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Showing posts with label taliban. Show all posts
Showing posts with label taliban. Show all posts

Sunday, May 3, 2015

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: Books


Selected Books from the NATO Multimedia Library


Every Insurgency Is Different




CHICAGO — America faces a wide array of insurgencies across the globe, from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to the Taliban in Afghanistan, each one different in its aims, structures and strategies. So why do the United States and its allies take pretty much the same approach to all?
A “surge” briefly stabilized Iraq, but the same strategy failed in Afghanistan. Internationally backed negotiations succeeded in Bosnia, but have so far failed in Syria. Israel’s targeting of Hamas leaders has not degraded the group, even as the deaths of factional leaders have sowed confusion within the Pakistani Taliban.
This track record is spotty because the insurgents themselves vary tremendously, particularly in the social networks among their leaders, and between those leaders and the local communities in which they operate. All insurgents are not created equal, and so strategies need to be matched to the specific strengths and weaknesses of a group.
That said, it is possible to categorize insurgent groups as one of three primary types. The first, what we might call “integrated groups,” like the Afghan Taliban, rely on robust social networks to link leaders to one another and to local communities. They are resilient and cohesive: Despite various local feuds and internal disagreements, the Afghan Taliban have never collapsed into internecine warfare.
That cohesion helps to explain why the huge, decade-long American investment in counterinsurgency in Afghanistan has largely failed. Integrated groups can survive many of the standard prescriptions of counterinsurgency doctrine, leading to long, bloody conflicts. Only intense, often brutal, warfare, like Sri Lanka’s campaign against the Tamil Tigers, is likely to destroy or contain them.
Because organizations like the Afghan Taliban are unlikely to collapse quickly, governments need to consider deal-making as an alternative to protracted warfare, even if the groups pursue undesirable goals. They are cohesive enough to bargain with the government or international community, allowing them to implement agreements without splintering.
Insurgent organizations in another category, “vanguard groups,” have a tight leadership core but weak pre-existing links to local communities. They often emerge when urban, elite or foreign fighters try to mobilize parts of society with which they have few ties. Their cohesion lets them move fast and effectively, as the Bolsheviks did in Russia in 1917, or as Al Qaeda in Iraq did in the first years after the American invasion.
But unless they quickly embed themselves in local communities, vanguards are vulnerable to dissent and disobedience from below. That’s why Al Qaeda in Iraq was so susceptible to the Sunni Awakening in 2007. Similarly, the Islamic State has been able to rapidly expand as a vanguard, but its major weakness remains the possibility of counterrevolt by wary local allies.
Vanguard groups are also vulnerable to a wider range of government strategies than integrated groups. If their leadership is quickly eliminated or politically co-opted, the organization crumbles. The key to counterinsurgency against them, then, is to quickly target leaders while preventing these groups from rebuilding.

Vanguards present difficult dilemmas for peace processes, however: Even if leaders agree to a deal, they may not be able to persuade their local units to go along. Negotiating partners therefore need to actively bolster the leadership of such groups in order to prevent dissension and encourage unity — in other words, peace may require that a government support the leaders of a group it has long been fighting.
Groups in a third type, “parochial insurgents,” have a fragmented leadership splintered across powerful factions, despite existing under a shared organizational banner. They often emerge from loose alliances among distinct local networks. Their local ties make them militarily formidable, but leadership divisions leave them prone to internal splits.
The Pakistani Taliban is a classic parochial insurgent group that has been plagued by infighting, side-switching and an inability to build and maintain coherent strategies, even as it has been able to impose heavy costs on Pakistan’s government and society. These internal rivalries have triggered brutal violence against civilians to try to show a faction’s power, as in the group’s recent attack on a school in Peshawar. (Parochial groups shouldn’t be confused with truly fragmented organizations, like some of the non-ISIS groups fighting in Syria; such groups are fatally undermined by the complete absence of central leadership and are easily marginalized.)
Dealing with parochial groups presents a distinct challenge. Targeting the overall leadership — whether through violence or negotiations — is not very productive, since central control is weak. Killing top leaders may affect only their own faction, not the broader organization. Counterinsurgents are instead forced into long and messy campaigns focused on imposing state control at the local level.
Peace is also hard to negotiate and implement with parochial groups. Because of the weakness of central leaderships, local factions must be approached individually, an often protracted and byzantine process. Rather than grand bargains or overarching settlements, peace with parochial groups is built through live-and-let-live deals, cease-fires and local accommodations.
This diversity among insurgent groups means that some strategies that work in one place might be counterproductive in another. There is no such thing as counterinsurgency doctrine; rather, doctrines and strategies have to be tailor-made to unique situations, based on a careful study of the groups and the political, social and economic contexts in which they operate. Only then can America and its allies hope to stabilize conflict-weary regions of the world.
Paul Staniland is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago and author of “Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse.”

TALIBAN START SPRING OFFENSIVE




KABUL, Afghanistan — Months after President Obama formally declared that the United States’ long war against the Taliban was over in Afghanistan, the American military is regularly conducting airstrikes against low-level insurgent forces and sending Special Operations troops directly into harm’s way under the guise of “training and advising.”
In justifying the continued presence of the American forces in Afghanistan, administration officials have insisted that the troops’ role is relegated to counterterrorism, defined as tracking down the remnants of Al Qaeda and other global terrorist groups, and training and advising the Afghan security forces who have assumed the bulk of the fight.
In public, officials have emphasized that the Taliban are not being targeted unless it is for “force protection” — where the insurgents were immediately threatening American forces.
But interviews with American and Western officials in Kabul and Washington offer a picture of a more aggressive range of military operations against the Taliban in recent months, as the insurgents have continued to make gains against struggling government forces.
Photo
Gen. John F. Campbell, center, the top American commander in Afghanistan, insisted that it is within his purview to target Taliban insurgents who pose a threat to not just American or NATO troops but to any Afghan security forces. Credit Lucas Jackson/Reuters
Rather than ending the American war in Afghanistan, the military is using its wide latitude to instead transform it into a continuing campaign of airstrikes — mostly drone missions — and Special Operations raids that have in practice stretched or broken the parameters publicly described by the White House.
Western and military officials said that American and NATO forces conducted 52 airstrikes in March, months after the official end of the combat mission. Many of these air assaults, which totaled 128 in the first three months of this year, targeted low- to midlevel Taliban commanders in the most remote reaches of Afghanistan.
As early as January, when officials in Washington were hailing the end of the combat mission, about 40 American Special Operations troops were deployed to Kunar Province to advise Afghan forces that were engaged with the Taliban over a handful of villages along the border with Pakistan.
With the troops on the ground, the command for the American-led coalition called in airstrikes under the authority of force protection, according to two Western military officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the details of the operation were not public.
“They are putting guys on the ground in places to justify the airstrikes,” one of the officials said. “It’s not force protection when they are going on the offensive.”
Commenting on the continuing military operations against the Taliban, the top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John F. Campbell, vehemently denied accusations that he was putting troops into harm’s way just to enable more airstrikes.
He has insisted that it is within his purview to target Taliban insurgents who pose a threat not just to American or NATO troops but to any Afghan security forces. And his options on the ground were clear, he said in an interview, even if Washington’s public description of them was not.
“Washington is going to have to say what they say politically for many different audiences, and I have no issue with that,” General Campbell said. “I understand my authorities and what I have to do with Afghanistan’s forces and my forces. And if that doesn’t sell good for a media piece then, again, I can’t worry about it.”
He added: “Combat and war and transition, as you know, it’s a very complex thing. For me, it’s not black and white.”
The operations are continuing during a troubling stretch for the Afghan security forces, as the Taliban are continuing to make gains. Members of the nation’s military and police forces were killed by the insurgents at a high rate last year. And in the first three months of this year, things already appeared worse: The casualty rate rose 54 percent over the same period last year, according to one Western and one Afghan official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the figures were not public.
The danger was highlighted in recent days in the northern province of Kunduz, where the Afghan Army has been forced to send thousands of reinforcements to beat back a major Taliban offensive. In addition to threatening to claim at least one district, the insurgents have come within a few miles of the provincial capital, officials in Kunduz said. Coalition forces deployed jets to the area in a show of force but no munitions were dropped, officials said.
In that environment, American military officials have been reluctant to let go of the war, arguing that their involvement remains necessary given the Taliban threat and changing regional factors.
But in March, when Mr. Obama and President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan publicly announced that they had agreed to slow the withdrawal of American troops, administration officials emphasized that counterterrorism and training were still the focus, not everyday combat missions against the Taliban. The idea of the extended timeline was to bolster the ability of Afghans to fight, officials said, not to directly fight on their behalf.
Now, though, the distance seems to be widening between the administration’s public statements and what the military appears to be doing, whether at the behest of the White House or on its own, officials here said.
“What I’m thankful for is that I have the authority and flexibility to make those very tough decisions,” General Campbell said. “They could have said, ‘Every time you hit a target, you have to get approval.’ ”
Beyond any discrepancy over mission descriptions, American airstrikes in Afghanistan have a fraught history. A high number of civilian casualties in such strikes created increasing tensions with Afghan officials and the public, and in recent years those missions had been sharply restrained to cut the risk.
Even though American officials argue that drone strikes are controlled and precise, in truth they have been far from trouble free — a fact highlighted last week when news surfaced that an American drone strike had accidentally killed American and Italian hostages of Al Qaeda in Pakistan.
Still, General Campbell has found strong support from Mr. Ghani, who became the president in September. Many officials characterize their relationship as a strikingly close partnership: General Campbell visits the president nearly every day — more than any other Western official in the country — and the commander’s staff has been tasked with not only helping to write policy for the Afghan forces but also helping direct overall strategy, at a time when the war is meant to be entirely in the hands of the Afghans.
Mr. Ghani, who has yet to name a minister of defense, has in many ways outsourced much of the running of the war to General Campbell.
Some Western officials have privately expressed discomfort with the American role and questioned how prolonging the American strategy in Afghanistan would be more effective this year than it was in the past 13.
“I’m not surprised they are continuing in this way,” said one Western diplomat living in Kabul. “What’s surprising is how much of it they’re doing.”
Many of the strikes described by officials had no discernible basis for force protection or terrorist hunting. One included an attack in Kunar Province that wounded two miners; another in Ghazni killed several “common Taliban fighters,” and, at most, one Taliban commander, according to the head of the provincial peace council.
In February, a disaffected ex-Taliban leader was killed in a drone strike in remote Helmand Province. Though the commander, Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim, had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, there was no evidence he had been staging or even planning significant operations.
When asked to justify the strike, the American military did not say it was for counterterrorism purposes but rather described it as force protection — despite there having been no American forces stationed in the area for years.
When asked about that decision, General Campbell responded with a question of his own: “Do you know what was in his mind?” he said of Mullah Khadim.
The military has said that it is authorized to send out Special Forces trainers at the ground level, but that they are not to advance on the target with their Afghan counterparts. In hostile areas, however, those restrictions do not often mean very much.
This month, for example, an American Special Forces soldier was shot in the chest while advising Afghan commandos conducting an operation against the Taliban in restive Logar Province, according to the two Western military officials. The bullet struck the soldier’s body armor and he survived, the officials said.
But when confronted with reports of a re-expanded American combat role in Afghanistan, Obama administration officials have vehemently rejected the claims.
One such case came in November when Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary, sought to discredit an article by The New York Times reporting that Mr. Obama had quietly approved an expanded combat authorization for American forces in Afghanistan in 2015.
“The U.S. military will not be engaged in specific operations targeting members of the Taliban just because they’re members of the Taliban,” Mr. Earnest said at the time. He laid out only two circumstances warranting continued combat operations: protection of American soldiers still stationed in Afghanistan and the counterterrorism mission against Al Qaeda and similar groups
.
On Sunday, however, a spokesman at the National Security Council issued a statement that appeared to broaden the circumstances, saying that American forces may provide combat support to Afghan troops “in limited circumstances to prevent detrimental strategic effects to these Afghan security forces.”



Sunday, April 19, 2015

Afghanistan - Attack by ISIS in Jalalabad kills 33 injures more than 100

Afghan policemen inspect the site of the suicide bombing in Jalalabad on Saturday morning. Photograph: Xinhua/Landov/Barcroft Media
Ashraf Ghani says Isis militants were behind blast that killed at least 33 people and injured more than 100
A suicide bomber in Afghanistan’s eastern city of Jalalabad killed at least 33 people and injured more than 100 after setting off a blast outside a bank where government workers collect salaries, the city’s police chief has said.
The Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani, blamed Islamic State militants, without giving further details. If true, it would be the first such major attack carried out by the group in Afghanistan, marking a significant step in its expansion into south Asia.
Up until now militants claiming allegiance to Isis in Afghanistan have been widely identified as former Taliban fighters disillusioned with their leadership. The Taliban itself condemned Saturday’s attack as “evil”.
The explosion smashed windows and sent debris flying across a tree-lined street, filling the air with smoke and dust.
“It was a suicide attack,” police chief Fazel Ahmad Sherzad told a press conference. He added that officials were investigating witness reports of a second explosion after people had rushed to the area to help the wounded.
Police said a later blast that shook Jalalabad was a controlled detonation after experts discovered a further bomb close to the scene of the initial explosion.
Local media said a former spokesman for the Pakistani Taliban had claimed responsibility on behalf of Isis in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Islamist militants of various hues already hold sway across unsettled and impoverished areas of south Asia, but Isis has started to draw support from younger fighters in the region, impressed by its rapid capture of territory in Syria and Iraq.
Ghani visited the US last month and warned that Isis posed a “terrible threat” to his country.
Taliban insurgents denied responsibility and did not comment on the alleged Isis link. The militants, who were ousted from power by a US-led invasion in 2001, rarely claim attacks that kill large groups of civilians, saying they target foreigners or the Afghan military and government.

“It was an evil act. We strongly condemn it,” a Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, told Reuters. 

Saturday, March 21, 2015

Afghan Militia Leaders Inspire Fear in Villages

Well I have no Idea who had the idiot idea of forming militias in Afghanistan but it is apperntly going on. This appears to have been an Obama strategy for Exit from Afghanistan, which he had promised would happen.....but ever since his education on what happens when you pull forces out to fast (this he did in Iraq and well...we all know what that lead to, sectarianism, and Maliki elbowing out minority groups and shrinking his circle of friends, and the rise of ISIL in Iraq that moved to Syria and then came back with a vengeance) - Ian Bach




KABUL, Afghanistan — Rahimullah used to be a farmer — just a “normal person living an ordinary life,” as he put it. Then he formed his own militia last year and found himself swept up in America’s exit strategy fromAfghanistan.
With about 20 men loyal to him, Rahimullah, 56, soon discovered a patron in the United States Special Forces, who provided everything he needed: rifles, ammunition, cash, even sandbags for a guard post in Aghu Jan, a remote village in Ghazni Province.
Then the Americans pulled out, leaving Rahimullah behind as the local strongman, and as his village’s only defense against a Taliban takeover.
“We are shivering with fear,” said one resident, Abdul Ahad. Then he explained: He and his neighbors did not fear the Taliban nearly as much as they did their protectors, Rahimullah’s militiamen, who have turned to kidnappings and extortion.
Mr. Ahad ran afoul of them in January, he said in a telephone interview. Militiamen hauled him to a guard station and beat him so badly that neighbors had to use a wheelbarrow to get him home.
Scattered across Afghanistan, men like Rahimullah continue to hold ground and rule villages. They are a significant part of the legacy of the American war here, brought to power amid a Special Operations counterinsurgency strategy that mobilized anti-Taliban militias in areas beyond the grasp of the Afghan Army.
From the start, some Afghan officials, including former President Hamid Karzai, objected to the Americans’ practice of forming militias that did not answer directly to the Afghan government. They saw the militias as destabilizing forces that undermined the government’s authority and competed with efforts to build up large and professional military and police forces.
Now, many of those concerns have become a daily reality in Afghan villages.
“For God’s sake, take these people away from us,” Mr. Ahad, 36, said of Rahimullah’s militiamen. “We cannot stand their brutality.”
About 50 miles northeast of Mr. Ahad’s village, other anti-Taliban fighters arrested a 13- or 14-year-old boy in January and then killed him, the boy’s father said.
And in the northern province of Kunduz, men in a militia that had received American support raped a 15-year-old boy last year after forcing him to join, according to a United Nations inquiry.
From the beginning of the American presence here, the United States doled out cash to militias and warlords. Paramilitary forces were raised to guard American bases. The C.I.A. trained and funded at least six paramilitaryforces, with names such as the Khost Protection Force and 0-4, to pursue the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
The Afghan Local Police program, with nearly 30,000 Special Forces-trained militiamen nominally answering to the central government, is the biggest and best-known result of the American counterinsurgency strategy, and it has been successful in places. But reports of abuses and banditry by units in the program have hurt its reputation.
Then there are militia groups like Rahimullah’s that have also received American training or support over the years but operate under even less oversight.
In Ghazni Province, the drive to create militias gained momentum after a series of anti-Taliban uprisings in 2012 emerged in areas once considered lost. Until they pulled out of Ghazni’s districts last year, American Special Operations units gave cash, ammunition and even armored vehicles to men who had little or no official connection to the Afghan government and were often former insurgents themselves.
One of them is Abdullah, a militia commander with a chiseled, almost gaunt face, who wishes “my brothers,” as he still calls the American Special Forces soldiers, had not left late last year. “Whatever they wanted me to do, I would do for them,” he said. “If they tell me to kill someone, I will kill them.”
The Americans, he said, had once fought alongside him in Ghazni’s Andar district, offering a sense of discipline — not to mention firepower and air support.
Abdullah described the growing desperation and brutality of a war he and his 150 men now fight mostly alone against the Taliban. Abdullah said 11 of his men were killed in their sleep in late January by a Taliban infiltrator posing as a new recruit. Then the Taliban followed up with a coordinated attack on his guard post.
“In this attack, the Taliban hit me hard,” Abdullah said during an interview last month in Kabul. He had come here to get medical treatment for a gunshot wound he received in the attack, and to seek support from Afghanistan’s intelligence agency.
Human rights groups portray Abdullah as being among Afghanistan’s most notorious militia commanders. Human Rights Watch and the human rights division of the United Nations have censured his militia in the past year, citing extrajudicial killings. In an episode in January, one of Abdullah’s sub-commanders killed the 13- or 14-year-old after questioning him about roadside bombs, the boy’s father, Khial Mohammad, said.
“After they killed my son, they said he was involved in planting bombs on roadsides and cooperating with the Taliban fighters,” Mr. Mohammad said. But he added that his son had had no involvement with the Taliban.
Abdullah insisted that he did not kill civilians. The Taliban, he said, not he, were responsible for escalating the brutality.
Abdullah recalled the Americans lecturing him about the laws of war and human rights, but those notions barely seemed to register. He admitted to desecrating the bodies of his enemies.
“Yes, dead bodies are left on the ground,” he said. “We drag their dead bodies with a car.”
The last time he saw the American Special Forces team was some five months ago. “ ‘You did great work with us,’ ” Abdullah recalled the soldiers telling him in parting. “ ‘If we stay in Afghanistan and we need something to get done, we need people like you to do it for us,’ they said.”
Since the Americans left, many of these militias have become more predatory, officials in Ghazni say, partly to feed themselves and partly because there is no one to stop them.
“These uprisers, they are like roundworms in your stomach,” said Khial Mohammad Hussaini, a tribal elder from Ghazni Province. “They are eating everything.”
In another part of Ghazni, Rahimullah became a militia leader last year, starting with about 20 men who joined him after the Taliban kidnapped and killed his son.
In an interview, he expressed pride: In the eight months since he had come to power, a school had reopened, and a new road was being built in Aghu Jan, home to about 1,500 families, he said.
Asked about his militia’s treatment of the people, he acknowledged expelling several of his men who had abused villagers. “I warned them several times not to rob or harass the people,” Rahimullah said. But in the same interview, he also claimed that many of the accusations against his men were part of a pro-Taliban conspiracy.
He said that he had the support of Afghanistan’s intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security, as well as the people of Aghu Jan. But tribal elders routinely travel from Aghu Jan to the district and provincial capital to complain about the heavy-handed ways of his men.
In January, when a roadside bomb wounded Rahimullah, retribution was swift — and random. Militiamen rounded up over a dozen people and brought them to the guard post the Americans had helped construct.
Mr. Ahad was one of those who was arrested. But he insists that he and the others had nothing to do with the roadside bombing. Their innocence was corroborated by the district police chief, Mohammad Hashem, who described the men rounded up as day laborers and farmers. In the guard station, the men were beaten with chains taken from motorcycles.
Rahimullah’s men told them the only thing they could do to save themselves, Mr. Ahad said: “They started asking each of us to pay 50,000 or 100,000 rupees, depending on who we were.”