Learning from the CIA's Village Defense Program in South Vietnam

Local defense forces and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: learning from the CIA's Village Defense Program in South Vietnam

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DOI:

10.1080/09592318.2014.959772

Jon Strandquist^a*

pages 90-113

Publishing models and article dates explained

• Received: 26 Jan 2013
• Accepted: 5 Jun 2013
• Published online: 12 Dec 2014

Article Views: 190

Abstract

This research note makes the case that if the US and its international allies are to successfully use ‘Local Defence Forces’ (LDF) to overcome counterinsurgency constraints in Afghanistan, current initiatives need to be significantly modified. A key issue is that the Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) LDF program is unlikely to be effective in filling security gaps in rural Afghanistan because, much rhetoric to the contrary, it is essentially focused on militarily combating the insurgency rather than fully developing local communities as counterinsurgency resources by winning their support for the Afghan central government. The CIA's Village Defense Program in South Vietnam, a counterinsurgency program that has thus far received cursory attention in current LDF literature, provides a useful counterpoint. Through a comparison of the VDP and VSO/ALP operational patterns, implications are drawn for current and future US counterinsurgency practice employing LDF components.

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Keywords:

• local defence forces, 
• Afghan Local Police, 
• US Special Operations Forces, 
• counterinsurgency, 
• Central Intelligence Agency, 
• Vietnam

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COIN US Army Manual – Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations

Originally posted on How to Fight ISIS Online:

from The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be Counterinsurgency (COIN) presents a complex and often unfamiliar set of missions and considerations. In many ways, the conduct of COIN is counterintuitive to the traditional U.S. view of war—although COIN operations have actually formed a substantial part of the U.S. military experience. Some representative paradoxes of COIN are presented here as examples of the different mindset required. These paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit it. The applicability of the thoughts behind the paradoxes depends on a sense of the local situation and, in particular, the state of the insurgency. For example, the admonition “Sometimes, the More Force Used, the Less Effective It Is” does not apply when the enemy is “coming over the barricades”; however, that thought is applicable when increased security is achieved in an area…

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COIN US Army Manual – Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations

from The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be Counterinsurgency (COIN) presents a complex and often unfamiliar set of missions and considerations. In many ways, the conduct of COIN is counterintuitive to the traditional U.S. view of war—although COIN operations have actually formed a substantial part of the U.S. military experience. Some representative paradoxes of COIN are presented here as examples of the different mindset required. These paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit it. The applicability of the thoughts behind the paradoxes depends on a sense of the local situation and, in particular, the state of the insurgency. For example, the admonition “Sometimes, the More Force Used, the Less Effective It Is” does not apply when the enemy is “coming over the barricades”; however, that thought is applicable when increased security is achieved in an area. In short, these paradoxes should not be reduced to a checklist; rather, they should be used with considerable thought. Ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations must be conducted, risk shared with the populace, and contact maintained. The effectiveness of establishing patrol bases and operational support bases should be weighed against the effectiveness of using larger unit bases. (FM 90-8 discusses saturation patrolling and operational support bases.) These practices ensure access to the intelligence needed to drive operations. Following them reinforces the connections with the populace that help establish real legitimacy. Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is Any use offeree produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. The more force applied, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. In contrast, using force precisely and discriminately strengthens the rule of law that needs to be established. As noted above, the key for counterinsurgents is knowing when more force is needed—and when it might be counterproductive. This judgment involves constant assessment of the security situation and a sense of timing regarding insurgents’ actions. The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted This paradox is really a corollary to the previous one. As the level of insurgent violence drops, the requirements of international law and the expectations of the populace lead to a reduction in direct military actions by counterinsurgents. More reliance is placed on police work, rules of engagement may be tightened, and troops may have to exercise increased restraint. Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more risk to maintain involvement with the people. Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction Often insurgents carry out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose of enticing counterinsurgents to overreact, or at least to react in a way that insurgents can exploit—for example, opening fire on a crowd or executing a clearing operation that creates more enemies than it takes off the streets. If an assessment of the effects of a course of action determines that more negative than positive effects may result, an alternative should be considered—potentially including not acting. Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot Counterinsurgents often achieve the most meaningful success in garnering public support and legitimacy for the HN government with activities that do not involve killing insurgents (though, again, killing clearly will often be necessary). Arguably, the decisive battle is for the people’s minds; hence synchronizing IO with efforts along the other LLOs is critical. Every action, including uses of force, must be “wrapped in a bodyguard of information.” While security is essential to setting the stage for overall progress, lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation, and restored hope. Particularly after security has been achieved, dollars and ballots will have more important effects than bombs and bullets. This is a time when “money is ammunition.” Depending on the state of the insurgency, therefore, Soldiers and Marines should prepare to execute many nonmilitary missions to support COIN efforts. Everyone has a role in nation building, not just Department of State and civil affairs personnel. The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than us doing it well It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done. Where the United States is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable HN leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant U.S. support. The longer that process takes, the more U.S. public support will wane and the more the local populace will question the legitimacy of their own forces and government. General Creighton Abrams, the U.S. commander in Vietnam in 1971, recognized this fact when he said, “There’s very clear evidence, … in some things, that we helped too much. And we retarded the Vietnamese by doing it. … We can’t run this thing. … They ’ve got to run it. The nearer we get to that the better off they are and the better off we are.” T.E. Lawrence made a similar observation while leading the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1917: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.” However, a key word in Lawrence’s advice is “tolerably.” If the host nation cannot perform tolerably, counterinsurgents supporting it may have to act. Experience, knowledge of the AO, and cultural sensitivity are essential to deciding when such action is necessary. If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next Competent insurgents are adaptive. They are often part of a widespread network that communicates constantly and instantly. Insurgents quickly adjust to successful COIN practices and rapidly disseminate information throughout the insurgency. Indeed, the more effective a COIN tactic is, the faster it may become out of date because insurgents have a greater need to counter it. Effective leaders at all levels avoid complacency and are at least as adaptive as their enemies. There is no “silver bullet” set of COIN procedures. Constantly developing new practices is essential. Tactical success guarantees nothing As important as they are in achieving security, military actions by themselves cannot achieve success in COIN. Insurgents that never defeat counterinsurgents in combat still may achieve their strategic objectives. Tactical actions thus must be linked not only to strategic and operational military objectives but also to the host nation’s essential political goals. Without those connections, lives and resources may be wasted for no real gain. Many important decisions are not made by generals Successful COIN operations require competence and judgment by Soldiers and Marines at all levels. Indeed, young leaders—so-called “strategic corporals”—often make decisions at the tactical level that have strategic consequences. Senior leaders set the proper direction and climate with thorough training and clear guidance; then they trust their subordinates to do the right thing. Preparation for tactical-level leaders requires more than just mastering Service doctrine; they must also be trained and educated to adapt to their local situations, understand the legal and ethical implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and sound judgment in accordance with their senior commanders’ intent.

Copyright notice: Excerpt from pages 47-51 of The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual by the United States Army and United States Marine Corps, published by the University of Chicago Press. (Footnotes and other references included in the book may have been removed from this online version of the text.) United States Army and United States Marine Corps The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual With Forewords by General David H. Petraeus and Lt. General James F. Amos and by Lt. Colonel John A. Nagl. With a New Introduction by Sarah Sewall. ©2007, 472 pages, 30 figures, 33 tables Paper $15.00 ISBN: 978-0-226-84151-9 (ISBN-10: 0-226-84151-0) For information on purchasing the book—from bookstores or here online—please go to the webpage for The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. See also: John A. Nagl’s foreword to the University of Chicago Press edition of The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam by John A. Nagl Instructions for American Servicemen in Iraq during World War II with a foreword by John A. Nagl Our catalog of history titles Our catalog of books about war and remembrance Other excerpts and online essays from University of Chicago Press titles Sign up for e-mail notification of new books in this and other subjects Read the Chicago Blog

The Future of Special Operations

Beyond Kill and Capture – By Linda Robinson – Linda’s Bio here

FROM OUR NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2012 ISSUE

Over the past decade, the United States’ military and the country’s national security strategy have come to rely on special operations to an unprecedented degree. As identifying and neutralizing terrorists and insurgents has become one of the Pentagon’s most crucial tasks, special operations forces have honed their ability to conduct manhunts, adopting a new targeting system known as “find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate.” They have adopted a flatter organizational structure and collaborated more closely with intelligence agencies, allowing special operations to move at “the speed of war,” in the words of the retired army general Stanley McChrystal, the chief architect of the contemporary U.S. approach to counterterrorism.

Implementing McChrystal’s vision has been costly. Spending on sophisticated communications, stealth helicopters, and intelligence technology; building several high-tech special operations headquarters; and transforming a C-130 cargo plane into a state-of-the-art flying hospital have consumed a large (and classified) portion of the total special operations budget, which has increased from $2.3 billion in 2001 to $10.5 billion in 2012. The investment has paid clear dividends, however, most dramatically in May 2011, when U.S. Navy SEALs, operating in coordination with the CIA, raided a compound in Pakistan and killed Osama bin Laden.

The target and location of that raid made it exceptional. But similar operations, which in earlier eras would have been considered extraordinary, have become commonplace: during the height of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. special operations units sometimes conducted as many as 14 raids a night, with each successive raid made possible by intelligence scooped up during the previous one and then rapidly processed. When decision-makers deem raids too risky or politically untenable, they sometimes opt for strikes by armed drones, another form of what special operators refer to as “the direct approach.” (The CIA conducts the majority of drone strikes, but special operations forces are also authorized to employ them in specific cases, including on the battlefields of Afghanistan.)

Dramatic raids and high-tech drone strikes make for exciting headlines, so the media naturally focus on them. But this attention, along with policymakers’ reliance on raids and drones, has encouraged a misperception of such actions as quick, easy solutions that allow Washington to avoid prolonged, messy wars. In fact, raids and drone strikes are tactics that are rarely decisive and often incur significant political and diplomatic costs for the United States. Although raids and drone strikes are necessary to disrupt dire and imminent threats to the United States, special operations leaders readily admit that they should not be the central pillar of U.S. military strategy.

Raids and drone strikes are rarely decisive and often incur significant political and diplomatic costs.

Instead, special operations commanders say the direct approach must be coupled with “the indirect approach,” a cryptic term used to describe working with and through non-U.S. partners to accomplish security objectives, often in unorthodox ways. Special operations forces forge relationships that can last for decades with a diverse collection of groups: training, advising, and operating alongside other countries’ militaries, police forces, tribes, militias, or other informal groups. They also conduct civil-affairs operations that provide medical, veterinary, or agricultural assistance to civilians, improving the standing of local governments and gaining access to and a greater understanding of local conditions and populations.

It is time for special operations forces to prioritize indirect operations. That approach — also called “special warfare,” the preferred term of its advocates in the U.S. Army — offers the prospect of lasting benefits with a smaller footprint and lower cost than the hugely expensive wars of the last decade. The indirect approach is not without its pitfalls, and the special operations community will need to reconfigure itself to execute it more skillfully. But it holds great potential for advancing security objectives, especially in a time of fiscal austerity.

DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT

In testimony delivered to the U.S. Congress last March, Admiral William McRaven, head of the U.S. Special Operations Command, said that “the direct approach alone is not the solution to the challenges our nation faces today as it ultimately only buys time and space for the indirect approach,” arguing that “in the end, it will be such continuous indirect operations that will prove decisive in the global security arena.”

Yet despite such high-level Read entire article here

Wahhabism - Please Read This

Wahhabism is not a sect. It is the name of a reform movement. It is the conduit of the modern spread of terrorism. The previous Posts show you legislation regarding Saudi Arabia's influence and spread of Wahhabism in America. The goal of the Wahhabist propaganda is to create more terrorists. This ideology "Wahhabism" has recent roots in Serbia, Bosnia, Somalia, Sudan, Algeria, and is spreading. It teaches hate, much like the Hitler Youth Movement in the 1930's, the terrorists/Wahhabists goals are to brain wash young minds and mold them into people who will hate anyone who does not follow their views. Currently the European infestation of the Wahhabi ideology stems from the Bosnia War. The Wahhabist are the people who wage Jihad. They spread hate propaganda much like Hitler and Gerbil. We must stop these people by any means necessary. My Next Post I will give some insight into how to spot a follower of Wahhabism.- Ian Bach

The following is some of the information I found regarding Jihad and Wahhabism and how it has spread throughout the World and why it must be stopped as soon as possible. - Ian Bach

Wahabism is a branch of Islam practiced by those who follow the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, after whom the movement is named. Ibn Abdul Wahhab, who reintroduced Shariah (Islamic) law to the Arabian peninsula, was influenced by the writings of scholars such as Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya. This theology is the dominant form found in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, as well as some pockets of Somalia, Algeria, Palestine and Mauritania.

"Wahabism" is among the most conservative forms of Islam?[says wikipedia - I call BS on that. - Ian bach]

Others have described the doctrine as inspiring violence and intolerance. [I agree says Ian Bach]

Ibn Abdul-Wahhab went so far as to declare jihad against Muslims who practiced so-called acts of polytheism. Ibn Abdul-Wahhab's views were totally opposite to those of the renowned Muslim scholars of Mecca and Medina of that time. For example, he called intermediation of the Prophet an act of polytheism.

Wahhabis see their role as restoring Islam from what they perceive to be polytheism and innovations, superstitions, deviances, heresies and idolatries. There are many practices that they believe are contrary to Islam, such as:

• Listening to hymns in praise of the Prophet Muhammad
• Praying to God while visiting tombs (praying near the Prophet Muhammad's tomb is also considered polytheism by the Wahhabis)
• Blindly following any madhhabs (schools of thought) of Islamic jurisprudence in their legal expertise, "except for one who is under necessity and can not reach the Sunnah
• Using non-literal explanations of God's attributes exclusively in preference to literal explanations.
• Celebrating the milad (birthday of the Prophet Muhammad )
• Supposed or actual innovations (bid'ah) in matters of religion (e.g. new supplementary methods of worship or laws not sanctioned by Ibn Abdul-Wahab)
• Killing of any Muslim or Non-Muslim who opposes them in any way
• Killing of Muslims who interact the Non-Muslim is considered as Jihad and the best way to enter paradise to the extent that it is more important than praying salat (one of the pillars of Islam).
• Killing of Innocent Women and children as acceptable even if they are casulty of war, although in Islam these group of people are protected whether Muslims or non-Muslims.

Wahhabism also denounces "the practice of unthinking adherence to the interpretations of scholars and the blind acceptance of practices that were passed on within the family or tribe. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab believed in the responsibility of the individual Muslim to learn and obey the divine commands as they were revealed in the Quran and in the hadith."

This theology spread into Oman during the mid 1700's AD where it played a role in the internal disputes and succession struggles of the country. Ultimately however, its influence lessened over time

Modern spread of Wahhabism

In 1924 the al-Saud dynasty (who were influenced by the teachings of Abdul Wahhab) conquered Mecca and Medina, the Muslim holy cities. This gave them control of the Hajj, the annual pilgrimage, and the opportunity to preach their version of Islam to the assembled pilgrims. However, Wahhabism was a minor current within Islam until the discovery of oil in Arabia, in 1938. Vast oil revenues gave an immense impetus to the spread of conservative Islamic theology. Saudi laypeople, government officials and clerics have donated many tens of millions of US dollars to create religious schools, newspapers and outreach organizations.

Wahhabism is also thought to have had a large impact on the Qatar peninsula. It was embraced by many of the tribes of the peninsula and was a motivating factor in the efforts of the Al Thani clan (the current ruling dynasty of Qatar) to resist attempted conquest by the Al Khalifa clan (the current ruling dynasty of Bahrain) who rejected Wahhabism. Wahhabism also set Qatar apart from the rest of the Persian Gulf States. This may have been part of the reason that Qatar did not join the United Arab Emirates as was suggested by the British at the time.

Wahhabism in Qatar and Saudi Arabia

Get out your Google Earth and check look at Qatar this is a small country but it is significant in the war on terror. There are many followers of Wahhabism here. Wahhabism started in mid 1700s in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism faded out for many years up until about the early 1900's

It has spread now to many other Countries. These include Pakistan, Algeria, Somalia, Sudan, Qatar, Palestine, Serbia, Bosnia, and now it is being spread throughout Europe, Americas, Southeast Asia, and even Australia. Saudi Arabia has been a big producer of propaganda magazines to spread Wahhabism. In 2005 the US Senate started to take further actions against the hate propaganda.

Please understand not all Saudis' or Arabs are Wahhabist. But today most of the people approx. 90% mostly the poor and disenfranchised in Saudi Arabi are followers of wahhabism. The Royal Family are not followers and do not want Wahhabism. Since about 1995 Bin Laden and his followers have sought to takeover the power of the Saudi Royal Family and to overthrow the Saudi Arabian government. There are some very powerful and influential people and some Clerics in Saudi Arabia who preach and spread Wahhabism. One area is in the Southwest of Saudi Arabia is where Bin Laden spent much of his time in the Mosques as a young man. This is where he first started to learn about Radical Wahhabism and he started to practice and preach the hate and lies that wahhabism represents. End Note....

NOTE: People like Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Al Zarqawy, etc... are the preachers and teachers of Wahhabism today. End Note....

Bin Laden who is sorta the bastard child of royal family had syrian mother who his dad divorced soon after bin laden was born. Bin Laden has never been a true part of royal family, he was not included in family vacations and he has been described as a loner during his childhood years, and this may be part of reason he talks so bad about, and hates the Saudi Royal Family.

Prior to 911 Sudan wanted to kick Osama out of Sudan, But the Saudi royal family had already disowned him by this point because of his actions. It has been stated by many reputable sources that Sudan attempted to hand Bin Laden over to USA but the Clinton Administration did not want the Liabilities that may have occured. This is about the time that Osama went to Afghanistan.

(In fact my investigations and that of others has shown that the Clinton Administration made many mistakes most of these were due to white house lawyers who felt doing anything would have unknown implications.... Well it's too bad they didn't make the move when they had so many chances.)

Saudis themselves do not use the term "Wahhabi", preferring to call themselves Unitarians - believers in one indivisible deity.

The Wahhabia movement Started sometime, around 1748 AD. The movement faded out somewhat until about 1928 when an alliance was created between the Wahhabi religious movement and the House of Saud - the family that has ruled the Saudi kingdom since its creation in the 1930s. In daily life, the Saudi religious establishment - the ulema - have imposed strict segregation of the sexes, an absolute prohibition of the sale and consumption of alcohol, a ban on women driving and many other social restrictions. The rules are enforced by the "mutawa", or religious police, who patrol the streets and shopping centres on the look-out for anyone breaking the rules.

Taleban version
There are some similarities between the Saudi interpretation of Islam and that of the ruling Taleban movement in Afghanistan. The Taleban, too, represent an unusually strict form of Sunni Islam - and restrictions on women, for example, are even tighter than in Saudi Arabia. But the Taleban are not Wahhabis. They belong to what is known as the Deobandi movement, named after the small town of Deoband in the Indian Himalayas. It was here that the movement was founded, in the 1860s, during the period of British rule in India. Over time, the movement has become a broad umbrella, including in its ranks Muslims who wish to remain aloof from politics - and others, like the Taleban, who are politically militant. It would be wrong to see either Bin Laden or the Taleban as typical of modern Sunni movements. They represent a radical fringe, rather than the Sunni mainstream.

Al jazeera TV is a propaganda of hate and lies Wahhabi use this to Spread their lies and to create more fear and to recruit more followers.

Recently Al Jazeera TV started to air its hate and lies in English. But American Business men made sure that all TV networks and Cable Providers would not broadcast Al Jazeera in America. But the al Jazeera TV station has gained more listeners. Now Iran has announced a new 24/7 Satelite TV station and this is very bad for all the world.

The War on Terrorism - Stand up and join up and help

3/6/2007

More news...

Coordinating a national strategy against terrorism, more...		Providing aid to those in need, more...
Securing information, logistical and military support, more...		Mobilizing troops for action, more..
Freezing Assets, establishing Terrorist Financing List, more...		Investigating leads, analyzing threaths, arresting suspects, more...
Providing emergency assistance to those in need, more... Federal Agencies and Resources Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Aviation Adminstration Federal Emergency Management Agency FirstGov.gov Department of Defense Department of Health and Human Services Department of Justice Department of Labor Department of State Department of Transportation Department of Treasury Office of Personnel Management		How You Can Help The Relief Effort Libertyunites.org links to relief organizations frequently asked questions Red Cross Information 1-866-GET-INFO (866-438-4636) 800-526-1417 TDD The Investigation Federal Bureau of Investigation 1-866-483-5137

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FBI starts removing the illegal Botnets

Mon Jun 18, 2:59 PM ET

WASHINGTON (AFP) - The FBI is in the process of locating and notifying the users of one million computers controlled by hackers through automated crime networks or "botnets," officials said Friday.

Authorities announced this week three arrests in separate schemes to infect computers to allow them to be remotely controlled by malicious software, usually sent by spam e-mail.

FBI special agent Richard Kolko said "the vast majority" of the million computers were in the United States but added that "it's a global problem" and the US authorities have worked with partners from as many as 60 countries in the investigations.

"The majority of victims are not even aware that their computer has been compromised or their personal information exploited," said FBI assistant director for the cyber division James Finch in a statement.

"An attacker gains control by infecting the computer with a virus or other malicious code and the computer continues to operate normally," he said.

"Citizens can protect themselves from botnets and the associated schemes by...

(click here for full article)

FBI WARNING: The FBI will not contact victims on-line. Any e-mails that look like it is from the FBI is likely a virus and should be viewed with caution and reported. Because they could be part of a malicious phishing scheme attempting to exploit this issue.

Never give up never surrender

I decided that because there is so many times that I want (or need) to vent and times I just want to get stuff off my chest. It is bad to keep stuff bottled up inside and publishing my personal life on my counter terrorism Blog is not the place for it.

I don't want to distract from my goals here about creating awareness and bring real News, and News about good things that the Media doesn't talk about.

I also want to keep this Blog focused on my most important goal of exposing terrorist propaganda and creating awareness.

I also plan to start to add info here on yahoo360 on how to stay safe while surfing the web, how to ignore/block unwanted comments from jerks, and mean people. I will attempt to teach how to keep you and your computer safe and clean from spyware, viruses, phishing, bank scams, and identity theft.

So I am not sure if anyone wants to see the other side of me but I decided to create a Journal Blog. It feeds to my dot com (www.ianbach.com).

The Address for the Journal is http://www.ianbach.com/journal/

I lived with Mormons for almost 3 years back when I was young about 19-21. They are good people and the focus on family life and personal wellness. This is something that should be praised. They are taught to be very ethical, honest, good humans. One thing I learned was that they promote writing a Personal Journal and I do believe and all of them or anyone who keeps a journal will tell you that it helps them in many ways. - Ian Bach

Giuliani Broadens His Message on Terrorism

By MARC SANTORA

Published: April 26, 2007

nytimes.com

MANCHESTER, N.H., April 25 — In his two months on the campaign trail, the central animating theme of Rudolph W. Giuliani’s presidential campaign has been that his performance as New York mayor on Sept. 11, 2001, makes him the best candidate to keep the United States safe from terrorists.

But when Mr. Giuliani broadened that message here on Tuesday night, saying that Democrats “do not understand the full nature and scope of the terrorist war against us” and that if they were elected the United States would suffer “more losses,” the response from his Democratic rivals was swift and pointed.

Senator Barack Obama of Illinois accused Mr. Giuliani of “taking the politics of fear to a new low.” Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York used the remarks to link Mr. Giuliani to a failure by the Bush administration to quash Al Qaeda. John Edwards called the remarks “divisive and just plain wrong.”

The skirmishing, some of the most intense between the parties in the young 2008 campaign, suggests that a line of attack that the administration used in 2004 would again be a central Republican theme.

In his speech before Republicans here on Tuesday night, Mr. Giulani called the fight against terrorism “the defining conflict of our time.” If a Democrat were elected president, he said, they would “wave the white flag” in Iraq, cut back on surveillance of terrorists, restrict the ability of law enforcement officials to gather intelligence and limit interrogation techniques, curtailing their effectiveness.

“Make no mistake about it, the Democrats want to put us back on defense,” he said.

In the end, he added, the United States would prevail regardless of who was in office, but if it was a Democrat, there would probably be greater loss of life before that victory was achieved. FULL ARTICLE HERE