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Showing posts with label #iraq. Show all posts
Showing posts with label #iraq. Show all posts

Sunday, March 22, 2015

Kiwi soldiers identities to be kept secret are on way to #Iraq

The Government is keeping a tight lid on the identities of the soldiers being deployed to Iraq to ensure the safety of both them and their families from what it calls a barbaric terrorist group with "broad tentacles".
The New Zealand Defence Force's reconnaissance team has already arrived in Iraq and next month Kiwi troops were expected to be deployed to train Iraqi soldiers in the fight against Islamic State (IS).
While the threat to soldiers and their families shouldn't be a worry on a "daily basis", Defence Minister Gerry Brownlee told TVNZ's Q+A it was enough of a concern to warrant protecting the identities of all those being deployed.
The deployment would still be recognised at a Government level but their departure would be treated "a little different this time" to ensure all the right protections, he said.
"We shouldn't assume that New Zealanders aren't affected by this particular terrorist grouping. They have very broad tentacles, deep connections and extraordinary reach to people who are disaffected through social media such that we've never seen before."
Brownlee said IS was far more "financially resourced" in ways other terrorist organisations haven't been.
"They have a message that is very much opposed to the way of life that we enjoy here in New Zealand."
A status of forces agreement to protect New Zealand soldiers from civil and military court processes in Iraq is still to be worked out with the Iraq Government.

Swedish anti-Isis troops to #Iraq ‘before summer’

Well they will not actually be fighting these Swedes are being sent to train Peshmerga forces fighting #ISIS #daeshbags in #Iraq. - I.B.

Up to 30 Swedish troops are likely to join the US-led coalition against the militant Islamist group ISIS in Iraq before the summer, government sources said Saturday, upping both the number of soldiers and speeding up the timetable for their deployment.
In January, Sweden announced it would join the US-led coalition against Isis militants in Iraq by contributing with 20 troops that would train Kurdish peshmerga soldiers stationed near the city of Kerbil in northern Iraq.
Now, the government is considering increasing the number of troops to 30, and deploying them within just a few months, a government source told Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet in an article published Saturday.
According to the newspaper, the Swedish army has already begun preparations for the deployment and a proposal could be handed to the parliament for approval as soon as April.
“The government has ordered us to plan and prepare for a potential Swedish military contribution to the coalition against Isil,” Swedish army spokesman Philip Simon was quoted as saying, using another acronym for the group.
Thomas Hegghammer, a terror expert at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, told news agency TT that the move could raise the threat level against Sweden.
“It could motivate someone to carry out violent acts to protest,” he said, adding that the more Isis is threatened on the ground in Syria and Iraq, the more likely the group os to to carry out terror attacks.
“There will be more attacks. We can already see a marked increase.” Earlier this year, Anders Thornberg, the head of the Swedish intelligence service Säpo, said that more than 100 Swedeshttp://www.thelocal.se/20150121/sweden-confirms-100-citizens-fighting-for-isis have been confirmed to be fighting for Isis.




Saturday, February 21, 2015

Muslims Condemn ISIS around the World !!

Muslims Condemn ISIS actions and declare ISIS are not true Muslims, ISIS are barbarians.
Around the World Muslims have protested and condemned the #ISIS / #ISIL / #Daeshbags atrocities, #Daesh is an abomination. Currently they control #Mosul in #Iraq and #Raqqa in #Syria. Their Defeat in #Kobane in Northern Syria finally has #ISIL on the run. The #Kurdish #Peshmerga have done an amazing job of pushing #ISIS out of Kobane and they are now pushing them all the way back to #Raqqa. The #Kurds in Iraq have #Mosul surrounded on 3 sides and are ready to oust them from #Iraq. But we are still waiting on the #Iraqi army. I expect the Iraqi Army will approach Mosul from the South or Southeast of Mosul. This should start in about a month but may take 2 months till the big battle for Mosul Starts. The #deashbags in MOsul have told the citizens in Mosul that they must give them one boy from each family to help #ISIS in the fight. Lets hope these unwilling recruits will turn their guns on #ISIL. I hope that we wil see what happened in Baquba in 2007 when the citizens helped point out where the terrorists were hiding.


Monday, February 16, 2015

Whats going to happen in next 2 Months in Iraq?

Even without a crystal ball we can make a few assumptions based on what we see going on the Ground.

Kurds have Mosul surrounded on North West and East

Iraq's Prime Minister says they are preparing to retake Mosul from ISSI / Daesh

ISIS has recently moved Southeast of Mosul and almost have control of the town al-Baghdadi

al-Baghdadi is City near the al-Asad airport where U.S. troops are training Iraqi Army Units.

I am hoping we will see the IA Iraqi Army move through al-Baghdadi on their way to the Southern boarders of the city of Mosul. However that is not that likely. One sad note will be the people who Daesh have co-opted on their way across Western Iraq last year, and those within Mosul. Daesh has already made it clear they expect each family iin Mosul to have one of their sons join Daesh in their attempts to hold back the Peshmerga and Iraqi Army. Hopefully and I am expecting this we may not see the Shiite militias involved expect maybe some top commanders aidiing the Iraqi Army IA battle commanders. The reason I hope we do not see them in the battle for Mosul is it would send the wrong message to Sunni Tribes in the Anbar Provence. I would love to see local Anbar militias join in on the battle to take back Mosul. It would send a good strong message the Government is willing to work with, and include them, However it is unlikely we would see that happen. The Anbar militias have been meeting with the U.S. Government to try get heavy weapon for the Suni Militias. The U.S. governments position so far has been to give all Weapons and Ammo to the Iraqi Government. This requirement has ended up with the Shiite militias getting all the best weapons while the Kurds and Sunni tribes have been denied shipments of heavy weapons, (which they both desperately need). ISIS has been targeting and killing many Sunni shieks and any other high profile military, religious and/or other high rank persons of interest.




Map of Kurdish Populations throughout Syria Iraq Iran and Turkey


Saturday, February 14, 2015

Battle for Iraq and Syria in maps

The rapid advance across Syria and Iraq by militant fighters from Islamic State (IS) in 2014 threw the region into chaos and led to US air strikes against their key positions.
By June, the jihadist group, which has fighters from across the world, announced the establishment of a "caliphate" - an Islamic state - stretching from Aleppo in Syria to the province of Diyala in Iraq.
The US went on to assemble a coalition to fight the militants, and has so far launched more than 1,200 air strikes against IS targets in Iraq since the campaign began on 8 August. Meanwhile, the UK launched its first air strikes on 30 September.
In neighbouring Syria, the US, along with Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, has also carried out more than more than 900 attacks on IS-held areas since 23 September 2014.
US President Barack Obama has warned his coalition allies they are facing a "long-term campaign".

Militants from abroad
The US Central Intelligence Agency believes IS may have up to 31,000 fighters in the region, many of whom are foreign recruits.
Chart showing the origin and number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq

Figures from the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) and the New York-based Soufan Group show an estimated 20,000 fighters from almost 80 countries have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight with extremist groups.
The figures suggest that while about a quarter of the foreign fighters are from the West, the majority are from nearby Arab countries, such as Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and Morocco.
World map showing origin of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria
Refugees
Almost four million people have fled abroad to escape the fighting in Syria. Most have gone to Lebanon and Turkey - but a significant number have also gone to Iraq.
Syrian refugees have put pressure on local services and infrastructure in Iraq - which is also having to cope with the return of many Iraqi refugees from Syria.
In addition, the UN estimates there are more than 2m Iraqis who have been forced to leave their homes to escape the conflict and are displaced within the country or elsewhere.
Map showing the number of refugees who have fled from Syria
Battlegrounds
One of the key battlegrounds has been the fight for Kobane, a town close to the Syrian border with Turkey.
Thousands of residents were forced into Turkey to flee the fighting, while coalition airstrikes targeted the advancing Islamic State fighters.
After months of fighting, in which about 1,600 people died, US Central Command announced in January 2015 that anti-IS forces controlled 90% of the town.
Strategically for IS, Kobane's capture would have allowed the militants control of key border territory. But although the liberation of the town is a setback for the militant movement, it still controls large parts of northern and eastern Syria, as well as northern and western Iraq.
Satellite map of Kobane
IS fighters targeted a number of Iraqi dams during their advance, capturing the facility at Falluja in April 2014. They went on to take Mosul dam in August, before US air strikes helped force them out later that month.
Map of Mosul Dam, Iraq
IS fighters also attacked the country's second largest dam at Haditha, but the area was secured by Iraqi forces In September.
In the course of its offensives in Iraq and Syria in June 2014, IS gained control of much of the oil infrastructure.
These refineries and the fields supplying them with oil have played a vital role in fuelling IS military units and in generating revenue for the group.
The coalition has targeted these locations in an attempt to damage IS capabilities.
Map showing oil pipelines and IS control













Wednesday, February 11, 2015

Peshmerga forces liberate 7 villages in northwest of Mosul

IRAQ-CONFLICT
Representational file photo.
Nineveh (IraqiNews.com) On Saturday, a source within the paramilitary Kurdish Peshmerga force said, that the Peshmerga fighters killed and wounded dozens of ISIS militants and liberated 7 villages in northwest of Mosul.
The source informed IraqiNews, “The paramilitary Kurdish Peshmerga forces, with support from the international coalition, have managed to liberate the villages of Kafraj, Dirm-Tussah, Dawanish, Ladwasa and Masra in the area of Wanki, located in northwest of Mosul,” pointing out that, “Violent clashes between the Peshmerga forces and the ISIS group resulted in killing and wounding dozens of ISIS militants, in addition to seizing a number of the group’s vehicles.”

Q&A: Why Sunni Extremists Are Destroying Ancient Religious Sites in Mosul

The Islamic State is demolishing tombs, statues, mosques, and shrines of importance to Christians, Muslims, and Jews.

A photo of a person riding a bicycle in front of the destroyed Prophet Jirjis mosque in central Mosul.
A boy bikes past the Prophet Jirjis mosque in Mosul, Iraq, on July 27, 2014. The Muslim shrine was destroyed by militants who overran the city in June.

Eve Conant
PUBLISHED AUGUST 2, 2014
Mosul has long been known for its religious diversity. Iraq's second largest city has been home to Persians, Arabs, Turks, and Christians of all denominations since it was first believed to have been settled in 6000 B.C. The ruins of Ninevah, one of the greatest cities in antiquity and former seat of the Assyrian Empire, lie within its modern city limits.
But now the Islamic State (IS) has arrived.
The Sunni extremists of the IS, previously known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have been working to erase evidence of that diverse history since they seized the ancient city on June 10. (Related: "Iraq: 1,200 Years of Turbulent History in Five Maps.")
By some estimates 60,000 Christians lived in Mosul a decade ago, a number that may have been halved over the past decade of turmoil but could now be close to zero following an order by the IS to convert, leave, or die. This month reportedly marks the first time in 1,600 years in Mosul that no Sunday Mass has been held. (Related: "Iraq Crisis: 'Ancient Hatreds Turning Into Modern Realities.'")
The IS is also trying to eradicate visual evidence of belief systems that don't follow its strict interpretation of Islam. The Sunni extremist fighters have removed or destroyed more than a dozen tombs, statues, mosques, and shrines—including shrines that hold meaning for Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike—such as the site believed to be the tomb of the biblical prophet Jonah, which was wired with explosives and detonated last week. The shrine of Prophet Seth, considered to be the third son of Adam and Eve, has also been demolished.
Archaeologists, historians, and many in the local populace are distraught. Iraqi-British archaeologist Lamia Al-Gailani Werr is an honorary senior research associate at the Institute of Archaeology, University College London, and a senior researcher with the Department of the Languages and Culture of Near and Middle East at the University of London. Born in Baghdad and educated in Britain, Al-Gailani Werr has worked extensively in Iraq, previously serving as a consultant to Iraq's Ministry of Culture for Baghdad's Iraq Museum.
She spoke with National Geographic about the physical and spiritual heritage being lost in Mosul today.
Were you at the Baghdad museum when it was looted in 2003, and are there similarities between then and what is happening now in Mosul?
I went to Baghdad in June of 2003, after the looting. There is a difference between what happened then in Baghdad and now in Mosul—no standing building was destroyed in 2003. Back then it was the looting of antiquities from the Iraq Museum and the illegal looting of ancient sites. In Mosul, it is standing and mostly religious buildings that are the targets, and many of are of great archaeological heritage value.
Mosul is one of the oldest cities in Iraq. Ninevah is now part of the city; it used to be just outside Mosul. During the 9th century onward, Mosul was the seat for all the Christian religious movements and studies. Just outside the city is one of perhaps the oldest monasteries in the world—Mar Mattai, or St. Matthews.
A photo of the Syrian Orthodox Mar Mattai monastery.
Mar Mattai, one of the oldest monasteries in the world, is in danger from the Islamic State's systematic attack on religious sites.
PHOTOGRAPH BY MICHAEL RUNKEL, IMAGEBROKER VIA CORBIS
Is that monastery safe so far?
I have not heard anything about Mar Mattai, so it could be still safe. Some say it dates back earlier than the fourth century, to the second century.
The Assyrian Empire dates to the first millennium B.C., but there are a lot of sites within the area that go back 10,000 years. Mosul is absolutely rich with archaeological sites. Rich with people too: The people there count themselves as being in the center of the world. The people of Mosul are very proud of their city. For Christianity, the Eastern Church in Mosul was really the church that spread Christianity to the east. Islam was also there from the beginning, when it came through Iraq in the seventh century.
Did Mosul change significantly after the U.S. intervention in Iraq?
Mosul was always diverse. There are several sects living there, different offshoots of Islam or Christianity. One is called Shabak, which is an offshoot of Shiite Islam; they've been living there quite freely, quite peacefully together. But in 2003 the fundamentalists did start having a foot in Mosul.
I remember when I was in Baghdad in 2003 and 2004, I heard there were streets in Mosul that people called Kandahar [the religious and political base of the Taliban in Afghanistan] because there were all these people who were fundamentalists and were dressing in that Islamic style.
A photo of elderly men leaving the Al-Noori Al-Kabeer mosque in Mosul.
Iraqi elderly men leave Mosul's Al-Noori Al-Kabeer mosque on July 9. The leader of the IS purportedly delivered a sermon there on July 4.
PHOTOGRAPH BY EPA
Have you visited the sites that have been destroyed?
I went to visit the archaeological sites in 2001. We saw Nabi Yunus [the tomb of Jonah], which has a mosque that has been renewed again and again. The minaret of Nabi Yunus was only from 1924 because the old one fell down. Nabi Yunus has been renewed quite often—during Saddam's time they did a lot of renovations. Mosul has a number of these shrines that go back to the 9th, 10th century, especially 12th and 13th century.
The shrine of Jonah, isn't that something of value not just to Jews and Christians but also to Muslims?
Yes, it has—or it had—a mosque over it. It's difficult to say when it was built, but Nabi Yunus stands on top of a mound that was probably an Assyrian temple. After the Assyrians it became a Zoroastrian temple. Then it became a church, and afterwards it became a mosque. In the 1990s, the State Board of Antiquity and Heritage did excavate at the bottom of this mound and they found the gates from an Assyrian palace.
Why is the IS destroying places that are also important to Islam?
They are shrines. The IS, or the fundamentalist Salafist people, don't think that it is right to go and worship a dead person. They are absolutely against that. So what they've been doing literally is destroying any shrine. Not mosques, but shrines. They did destroy mosques or smaller mosques that belong to the Shiites, but they consider the Shiites as not religious, as not Islamic.
The Shiite mosques are called husseiniya. The IS has been destroying them systematically, not only in Mosul but also other places. But then the minute they got to Mosul, they demolished a shrine which is from the 12th century. It was that of Ali ibn al-Athir, a historian and writer from that period who was accused even then of being an apostate.
Aren't they also, like the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, attacking relics that depict a human face or form?
We don't have that in these sort of shrines in Iraq, these human forms. That's mostly in Christian places. But they could destroy these in Christian places if they get to them.
The extremists also tried—and so far have failed—to destroy thecrooked minaret of Mosul, which is said to be 840 years old.
Yes, it is still standing. Next to it there's another shrine, and they presumably were intending to destroy it. I heard that they put all these explosives around it and asked the people who live around it to evacuate their houses.
But the local people have shown complete opposition to them, and there's another militia that came in and surrounded the place so the IS people left. So it's been spared for the time being. We don't know what will happen next. This is the most frightening thing, that minaret.
A photo of people walking on the rubble of the destroyed Prophet Jonah Mosque.
People walk on the rubble of Nabi Yunus, or tomb of the biblical prophet Jonah, which was destroyed by the IS on July 24.
PHOTOGRAPH BY AP
Why is that so frightening?
Because it really is more iconic to Mosul than even the tomb of Jonah. It's like the leaning tower of Pisa. All the Iraqis and the people of Mosul are so proud of it. It's a beautiful minaret. The Hadba Minaret is built of brick, which is all intricately decorated and is from about the 12th-13th century.
Why is the minaret crooked?
It is something to do with the geological ground—a structural fault. Most minarets in Iraq, and especially in Mosul, tend with time to lean slightly. That is one reason why minarets are always being replaced. However, the Hadba is still standing after so many centuries and has become the icon of Mosul.
What is the cultural value of these minarets and shrines?
They are very important. If we're talking about Islamic shrines, quite a number of them have very distinctive architectural domes. Because most of the domes in Iraq are built with brick, not many of them have survived. In Mosul, however, there are quite a number of them and they're being destroyed. From an architectural point of view, it's a great pity.
Has there been any other time in Mosul's history where its diversity has been so threatened?
Never like now where there is an evacuation of all of them [the Christians]. That was the lovely thing about Iraq—we lived all of us together, and it is politics that has interfered. This time it is fundamentalist Islam. I'm very angry about this. The Jews were in Iraq from Babylonian captivity. And then politics let them leave from the 1950s onwards, and now the Christians are going. I remember as a child my father had three childhood friends. One was a Jew, one was a Christian, one was a Muslim. That gives you a symbol of what it was like. (Related: "What Does It Mean to Be Iraqi Anymore?")
I also have an English friend in Mosul whose husband has lived in Mosul for over 20 years. He says he's had tea and coffee and Coca-Colas with every single Christian sect in the world. Because they were all there. This is how it was. I honestly can't believe that its going like this. It is a great pity.
PHOTOGRAPH BY AP

ISIS Barbarians Face Their Own Internal Reign of Terror

The internal bloodletting among ISIS factions has begun, and could get much worse.
The propagandists of the putative Islamic State would have you believe it is just one big happy family, righteously slaughtering apostates, enslaving women (literally), beheading and burning alive its prisoners, all in the name of God. But quarrels over a range of issues—from divvying up of the spoils of war to competition over women and, yes, the handling of foreign hostages—point to a lot of trouble beneath the surface of this terror army.
This is according to political activists in northern Syria, including members of the a group called Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently, which follows developments in ISIS very closely and appear to be well-sourced inside the city of Raqqa, which is the so-called Islamic State’s capital. The group reported on a failed Jordanianattempt to rescue Muadh al Kasasbeh, a downed pilot from the Jordan Air Force, and his subsequent execution, burned alive, weeks before the hideous video of his murder was made public by ISIS.
Commanders in the Aleppo Operations Room, a center coordinating activities of the U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army and other factions, tell The Daily Beast there has also been an increase in defections from ISIS ranks, especially among militants who have been selected for suicide-bomb missions.
On Friday, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that an ISIS cleric in Aleppo province who dared to criticize the immolation of Kasasbeh has been removed from his post by the “caliphate” leadership and will be put on trial by the group. The Saudi-born imam had said those responsible for the video-recorded murder are the ones who should be put on trial. ISIS has responded to criticism from Quranic scholars the world over, who say the execution was utterly un-Islamic, by posting a line on Twitter insisting it is permissible to burn an infidel to death. (For the record, Kasasbeh was not an infidel at all, but a devout Muslim who prayed before he took off on the mission that ended with his plane crashing, his capture, and his murder. But the caliph and his cronies claim they have the exclusive right to decide who is and is not a Muslim, and what is and is not the will of God.)
Some independent Syrian media reported that the head of the al Hisba police force in Raqqa, responsible for the enforcement of Sharia law, fled after trying to mount a coup. But Slaughtered Silently activists say the departure of Abu Talha al-Kuwaiti, along with nearly a dozen of his supporters, wasn’t the upshot of a takeover bid. They say it arose out of more petty but equally deadly disputes that had led to the execution earlier in the war of his patron, the governor of the Raqqa, who went by the name Abu Ayyub al-Ansari.
The ISIS leadership has issued no statement about any of these reported executions.
Punitive killings, the flight of some senior ISIS commanders, and the execution of more than 60 foreign fighters who wanted to leave in recent days risk provoking more flare-ups, say residents who recently escaped Raqqa.
When arguments spin out of control, they are elevated to the level of treason, and disobedience is automatically seen as rebellion deserving of summary execution, according to some of these activists.
Many militants feel greater loyalty to their sub-groups—whether based on nationality or ideological background. Others have tried to leave ISIS to join the ranks of Jabhat al Nusra, which remains affiliated with al Qaeda but also has proven itself an effective force against Syrian dictator Bashar al Assad.
“ISIS has erected barriers and checkpoints throughout Raqqa, because the defectors have freed some detainees from Jabhat al Nusra group,” says a Raqqa activist who goes by the name Abu Mohammed. “Most of the defectors have fled to Turkey after paying large amounts of money, while the rest went to the areas controlled by the Jabhat al Nusra group.”
Disobedience is automatically seen as rebellion deserving of summary execution.
The burning alive of Kasasbeh and the slaying of two Japanese hostages last month also prompted sharp divisions over whether the captives should have been swapped for militants imprisoned in Jordan or elsewhere, or whether they should have been slaughtered immediately without any bargaining or prolonged publicity-seeking, according to the Slaughtered Silently activists reporting out of Raqqa.
One of those, who goes by the name Hamood Almossa, says ISIS militants are divided into several competing groups: Some are extreme hardliners originally attracted by the harsh application of Sharia law; others are Syrian militants who now complain that they bore the brunt of the months-long fighting over the border town of Kobani and are reluctant to be used to reinforce ISIS units in neighboring Iraq. Still others are Gulf Arabs jealous of the power held by hardcore Iraqi militants who form the inner coterie of the ISIS leadership around Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The Gulf Arabs, many of whom are veterans from the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, feel excluded from overall decision-making.
North African recruits among the Islamic State’s estimated 20,000 foreign fighters are among the most disgruntled, the Raqqa activists say. They complain they receive less than Gulf Arabs, Europeans, and Chechens who are paid as much as $1,000 a month. They grumble about missing out on many of the spoils of war, including women slaves and jihadi brides. Like local Syrian fighters, North African recruits say they have been used as cannon fodder, especially in the battle for Kobani.
Last week, four Tunisian recruits who joined ISIS months ago were executed in the neighborhood of Rumaila in central Raqqa, say opposition activists. They were described as traitors. Two other Tunisians, possibly along with family members, were executed in the Eddekhar neighborhood of Raqqa.
The quarrels and executions trigger more cycles of revenge as commanders and groups compete and jockey for power and survival. The disputes over the fate of Kasasbeh and the Japanese captives “raised the ire of the [Raqqa] security office, which started to eliminate a number of members who have become skeptical about the application of the law of God,” says Almossa.
The ISIS infighting and internal disputes could be likened to the Reign of Terror stage in the French Revolution, when Maximilien Robespierre sent revolutionaries as well foes to the guillotine.
Activists and Syrian Kurdish commanders in northeast Syria say the failure to capture Kobani has been a key factor in lowering morale, especially among foreign fighters who had never experienced a serious reversal in northern Syria. Kurdish commanders in the once-beleaguered city say they have found mass graves of both Kurds and ISIS fighters in recent days, the most recent containing the bodies of 200 Islamic militants. They claim, too, some Syrian fighters with ISIS defected during the siege and escaped to Turkey.
Mideast scholar Martin Kramer warns “there is a temptation to pick up signs of fragmentation and extrapolate them.” He says: “All Islamist movements have such potential conflicts. Hezbollah, for example, was a coalition of Shiites from two very different regions of Lebanon (Bekaa versus South), but it never split because Iran mediated the differences.”
The question is who within ISIS is mediating differences and whether internal conflict-resolution can contain the terror army’s mix of multiple groups and nationalities.
But activists are hoping that the disputes within ISIS will worsen before the group’s leaders are able to find a remedy and prevent deeper cleavages. Commanders with the Western-backed Free Syrian Army say they assess that the arrest campaigns and assassinations have taken their toll on ISIS but argue it is difficult to gauge how widespread the discontent is and how perilous it is for al-Baghdadi.
“There is a lot of mutual suspicion among the commanders,” says Mohammed, an FSA battle planner in Aleppo. “We tried to exchange some information with an ISIS commander recently and within days he was executed.” 

Crazy ISIS crap - Mainfesto for Women in ISIS held territory

What ISIS Women Really Want - 

Translated to English click here for the PDF

Girls can marry at 9 then stay veiled and house-bound the rest of their lives. Quilliam, the counter-terrorism organization, translates an ISIS “manifesto” for Arab women.
LONDON — In late January online supporters of the so-called Islamic State—the group that now controls a territory larger than the United Kingdom, spanning the deserts of Syria and Iraq—began circulating a document entitled “Women in the Islamic State: Manifesto and Case Study.”
The Arabic text, which was uploaded by the all-female Al-Khanssaa Brigade’s media wing onto a jihadist forum used by ISIS, as the group is widely known, was distributed extensively among its Arabic-speaking supporters. But it was not picked up by Western jihadists, male or female. As such, it ran the risk of slipping unnoticed past non-Arabic speaking Western analysts. To avoid this, I decided to translate it (PDF).
The treatise—the first such document of its kind—clarifies a number of issues hitherto obscured by the language barrier. It attacks at length notions of “Western civilization” and universal human rights such as gender equality. It allows us to get into the mind-set of the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of women who willingly join the group’s ranks.
Much of what ISIS supporters claim on social media is designed to exaggerate, obfuscate and confuse. However, this document, clearly intended as a means of drawing in women from countries in the region, in particular those in the Gulf, presents something that is more akin to the realities of living as a female jihadist in ISIS-held territories.
From it, we learn that, while there are indeed all-female police brigades operating in Iraq and Syria and that, in certain circumstances, women may be called to battle, policing and fighting are very low on the list of responsibilities given to women. Rather, the emphasis throughout the manifesto is on the importance of motherhood and family support—in this sense, ISIS is no different from any other jihadist group. It is fundamentally misogynist and, within its interpretation of Islamism, the role of women is “divinely” limited.
The document is split into three sections: The first portion deals specifically with “Western” preoccupations like feminism, education and science. The second part is based on the author’s (or authors’) eyewitness account of life in the territories now controlled by ISIS, first in the Iraqi city of Mosul, and, secondly, in the Syrian city of Raqqa. The final section is a diatribe that compares life for women living in ISIS-held Syria and Iraq with life for women living in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in Saudi Arabia.
Importantly, this document is not in any way aimed at a Western audience. Indeed, that it went untranslated is telling. It is a well-known fact that ISIS has a large number of English speakers within its ranks, and we have seen plenty of evidence in the past that renders apparent their ability to have propaganda translated into fluent English, French and Russian. This one targets Arab women, no more and no less.
The text is, unsurprisingly, laced with references to the Islamic scriptures. However, the myriad references—overt and otherwise—to Saudi Arabia suggest that the target audience can be narrowed down ever further to women in the Kingdom. It is therefore unlikely that this was released January 23, on the same day as the death of King Abdullah, by simple coincidence.
ISIS propaganda is always carefully honed to a particular target audience. For example, all the videos and photo reports that make it into Western media are intended to find a home there—the atrocities they depict are, first and foremost, designed to provoke outrage in the international community, a tactic that is part and parcel of the ISIS polarization strategy.
But this document plays on themes strikingly different from those used by the chief recruiters of Western women to ISIS, its English-speaking muhaajiratpopulation.
The manifesto is written in typical jihadist patois, and some sections have an almost juvenile ring to them. It tries to convince its audience that it is a fundamental necessity for women to have a sedentary lifestyle. Indeed, this is her “divinely appointed right.”
The first section, especially, provides an illuminating look into the psyche, ideology and worldview of a female ISIS supporter. After cataloguing the ills suffered by Muslims at the hands of Western civilization, it turns to the question of education: Since scientific research is central to modernity, it thus follows that the pursuit of any knowledge (except that which regards religion) is pointless. The West’s obsession with studying “the brain cells of crows, grains of sand and fish arteries” is deemed a distraction from the fundamental purpose of humanity—to worship God.
This, the manifesto argues, has sullied humanity’s purity. In the same breath, though, the author(s) insulate themselves from accusations of hypocrisy by claiming that those sciences “that people need, that help facilitate the lives of Muslims and their affairs are permissible.”
Such hypocrisy is at the root of all extremist Islamist thinking.
The above argument then moves, almost seamlessly, into an angry response to feminism, the “Western program for women.” This, the manifesto argues, has failed. The blurring of lines between the roles of each sex has caused people to forget how to worship God properly—it is a distraction that is tearing society apart.
In its attempt to identify the root cause of it all, the manifesto blames the emasculation of men. Because, it is argued, “women are not presented with a true picture of man,” they have become confused and complacent, unable to fulfill their appointed responsibilities, most of which revolve around motherhood and maintenance of the household.
The implication is obvious—the men of ISIS are deemed to be “real men.” Therefore, to live a sedentary life within the so-called Caliphate, to be exposed to their “rightful masculinity” would not only right the wrongs felt by the “Muslim community” today, it would allow a woman to be a better Muslim.
The manifesto advocates education for women, but only up to a point. A woman cannot fulfill her role if she is “illiterate or ignorant”, the manifesto argues. A curriculum is proposed would begin when girls “are seven years old and end when they are fifteen, or sometimes a little earlier”.
Then comes marriage. According to this treatise, a bride can be as young as nine years old. From this point on, it is the woman’s “appointed role [to] remain hidden and veiled and maintain society from behind.” In a jihadist perversion of feminism, then, the importance of women is championed. She is deemed to play a vital role, but always from the background.
Meanwhile, she faces myriad restrictions and an imposed piety that includeshudud or fixed punishments for breaches, including beheading, amputations and stoning.
ISIS, as usual, adapts its rigid rules to suit its own circumstances. So, some of its women are permitted to leave their houses if they are going to study theology, if they are women’s doctors or teachers, of if they have received a fatwa saying they must engage in jihad “as the women of Iraq and Chechnya did, with great sadness” when their community was in great danger.
The case studies of women “in the shade of the Caliphate” portray their experiences through rose-tinted glasses. There are no references, for example, to the myriad abuses against women that are carried out in the name of implementing ISIS’s austere version of Islamism.
The final section compares how women fare in the Arabian Peninsula to what their lives are like in ISIS-held Iraq and Syria. A litany of the offenses carried out by the Saudi monarchy is presented covers issues that range from “higher education” to “driving.” The text implores women living in the Kingdom to migrate to ISIS-held lands, and to do so urgently.
For the ISIS ideologue, women have been appointed by Got with the qualities of “sedentariness, stillness and stability” and men, “their opposites: movement and flux.” The matters of adventure and excitement, themes most used by female Western recruiters trying to lure young girls to ISIS, are limited to the realm of men.