. People from this group was eventually connect to like-minded leftists Kurds from other parts of Turkey.

1978 The formation of the PKK

In 1978, about 50 people met in secret to create the new party . The new party had to fight to get erected a popular revolution that would eventually lead to a Kurdish state across Turkey,Syria , Iran and Iraq - preferably a socialist Kurdish state. It took the PKK divided Kurdistan into action, and adopted a list of different obstacles for the revolution: Top of the list were 'fascists', (notorious far-right nationalist Turkish militia groups, also known as "gray wolves"). Next, the PKK declared themselves enemies of 'social-chauvinists' (competing Turkish leftist parties who neglected the Kurdish case), "agents and government networks' (in the Kurdish regions) and finally' feudal landlords and traitors' (traditional Kurdish tribal leaders who had enjoyed two decades of cooperation with the Turkish establishment). Abdullah Ocalan was elected as chairman of a small Politburo of seven.

Beside a number of similar left-wing parties and groups, was now also PKK. The others included: Maoist or Trotskyist organizations, or had a leader with a notorious past. Like the PKK declared themselves enemies of the other, the PKK also quickly accused of being 'fake socialists' who had fought on the road to the true revolution . The left-wing environment was generally filled with suspicion and rumors crisscross in. This led to internal fights, stabbings and shootings, and sometimes gave to each other to the state. It was "natural" to be wary of each other in the 1970s radical Turkish leftist environments.

1978-84 PKK Moves to Syria

PKK celebrated the founding of an attack on a member of the Turkish parliament, the famous Kurdish landowner and tribal leader Bucak. The attack failed, and the PKK was a powerful, vengeful clan on the neck. This caused other tribes - old enemies of Bucakklanen - to mingle on the PKK and the PKK quickly lost control over what was happening.

At the same time it came quickly to armed showdown with rival parties. Several writers who seek to explain why the PKK in a few years was eliminated virtually all competitors guess that PKK showed exceptional natural brutality in opgørene with the others. The heavy-handed methods were beyond doubt one part of the explanation, but it also plays the PKK as opposed to his political competitors survived the military coup in 1980, and in 1984 returned to carry out armed struggle. There are from the period testimony of extremely bloody clashes between the PKK and their competitors. But the PKK's actions and reprisals were carried out in secret and on local initiative. There was not reported back centrally, because no one should know too much about the others, if someone may have to be caught in the act. The PKK has even internally praised his leadership for its "determination" that led to success. But in reality PKK had not even any idea of ​​what was going on.

A better explanation of the PKK's success was an intelligent decision at a fortunate time. The turmoil in Turkey accelerated in the late 1970s. In 1980 the Turkish generals had enough, especially after combined religious and leftist forces in neighboring Iran last year had overthrown the Shah's military dictatorship. The Turkish generals committed coup in 1980 and scrubbed brutally. In a short time the entire left dissolved; murdered, imprisoned or exiled.

The PKK was one of the few parties that survived the coup. In 1979, Ocalan traveled to Syria, and here he had had contacts with Palestinians who fought guerrilla war against Israel . In the next few months followed several senior PKK members after, and the PKK was allowed to train 50 guerrillas in the Palestinian camps. These were sent into Turkey after the coup, but the unit was wiped out by Turkish troops. Then kept PKK low profile and prepared in Lebanon on guerrilla war.

1980-84 PKK in hiding

The switch to the Palestinians gave contacts to the Syrian State senior management, and the PKK had his own base to train recruits. PKK then made an alliance with the KDP - a much larger and far more experienced Kurdish guerrillabevægelse in northern Iraq. KDP gave PKK allowed to operate from northern Iraq. New recruits arrived, including survivors of the many smashed groups in Turkey. In exile laid the PKK a long timetable for the revolution in three phases: 1. Strategic defensive until 1990 when it was expected outnumbered equality and lack of support from the population, 2. Strategic balance between 1990 and 1995, where one might expect a mix of successes and failures, and 3. Strategic offensive, the final phase until 2000, after which together with the Kurdish people to lead the revolution to victory.

PKK fighters practicing in Mikado

1,984 PKK resumed the revolutionary struggle

In 1984 went PKK attacks. Disguised as horse smugglers (normal vision in the border regions of Kurdistan) snuck some man over the border to Turkey and fired gunfire of against some military barracks and ran. Although the PKK celebrated 'victory', was attacked mixed consequences. PKK had difficulty following the first attack up, and there was a rumor about the cowards who ran away - a very impractical reputation in the Kurdish provinces where traditional codes of honor has great value. But you could internally rejoice over the psychologically important first shot and improving itself. There was now spent far more energy to find strongholds, hideouts in the mountains and the like, so you could make a proper armed campaign.

PKK was better. Man overall in 1985 and 1986 new units tactical could gather and disperse after Vietcong model. Three men in the smallest unit, three of these groups together in larger unit types, again three of these to the largest units. After the attack stack one and split up continuously, so that the opponent could not catch the guerrillas. The Kurds gradually began to know the PKK as 'guerrillaen' rather than 'students'. But even if you had been better, many people died in battle, and there was not enough new recruits to fill the losses. "Kurdistan National Liberation Front 'ERNK was created in 1985 to make propaganda for the PKK, while" Kurdistan National Liberation Army' ARGK maintained guerrilla war. The division was not so clear at the beginning - ERNK's propaganda was "armed propaganda", which led to virtually the same as actions ARGK's.Gradually developed PKK However, a clearer division between ERNK as a political branch, while ARGK stood as the military arm.

1986 Turkish response

In 1986, Turkey responded by creating 'temporary' security guards in Kurdish villages. Featured Kurds were paid from the state to keep an eye on their local areas. Thus preferred central power to pay Kurds to fight each other rather than to interfere directly. But the Turkish strategy gave fatal backlash.Vagtværnene was organized by Kurdish tribal leaders who scrawled money into itself. The individual security companies could rarely a mutual assistance - they were scattered - and also had several tribal leaders used the opportunity to avenge old episodes against neighboring tribes. PKK attack then primarily vagtværnene.

The Turkish government had greater success in luftbombardere KDP bases in Iraq. Pressed by Turkey began KDP to criticize the PKK to attack civilians (vagtværnene) and threatened to terminate the alliance. As the KDP-controlled northern Iraq, the alliance was essential. A wing of the PKK began to criticize the harsh methods, also because there did not come new recruits, which was a clear sign of lack of support in the Kurdish civilian population. The disagreements led to a showdown on the PKK's third congress in 1986. Ocalan's position was that the PKK on the contrary should step up the fight against vagtværnene and that critics have to deal with the collective. The Congress won Ocalan line, and several critics were due to recent PKK dissidents executed, typically accused of being Turkish agents. The alliance with the KDP subsequently went to pieces.

Still, Ocalan line to give results. Turkey sent hundreds of thousands of troops to the Kurdish areas, but these could not normally get at the PKK, which is usually found refuge outside Turkey.The Turkish soldiers began to develop extremely cruel kontraguerrillastyrker, while self-styled nationalist militias were given carte blanche by the military to engage in vigilante. Hundreds of villages were burned, and torture was systematically used against Kurds suspected of supporting the PKK. This suspicion fell on whole villages that do not openly supported the state and such.Asked vigilante.

In the late eighties won PKK plenty of sympathizers and recruits because the PKK was the only one who avenged the Turkish state power brutal methods. In 1989, the number of guerrillas reached as high as 10,000 men. At the same time conducted PKK structural improvements. ERNK took the initiative to form networks among the 650,000 Kurdish guest workers in Europe, which gave a steady flow of new recruits for political education and guerrillatræning in ARGKs camps and extensive financial support.

1990 Turgut Özal and the thaw in Turkey

The Berlin Wall fell in 1989, and the international atmosphere of political thaw also reached Turkey. In Turkey began a cautious debate on the unilateral commitment to a military solution. The undeclared war had cost Turkey dearly, damaged the country's international prestige and did not seem to lead to victory. The situation began Ocalan to give interviews to Turkish press.

Öcalan showed new sides of themselves. He wanted to negotiate and stop the war, and he would not require 'unrealistic demands' prior to the negotiations. Expectations for a political settlement rose as Öcalan dropped the requirement for an independent Kurdish state. They grew further when Turkish President Turgut Özal in Turkish media said Öcalan as "Mr. Ocalan ', and publicly admitted that Özal even had Kurdish family roots. Several top politicians followed suit and declared that also recognized the existence of the Kurdish identity, although they also pointed out that one "can not negotiate with terrorists." In a few years exchanged Öcalan and Özal political signals through journalists.

While developed war with ever greater intensity. The Turkish generals dreamed continue to defeat the PKK militarily, and the Turkish army began conducting raids across the border into Iraq in search of guerrillas. Sympathy for the PKK and hatred of the military surveillance of the Kurdish provinces led to several bloody riots and uprisings in major Kurdish cities where children threw stones at soldiers. Eventually PKK popular support, from the outset, had declared its possession. In addition, a Kurdish party elected to the Turkish Parliament.

In March 1993, Ocalan tried to revive the positive sentiment from the early nineties with a surprising declaration of unconditional, unilateral ceasefire. Ocalan referred to the small Kurdish party DEP as interlocutors of the Turks (because all Turkish politicians had declared themselves unwilling to speak directly with PKK). But suddenly died president Turgut Özal in April 1993. Turkey had postponed a planned offensive but not stopped the local persecution of the PKK. In May 1993 cut off the PKK ceasefire with a bloody attack on 33 Turkish soldiers on leave. After a little hesitation admitted Ocalan, the PKK was work and said it caused "State ceasefire violations". Later declared Ocalan, that it was a PKK commander, who in protest against Ocalan's abandonment of the basic requirement for an independent state had deliberately sabotaged the truce.

1993 New wars and new strength

A new phase of the war started and was as brutal as never before. The Kurdish party was illegaliseret at a political trial, which accused the leaders of "supporting terrorism". A new was formed, but it was also eliminated in the same way a short time later, after having been subjected to bombings, arrests of random members at all levels and all kinds of harassment. By closing the only legal expression of the Kurds, the PKK only more popular than ever before.

PKK's popularity eventually became strong enough to mobilize large masses of Kurdish guest workers in Europe who flocked to the Kurdish associations, organized or infiltrated by ERNK. Also moderate Kurds supported in large numbers behind the PKK because Turkey left the PKK as the sole representative of the Kurds in Turkey. The Kurdish population was still divided - many Kurds were in postwar quiet periods been assimilated into Turkish society, and this group suffered from the growing Turkish general distrust of Kurds as potential terrorists. Another group of Kurdish Muslims remained suspicious of the socialist wicked and pro-feminist PKK'ere who stood for the opposite of Islam . In addition, there was a historical division of the largest groups of Kurds in Turkey by Kurds in Iran and Iraq. But with a now permanent Turkish military presence in northern Iraq began PKK also gaining in popularity here. PKK became the first Kurdish organization ever that developed potential for mass sympathies among Kurds across the border that divides Kurds.

The consequence of the resumed hostilities was in 1993 and 1994, the Turkish troops were forced on the defensive as never before. With a popular expression reigned Turkey per day, while the PKK ruled the night. ERNK opened offices in major cities throughout Europe, from which provocative issued visas to visit the liberated Kurdish areas.

Ocalan tried again in 1995 with a new ceasefire without Turkish response. In the Turkish establishment dismissed one ceasefires as a sign of the PKK's weakness, which may mean that you were close to victory. Turkey trap stringent desperate war to a level where the fight against the PKK guerrillas, who hardly ever spoke more than 30,000 inmates over half a million soldiers permanently employed alone in the fight against the PKK.

1993 Battle for Europe

It was clear that the PKK would never be able to prevail militarily. After more than ten years krigshærgen was the Kurdish provinces turned into a wasteland. The Turkish counter-guerrilla had gradually wiped out several thousand villages, and millions of Kurds were fleeing. With its three million Kurds were Istanbul has become the city with the most Kurds. The new refugees were living in poor conditions in shanty towns. Although the PKK retained sympathy and guerrilla war against Turkey, the PKK sent back on the defensive on the battlefield, including because Turkey had gradually pulverized everything that resembled strongholds. In these years, opened the PKK battle for Europe.

The war against the PKK indebted the troubled Turkish economy and Turkey was dependent on loans from international allies. As a member of NATO, Turkey could expect support from the United States , through Turkey maintained its influence in the Middle East and in the unstable regions south of Russia . But Turkey would also like into the lucrative EU , which was critical ofhuman rights in Turkey.

Battle for Europe was most intense in Germany , where 500,000 out of a total of 650,000 Kurdish immigrants live. In Germany the PKK could organize the biggest mass demonstrations by up to 200,000 people, and in England they established a Kurdish TV channel that sent per. satellite throughout Europe and to the Kurdish areas (hereinafter the dish receivers prohibited in areas where a state of emergency in Turkey). Internet penetration was also a new arena for politically active Kurds and Turks. The PKK was the first Kurdish organization on the internet.

In Germany it went quickly wrong for the PKK. More demonstrations ended in violent fights with the police, even burnings and highway occupations, and in several cases had Kurdish demonstrators attacked and set fire to the Turkish restaurants. The violent actions had, inter alia, Based on the close German military cooperation with Turkey and substantial assistance to the country. Among other things, a large part of the former East German tanks sent to Turkey.

PKK asked people not to travel on holiday to Turkey without much effect. But when the PKK began to snatch a few tourists for a few weeks, disappeared half of the tourists. Turkey had long argued that the PKK smuggled drugs, and now it's hooked up to the propaganda. Turkey began spreading information about the PKK smuggled drugs, people, organized crime across Europe and that the guerrillas committed mass rapes and murdered infants in Turkey. Even claimed Turkish nationalists that the Kurds had only been invented by the PKK leadership of raping the Turkish youth in the mountains while shoveling money into drug trafficking and extortion. Germany banned the PKK.

Turkish soldiers holding proudly the decapitated  heads of executed PKK guerrillas. PKK's comprehensive  publication of the images cost in the mid 90s of Turkey  to the EU. Turkey claims saying that the pictures are  fabricated by the PKK.

But Turkey went over the line in the propaganda war against the PKK. In order to gain more weight behind the accusations clad Turkish military people out as guerrillas and committed regular massacres - only to pork PKK publicly. International human rights organizations discovered and has revealed the fraud. At the same time rolled a major scandal ("Susurlukskandalen") in Turkey, which revealed links between the Turkish elite and notorious drug kingpins. It was getting worse by the fact that the studies were classified nature. Turkey began to lose ground diplomatically. ERNK moved deliberately from one capital to another, when held major conferences. Greece was traditionally anti-Turkish set, Italy allowed rapid ERNK to open an office and France opened a Kurdish Institute in Paris. Ahead of an important vote on Turkey's participation in EU cooperation, had PKK had scattered four disgusting pictures of Turkish soldiers who proudly holding severed guerrillahoveder rather than the photographer next to guerrillasoldaternes equal. Turkey lost therefore the vote. After secret negotiations with Öcalan removed Germany in 1997 once the ban on Kurdish organization.

The same year a book was published in German, which was fatal for their support to the PKK. PKK dissident Selim Cürükkaya had since 1993 spread a manuscript about his experiences in the PKK. With the well-known German author Günter Wallraff's help they were able to get translated and published the book, after which they together went on tour across Europe to share the PKK's demonic nature. The book was primarily about a sexual taboo of the PKK and Ocalan accused of having destroyed the PKK. In PKK circles were not particularly trust the charges, but the PKK lost support from most moderate left inform Europeans. The question of the Kurdish case was complicated: In Europe, popular support for the Kurdish cause, but not for the PKK.

The book 'PKK, Abdullah Ocalan  dictatorship' written by PKK  dissident Selim Cürükkaya in  1997 was fatal to the party.

1998 Kidnapping of Ocalan

In 1998, the PKK declared a ceasefire again. Amid ceasefire threatened Turkey with war, and Syria let it drive to terminate cooperation with the PKK. Ocalan appeared suddenly up in Italy.Here he repeated his ceasefire declarations and called for negotiations. There was no response from political circles. Kurds from all over Europe flocked to Rome, where Ocalan was. In the bourgeois press could read that Ocalan was an unpredictable terrorist.

After some time went Ocalan underground and appeared in the skies above the Netherlands, where he hoped to come to an international tribunal, but was denied landing permission. Ocalan disappeared again and hid in a Greek Embassy in Kenya , but here he was tracked and entrapped by Turkish agents. Turkish TV cooked over of pride over here, which triggered the Kurdish uproar over the world and new flare-up of unrest in Turkey.

While Ocalan was in solitary confinement, prepared ERNK on a large-scale media offensive that would condemn Turkey's treatment of Ocalan. Ocalan was re-elected in absentia as the leader of the PKK, and his popular support had never been greater. But when Ocalan went to court, turned Ocalan everything and began thinly veiled sending negotiation messages to the Turkish top management. Ocalan took tactically a position where he handed out Greece and denounced several prominent Europeans who had defended the Kurdish cause. Finally distanced Ocalan from a "violent faction of the PKK" and took revenge on Selim Cürükkaya by laying the blame for Palm murder of PKK Vejin - a breakaway group of PKK as highly praised in Cürükkaya / Wallraff's book.

After some days of gaping silence confirmed guerrillaledelsen Ocalan. The trial ended with a predictable death sentence for an interesting course, and after the trial continued Ocalan in directing the PKK's policy through public statements. In the summer of 1999, stated that Ocalan from his prison cell that the armed struggle was an obstacle to a political solution. The guerrillas confirmed the statement and declared that the PKK after a truce in 1999 would stop the armed struggle.

Throughout its development was the PKK helped along by a series of Turkish political mistakes, and the PKK was adept at exploiting the flaws. PKK has always been identified with Öcalan and vice versa. This has at once been an advantage and a disadvantage. Ocalan's personal ambitions infected the whole movement so that the PKK with highest cigar lead a relatively short time reached remarkable results. On the other hand, the focus on Ocalan, the PKK made vulnerable to a perception of the movement as a single tyrant work.

Uncertainty about Ocalan's leadership of the PKK has torn western leftists in moderate forces that problematize Ocalan, and radicals who support Ocalan. But regardless of the West's positions will the PKK Kurds go down in history as one of the main Kurdish organizations ever, loved by millions of Kurds. PKK's importance to the Kurds lies primarily in the substantial strengthening of the Kurdish national identity and group feeling, as well as in maintaining 20 years of record-long guerrilla war. This will undoubtedly make Öcalan to one of the largest Kurdish heroes ever.

JB-N.

 PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) -:DanishSource PKK (Kurdistans Arbejderparti)

Kurdistans Arbejder Parti (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan), (1978-), nord-kurdisk venstrefløjsparti, bedst kendt under sit kurdiske akronym PKK. Partiet blev stiftet i 1978 af omkring 50 mennesker, og voksede siden markant i styrke igennem sin væbnede kamp rettet mod den tyrkiske undertrykkelse af kurderne. Med et program baseret på socialisme, pro-feminisme, anti-feudalisme og anti-tribalisme udviklede PKK's oprør sig i løbet af 1980'erne og 1990'erne til at blive det største nogensinde i Kurdistan - både set i forhold til varigheden og til Tyrkietsanstrengelser på at holde oprøret nede. Centrale elementer i PKK's historie har været den dominerende lederskikkelse Abdullah Öcalan, en markant fremgang, et meget højt ambitionsniveau, samt en tendens til at ville tilpasse sig de politiske realiteter for at opnå resultater (med skiftende held).

I medierne ser man ofte PKK omtalt meget unuanceret, ofte præget af myter. Dette gælder ikke kun de borgerlige medier, men er i det hele taget en følge af, at der findes meget lidt materiale om PKK's historie.

Siden 1990 har den tyrkiske stat nedbrændt over 3500 byer og landsbyer i Nordkurdistan

Det kurdiske problem i Tyrkiet

Halvdelen af kurderne bor i Tyrkiet. Tyrkiet er samtidig landet, hvor kurderne udsættes for den værste undertrykkelse. Kort efter republikken Tyrkiets grundlæggelse i 1923 udstedte den nye diktator, den tyrkiske general og nationalhelt Kemal Pasha (Atatürk) et forbud mod kurdiske skoler, aviser og foreninger. Samtidig indførte Atatürk nogle vidtgående love rettet mod religiøs praksis. De religiøse kurdere gik i oprør, men det blev slået ned militært. Nye oprør startede, og der var næsten permanent oprør eller undtagelsestilstand i de kurdiske regioner helt op til anden verdenskrig.

I et forsøg på at vinde kampen over kurderne indførte Tyrkiet en tvangsassimilering gennem skolevæsenet. Kurdisk sprog blev forbudt, kurdiske navne på steder og byer blev udskiftet med tyrkiske, sågar kurdiske personnavne blev forbudte. De nye generationer skulle vokse op som tyrkere og med tiden glemme deres kurdiske rødder.

Efter anden verdenskrig så det længe ud til, at assimilationen var ved at lykkes. Der blev relativt ro i de kurdiske områder, og mange kurdiske stammeledere arbejdede nu sammen med de tyrkiske myndigheder. Ved at give stammelederne særlige privilegier fik Tyrkiet kontrol. I denne periode fik en del kurdere uddannelse, flyttede til de rigere vestlige dele af Tyrkiet og havde succesrige karrierer - som tyrkere. Nogle blev endda til ministre, generaler og fremtrædende forretningsfolk.

I forhold til det øvrige Tyrkiet forblev de kurdiske provinser dog klart fattigere og underudviklede. Andelen af analfabeter var stor, og de kurdiske stammeledere regerede med statens velsignelse som feudale herskere. Intellektuelle kurdere, der fortsat prøvede at bevare erindringen om modstanden mod Tyrkiet, blev let sat ud af spillet af de tyrkiske myndigheder, sat i fængsel eller sendt i eksil. (Se også: Kurdistan).

Tidlige 1970'ere: Før dannelsen af PKK

Kurdiske nationalister søgte i slutningen af 1960'erne og 1970'erne at knytte forbindelser til den tyrkiske venstrefløj, der voksede frem i ungdomsmiljøer på universiteterne - det vi i Danmark parallelt kender som «1968'erne». Samtidig blev der i det nordlige Irak udkæmpet en guerrillakrig mellem irakiske regeringsstyrker og den irakiske kurdiske organisation KDP. Den kurdiske sag blev på den måde et kendt tema i de radikale venstreorienterede kredse. Men generelt var der kun ringe interesse for kurdernes sag - de tyrkiske studerende mente, at problemerne ville blive løst «af sig selv», når den samlede tyrkiske revolution var gennemført. Mange kurdere brød derfor og stiftede deres egne kurdiske venstreorienterede partier.

I hovedstaden Ankara samlede den politologistuderende Abdullah Öcalan i 1973 en privat studiekreds af folk, der var brudt ud af en større tyrkisk studenterorganisation. Gruppen mødtes jævnligt for at diskutere den kurdiske sag og marxisme, og efterhånden konkluderede man, at statens vold kun kunne standses ved at kurderne organiserede sig selv og førte «væbnet propaganda» (propagandaaktioner rettet mod civilbefolkningen efter indtagelsen af boligområde eller landsby). Et kampkoncept som man tog med sig fra den tyrkiske venstrefløj. Folk fra denne kreds fik efterhånden forbindelse til ligesindede venstreorienterede kurdere fra det øvrige Tyrkiet.

1978 Dannelsen af PKK

I 1978 mødtes omkring 50 mennesker i al hemmelighed for at stifte det nye parti. Det nye parti skulle kæmpe for at få rejst en folkelig revolution, der i sidste ende skulle føre til en kurdisk stat på tværs af Tyrkiet, Syrien, Iran og Iraq - helst en socialistisk kurdisk stat. Man tog navnet PKK, delte Kurdistan op i aktionsområder, og vedtog en liste over forskellige forhindringer for revolutionen: Øverst på listen stod «fascister», (berygtede ekstremt højre-nationalistiske tyrkiske militsgrupper, også kendt som «de grå ulve»). Dernæst erklærede PKK sig fjender af «social-chauvinisterne» (de konkurrerende tyrkiske venstreorienterede partier, der negligerede den kurdiske sag), «agenter og statsstøttede netværk» (i de kurdiske regioner) og endelig «feudale godsejere og forrædere» (de traditionelle kurdiske stammeledere, der havde nydt godt af to årtiers samarbejde med det tyrkiske establishment). Abdullah Öcalan blev valgt som formand for et lille politbureau på syv personer.

Ved siden af en lang række lignende venstreorienterede partier og grupper, fandtes nu også PKK. De andre var bl.a. maoistiske eller trotskistiske organisationer, eller havde en leder med en berygtet fortid. Ligesom PKK erklærede sig fjender med de andre, blev PKK også hurtigt beskyldt for at være «falske socialister», som skulle bekæmpes på vejen til den sande revolution. Det venstreorienterede miljø var generelt fyldt med mistro og rygter på kryds og tværs i. Det førte til interne slagsmål, knivstikkerier og skyderier, og undertiden angav man hinanden til staten. Det var «naturligt» at være på vagt overfor hinanden i 1970'ernes radikale tyrkiske venstrefløjsmiljøer.

1978-84 PKK Flytter til Syrien

PKK fejrede stiftelsen med et attentat på et medlem af det tyrkiske parlament, den kendte kurdiske godsejer og stammeleder Bucak. Attentatet mislykkedes, og PKK fik en magtfuld, hævngerrig klan på nakken. Dette fik andre stammer - gamle fjender af Bucakklanen - til at blande sig på PKK's side, og PKK mistede hurtigt kontrollen over hvad der foregik.

Samtidig kom det hurtigt til væbnede opgør med konkurrerende partier. Flere skribenter der søger at forklare hvorfor PKK på få år fik elimineret stort set alle konkurrenter gætter på, at PKK udviste ekceptionel brutalitet i opgørene med de andre. De hårdhændede metoder var uomtvistelig én del af forklaringen, men det spiller også ind, at PKK i modsætning til sine politiske konkurrenter overlevede militærkuppet i 1980, og fra 1984 vendte tilbage for at gennemføre væbnet kamp. Der er fra perioden vidnesbyrd om særdeles blodige sammenstød mellem PKK og deres konkurrenter. Men PKK's aktioner og hævnaktioner blev udført hemmeligt og på lokalt initiativ. Der blev ikke rapporteret tilbage centralt, fordi ingen skulle vide for meget om de andre, hvis nogen eventuelt skulle blive taget på fersk gerning. PKK har selv internt rost sin ledelse for sin «beslutsomhed», der førte til fremgang. Men reelt havde PKK ikke selv noget overblik over, hvad der foregik.

En bedre forklaring på PKK's succes var en intelligent beslutning på et heldigt tidspunkt. Uroen i Tyrkiet tog til i slutningen af 1970'erne. I 1980 havde de tyrkiske generaler fået nok, særligt efter at forenede religiøse og venstreorienterede kræfter i nabolandet Iran året før havde væltet Shahens militærdiktatur. De tyrkiske generaler begik statskup i 1980 og rensede brutalt ud. I løbet af kort tid var hele venstrefløjen opløst; myrdet, fængslet eller sendt i eksil.

PKK var et af de få partier, der overlevede kuppet. I 1979 var Öcalan rejst til Syrien, og her havde han fået kontakt til palæstinensere, der kæmpede guerrillakrig mod Israel. I de næste par måneder fulgte flere ledende PKK medlemmer efter, og PKK fik lov til at træne 50 guerrillaer i palæstinensernes lejre. Disse blev sendt ind i Tyrkiet efter statskuppet, men enheden blev udslettet af tyrkiske tropper. Herefter holdt PKK lav profil og forberedte sig i Libanon på guerrillakrig.

1980-84 PKK i skjul

Kontakten til palæstinenserne gav kontakter til den syriske stats topledelse, og PKK fik sin egen base at træne rekrutter i. PKK lavede derpå en alliance med KDP - en meget større og langt mere erfaren kurdisk guerrillabevægelse i Nordirak. KDP gav PKK lov til at operere fra det nordlige Irak. Nye rekrutter kom til, bl.a. overlevende fra de mange smadrede grupper i Tyrkiet. I eksil lagde PKK en langtidsplan for revolutionen i tre faser: 1. Strategisk defensiv indtil 1990, hvor man forventede undertallighed og manglende støtte fra befolkningen, 2. Strategisk balance mellem 1990 og 1995, hvor man kunne forvente en blanding af sejre og nederlag, og 3. Strategisk offensiv, den endelige fase indtil år 2000, hvorefter man sammen med det kurdiske folk kunne føre revolutionen til sejr.

PKK partisaner øver sig i Mikado

1984 PKK genoptager den revolutionære kamp

I 1984 gik PKK til angreb. Forklædt som hestesmuglere (et normalt syn i grænseregionerne i Kurdistan) sneg nogle mand sig ind over grænsen til Tyrkiet og fyrede skudsalver af mod nogle militære barakker og stak af. Selvom PKK fejrede «sejren», fik angrebet blandede konsekvenser. PKK havde svært ved at følge det første angreb op, og der opstod et rygte om kujonerne, der stak af - et meget upraktisk ry i de kurdiske provinser, hvor traditionelle æresbegreber har stor værdi. Men man kunne internt glæde sig over det psykologisk vigtige første skud og søge at forbedre sig. Der blev nu brugt langt større energi på at finde støttepunkter, gemmesteder i bjergene og lignende, så man kunne gennemføre en ordentlig væbnet kampagne.

PKK blev dygtigere. Man samlede i 1985 og 1986 nye enheder, der taktisk kunne samles og splittes efter Vietcong-forbillede. Tre mand i mindste enhed, tre af disse grupper samlet i større enhedstyper, igen tre af disse til de største enheder. Efter angreb stak man af og splittedes løbende op, så modstanderen ikke kunne fange guerrillaerne. Kurderne begyndte efterhånden at kende PKK som «guerrillaen» fremfor «studenterne». Men selvom man var blevet bedre, døde mange folk i kamp, og der kom ikke tilstrækkeligt med nye rekrutter til at udfylde tabene. «Kurdistans Nationale Befrielses Front» ERNK blev oprettet i 1985 for at lave propaganda for PKK, mens «Kurdistans Nationale Befrielses Hær» ARGK fastholdt guerrillakrigen. Opdelingen var ikke så klar i starten - ERNK's propaganda var «væbnet propaganda», hvilket førte til stort set de samme som aktioner som ARGK's. Efterhånden udviklede PKK dog en klarere opdeling mellem ERNK som en politiske gren, mens ARGK stod som den militære gren.

1986 Tyrkiske modtræk

I 1986 reagerede Tyrkiet ved at oprette «midlertidige» vagtværn i de kurdiske landsbyer. Udvalgte kurdere fik betaling fra staten for at holde øje med deres lokalområder. Således foretrak centralmagten at betale kurderne til at bekæmpe hinanden fremfor at blande sig direkte. Men den tyrkiske strategi gav fatale bagslag. Vagtværnene blev organiseret af kurdiske stammeledere, som kradsede pengene ind selv. De enkelte vagtværn kunne sjældent komme hinanden til undsætning - de var for spredte - og desuden havde flere stammeledere benyttet lejligheden til at hævne gamle episoder mod nabostammer. PKK angreb herefter primært vagtværnene.

Den tyrkiske stat havde større held med at luftbombardere KDP-baser i Irak. Presset af Tyrkiet begyndte KDP at kritisere PKK for at angribe civile (vagtværnene) og truede med at opsige alliancen. Da KDP kontrollerede det nordlige Irak, var alliancen essentiel. En fløj i PKK begyndte at kritisere de hårde fremgangsmåder, også fordi der slet ikke kom nye rekrutter nok, hvilket var et tydeligt tegn på manglende opbakning i den kurdiske civilbefolkning. Uenighederne førte til et opgør på PKK's tredie kongres i 1986. Öcalans holdning var, at PKK tværtimod skulle optrappe kampen mod vagtværnene, og at kritikere skulle underlægge sig kollektivet. På kongressen sejrede Öcalans linie, og flere kritikere blev ifølge senere PKK-dissidenter henrettet, typisk beskyldt for at være tyrkiske agenter. Alliancen med KDP gik efterfølgende i stykker.

Alligevel kom Öcalans linie til at give resultater. Tyrkiet sendte hundredetusinder af soldater til de kurdiske områder, men disse kunne normalt ikke få ram på PKK, der som regel befandt sig i sikkerhed udenfor Tyrkiet. De tyrkiske soldater begyndte at udvikle særdeles grusomme kontraguerrillastyrker, samtidig med at selvbestaltede nationalistiske militser fik carte blanche af militæret til at udøve selvtægt. Hundredevis af landsbyer blev brændt ned, og tortur blev systematisk anvendt mod kurdere, mistænkt for at støtte PKK. Denne mistanke faldt på hele landsbyer, der ikke åbenlyst støttede staten og f.eks. stillede vagtværn.

I slutningen af firserne vandt PKK masser af sympatisører og rekrutter, fordi PKK var de eneste, der hævnede den tyrkiske statsmagts brutale metoder. I 1989 var antallet af guerrillaer nået helt op på 10.000 mand. Samtidig gennemførte PKK strukturelle forbedringer. ERNK tog initiativ til at danne netværk blandt de 650.000 kurdiske gæstearbejdere i Europa, hvilket gav en stabil strøm af nye rekrutter til politisk skoling og guerrillatræning i ARGKs lejre samt omfattende økonomiske støtte.

1990 Turgut Özal og tøbruddet i Tyrkiet

Berlinmuren faldt i 1989, og den internationale stemning af politisk tøbrud nåede også til Tyrkiet. I Tyrkiet startede en forsigtig debat om den ensidige satsning på en militær løsning. Den uerklærede krig havde kostet Tyrkiet dyrt, skadet landets internationale prestige og så ikke ud til at føre til sejr. I den situation begyndte Öcalan at give interviews til tyrkisk presse.

Öcalan viste nye sider af sig selv. Han ville gerne forhandle og stoppe krigen, og han ville ikke kræve «urealistiske krav» forud for forhandlingerne. Forventningerne til en politisk løsning steg, da Öcalan droppede kravet om en uafhængig kurdisk stat. De steg yderligere, da den tyrkiske præsident Turgut Özal i tyrkiske medier omtalte Öcalan som «hr. Öcalan», og offentligt indrømmede, at Özal selv havde kurdiske familierødder. Flere toppolitikere fulgte efter og erklærede, at også de anerkendte eksistensen af den kurdiske identitet, omend de samtidig pointerede, at man «ikke kan forhandle med terrorister.» I et par år udvekslede Öcalan og Özal politiske signaler gennem journalister.

Imens udviklede krigen sig med stadig større intensitet. De tyrkiske generaler drømte fortsat om at besejre PKK militært, og den tyrkiske hær begyndte at gennemføre raids ind over grænsen til Irak på jagt efter guerrillaer. Sympatien for PKK og hadet til den militære overvågning af de kurdiske provinser førte til flere blodige uroligheder og opstande i større kurdiske byer, hvor børn kastede med sten mod soldater. Med tiden fik PKK den folkelige opbakning, man fra start havde erklæret sig i besiddelse af. Endvidere blev et kurdisk parti valgt ind i det tyrkiske parlament.

I marts 1993 forsøgte Öcalan at genoplive den positive stemning fra starten af halvfemserne med en overraskende erklæring om ubetinget, ensidig våbenhvile. Öcalan henviste til det lille kurdiske parti DEP som forhandlingspartnere for tyrkerne (fordi alle tyrkiske politikere havde erklæret sig uvillige til at tale direkte med PKK). Men pludselig døde præsident Turgut Özal i april 1993. Tyrkiet havde udsat en planlagt offensiv, men ikke standset den lokale forfølgelse af PKK. I maj 1993 afbrød PKK våbenhvilen med et blodigt angreb på 33 tyrkiske soldater på orlov. Efter lidt tøven indrømmede Öcalan, at det var PKK's værk og sagde, at det skyldes «statens overtrædelser af våbenhvilen». Senere erklærede Öcalan, at det var en PKK-kommandør, der i protest mod Öcalans opgivelse af basiskravet om en uafhængig stat bevidst havde saboteret våbenhvilen.

1993 Nye krigshandlinger og ny styrke

En ny fase af krigen startede og blev så brutal som aldrig før. Det kurdiske parti blev illegaliseret ved en politisk retssag, som anklagede lederne for «støtte til terrorisme». Et nyt blev dannet, men det blev også elimineret på samme måde kort tid senere, efter at have været udsat for bombesprængninger, fængslinger af tilfældige medlemmer på alle niveauer og alskens chikane. Ved at lukke det eneste legale udtryk for den kurdiske sag, blev PKK blot mere populær end nogensinde før.

PKK's popularitet blev efterhånden stærk nok til at mobilisere store masser af kurdiske gæstearbejdere i Europa, der strømmede til de kurdiske foreninger, organiseret eller infiltreret af ERNK. Også moderate kurdere støttede i stort tal op bag PKK, fordi Tyrkiet efterlod PKK som eneste repræsentant for den kurdiske sag i Tyrkiet. Den kurdiske befolkning var dog fortsat splittet - mange kurdere var i efterkrigstidens rolige perioder blevet assimileret ind i det tyrkiske samfund, og denne gruppe led under den voksende generelle tyrkiske mistro mod kurdere som potentielle terrorister. En anden gruppe af kurdiske muslimer forblev mistænksomme overfor de socialistisk ugudelige og pro-feministiske PKK'ere, der stod for det stik modsatte afIslam. Herudover var der en historisk splittelse af de største grupper af kurdere i Tyrkiet fra kurderne i Iran og Irak. Men med en efterhånden permanent tyrkisk militær tilstedeværelse i det nordlige Irak begyndte PKK også at vinde frem i popularitet her. PKK blev således den første kurdiske organisation nogensinde, der udviklede potentiale for massesympatier blandt kurderne på tværs af de landegrænser, der deler kurderne.

Konsekvensen af de genoptagne krigshandlinger var i 1993 og 1994, at de tyrkiske tropper blev trængt i defensiven som aldrig før. Med et populært udtryk regerede Tyrkiet om dagen, mens PKK regerede om natten. ERNK åbnede kontorer i større byer overalt i Europa, hvorfra man provokerende udstedte visa til at besøge befriede kurdiske områder.

Öcalan prøvede igen i 1995 med en ny våbenhvile uden tyrkisk reaktion. I det tyrkiske establishment affærdigede man våbenhvilerne som et tegn på PKK's svaghed, hvilket måtte betyde, at man var tæt på sejr. Tyrkiet trappede desperat krigen op til et niveau, hvor man i bekæmpelsen af PKK's guerillaer, der næppe på noget tidspunkt talte meget mere end 30.000, indsatte over en halv million soldater permanent beskæftiget alene med bekæmpelsen af PKK.

1993- Kampen om Europa

Det var klart, at PKK aldrig ville blive i stand til at sejre militært. Efter mere end ti års krigshærgen var de kurdiske provinser forvandlet til en ødemark. Den tyrkiske kontra-guerrilla havde efterhånden udslettet adskillige tusind landsbyer, og millioner af kurdere var på flugt. Med sine tre millioner kurdere var Istanbul nu blevet byen med flest kurdere. De nye flygtninge levede under elendige forhold i barakbyer. Selvom PKK fastholdt sympatien og guerrillakrigen mod Tyrkiet, blev PKK sendt tilbage i defensiven på slagmarken, bl.a. fordi Tyrkiet efterhånden havde pulveriseret alt, hvad der lignede støttepunkter. I disse år åbnede PKK kampen om Europa.

Krigen mod PKK gældsatte den plagede tyrkiske økonomi, og Tyrkiet var afhængig af lån fra internationale allierede. Som medlem af NATO kunne Tyrkiet forvente støtte fra USA, der gennem Tyrkiet fastholdt sin indflydelse i Mellemøsten og i de ustabile regioner syd for Rusland. Men Tyrkiet ville også gerne ind i det lukrative EU, der var kritiske overformenneskerettighederne i Tyrkiet.

Kampen om Europa blev mest intens i Tyskland, hvor 500.000 ud af ialt 650.000 kurdiske immigranter bor. I Tyskland kunne PKK organisere de største massedemonstrationer med deltagelse af op til 200.000 mennesker, og i England oprettede man en kurdisk TV-kanal, der sendte pr. satellit til hele Europa og til de kurdiske områder (herefter blev parabolmodtagere forbudte i områder med undtagelsestilstand i Tyrkiet). Udbredelsen af internettet blev desuden en ny arena for både politisk aktive kurdere og tyrkere. PKK blev den første kurdiske organisation på internettet.

I Tyskland gik det dog hurtigt galt for PKK. Flere demonstrationer endte i voldsomme slagsmål med politiet, selvafbrændinger og motorvejsbesættelser, og i flere tilfælde havde kurdiske demonstranter angrebet og sat ild til tyrkiske restauranter. De voldsomme aktioner havde bl.a. baggrund i det tætte tyske militære samarbejde med Tyrkiet og en betydelig bistand til landet. Bl.a. blev en stor del af det tidligere Østtysklands kampvogne sendt til Tyrkiet.

PKK bad folk om ikke at rejse på ferie til Tyrkiet uden større effekt. Men da PKK begyndte at bortføre nogle få turister i nogle uger, forsvandt halvdelen af turisterne. Tyrkiet havde længe hævdet, at PKK smuglede narko, og nu skruede man helt op for propagandaen. Tyrkiet begyndte at sprede information om, at PKK smuglede narko, mennesker, organiserede kriminalitet over hele Europa, og at guerrillaerne begik massevoldtægter og myrdede spædbørn i Tyrkiet. Sågar hævdede tyrkiske nationalister, at den kurdiske sag kun var blevet opfundet af PKK's ledelse for at voldtage den tyrkiske ungdom i bjergene, mens man skovlede penge ind på narkohandel og pengeafpresning. Tyskland forbød PKK.

Tyrkiske soldater holder stolt de afhuggede hoveder  af henrettede PKK partisaner. PKK's omfattende  offentliggørelse af billederne kostede i midten af  90'erne Tyrkiets optagelse i EU. Tyrkiet hævder selv , at billederne er fabrikeret af PKK.

Men Tyrkiet gik over stregen i propagandakrigen mod PKK. For at få mere vægt bag beskyldningerne klædte tyrkiske militærfolk sig ud som guerrillaer og begik regulære massakrer - kun for at svine PKK til offentligt. Internationale menneskerettighedsorganisationer opdagede og afslørede dog svindelen. Samtidig rullede en større skandale («Susurlukskandalen») i Tyrkiet, som afslørede forbindelser mellem den tyrkiske elite og berygtede narkotikabagmænd. Det blev kun værre af, at undersøgelserne blev hemmeligstemplede. Tyrkiet begyndte at tabe terræn diplomatisk. ERNK rykkede bevidst fra den ene hovedstad til den anden, når man afholdt større konferencer. Grækenland var traditionelt anti-tyrkisk indstillet, Italien tillod hurtigt ERNK at åbne et kontor og Frankrig åbnede et kurdisk institut i Paris. Forud for en vigtig afstemning om Tyrkiets deltagelse i et EU-samarbejde, havde PKK fået spredt fire ulækre billeder af tyrkiske soldater, der stolte holder afhuggede guerrillahoveder frem for fotografen ved siden af guerrillasoldaternes lig. Tyrkiet tabte derfor afstemningen. Efter hemmelige forhandlinger med Öcalan fjernede Tyskland i 1997 atter forbuddet mod kurdisk organisering.

Samme år udkom en bog på tysk, der blev fatal for opbakningen til PKK. PKK-dissidenten Selim Cürükkaya havde siden 1993 spredt et manuskript om sine oplevelser i PKK. Med den kendte tyske forfatter Günter Wallraffs hjælp lykkedes det at få oversat og udgivet bogen, hvorefter de sammen gik på turne over hele Europa for at fortælle om PKK's dæmoniske natur. Bogen handlede primært om et seksuelt tabu i PKK, og anklagede Öcalan for at have ødelagt PKK. I PKK-kredse var der ikke speciel tillid til anklagerne, men PKK mistede støtten fra de fleste moderate venstreorientere europæere. Spørgsmålet om den kurdiske sag blev kompliceret: I Europa var der folkelig støtte for den kurdiske sag, men ikke for PKK.

Bogen «PKK, Abdullah Öcalans  diktatur» skrevet af PKK  dissidenten Selim Cürükkaya i  1997 blev fatal for partiet.

1998 Kidnapningen af Öcalan

I 1998 erklærede PKK igen våbenhvile. Midt i våbenhvilen truede Tyrkiet med krig, og Syrien lod sig presse til at opsige samarbejdet med PKK. Öcalan dukkede pludseligt op i Italien. Her gentog han sine våbenhvileerklæringerne og opfordrede til forhandlinger. Der kom ingen reaktion fra politiske kredse. Kurdere fra hele Europa valfartede til Rom, hvor Öcalan befandt sig. I den borgerlige presse kunne man læse, at Öcalan var en uberegnelig terrorist.

Efter nogen tid gik Öcalan under jorden og dukkede op i luftrummet over Holland, hvor han håbede på at komme for en international domstol, men blev nægtet landingstilladelse. Öcalan forsvandt igen og gemte sig på en græsk ambassade i Kenya, men her blev han sporet og lokket i en fælde af tyrkiske agenter. Tyrkisk TV kogte over af stolthed herover, hvilket udløste kurdiske tumulter over hele verden og ny opblussen af uroligheder i Tyrkiet.

Mens Öcalan var i isolationsfængsel, forberedte ERNK sig på en storstilet presseoffensiv, der skulle fordømme Tyrkiets behandling af Öcalan. Öcalan blev genvalgt in absentia som leder af PKK, og hans folkelige popularitet havde aldrig været større. Men da Öcalan kom for retten, vendte Öcalan alting om og begyndte slet skjult at sende forhandlingsbudskaber til den tyrkiske topledelse. Öcalan indtog taktisk en position, hvor han udleverede Grækenland og fordømte flere fremtrædende europæere, der havde forsvaret den kurdiske sag. Endelig distancerede Öcalan sig fra en «voldelig fraktion i PKK» og hævnede sig på Selim Cürükkaya ved at lægge skylden for Palmemordet på PKK-Vejin - en udbrydergruppe af PKK som blev rosende omtalt i Cürükkaya/Wallraffs bog.

Efter nogle dages måbende tavshed bekræftede guerrillaledelsen Öcalan. Retssagen endte med en forudsigelig dødsdom efter et interessant forløb, og efter retssagen fortsatte Öcalan med at dirigere PKK's politik via offentlige statements. I sommeren 1999 erklærede Öcalan fra sin fængselscelle, at den væbnede kamp var en forhindring for en politisk løsning. Guerrillaerne bekræftede meddelelsen og erklærede, at PKK efter en våbenhvile fra 1999 ville standse den væbnede kamp.

Igennem hele sin udvikling blev PKK hjulpet godt på vej af en stribe tyrkiske politiske fejltagelser, og PKK var dygtig til at udnytte fejlene. PKK er altid blevet identificeret med Öcalan og omvendt. Dette har på en gang været en fordel og en ulempe. Öcalans personlige ambitioner smittede af på hele bevægelsen, således at PKK med højeste cigarføring på relativt kort tid nåede bemærkelsesværdige resultater. På den anden side har fokuseringen på Öcalan gjort PKK sårbar for en opfattelse af bevægelsen som en enkelt tyrans værk.

Usikkerheden omkring Öcalans ledelse af PKK har splittet vestlige venstreorienterede i moderate kræfter, der problematiserer Öcalan, og radikale, der støtter Öcalan. Men uanset vestens holdninger vil PKK for kurderne gå over i historien som en af de største kurdiske organisationer nogensinde, elsket af flere millioner kurdere. PKK's betydning for kurderne ligger primært i en kraftig styrkelse af den kurdiske nationale identitet og gruppefølelse, samt i at fastholde 20 års rekordlang guerrillakrig. Dette vil utvivlsomt også gøre Öcalan til en af de største kurdiske helte nogensinde.

J.B-N.