tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-66412153684887326772024-02-06T20:53:53.764-08:00Counter Insurgency Blog - Syria, Iraq, & Afghanistan - Since 2007#Syria #Kobane #twitterkurds #Iraq and #COIN #counterinsurgency #ethicalreporting #waronterror #counterterrorismAnonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.comBlogger574125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-68509940071826818852015-06-06T21:26:00.001-07:002015-06-06T21:39:44.802-07:00Kurdish Northern Syrian - Rojava - Forces & Allies<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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Rojavan Allies, Rojava Allies, Rojavan Forces, Rojava Forces, Peshmerga, YPG, YPJ, Kobane, Rojavaye Hevalbend, Kurdish, Brigade, Militia, militias, Assyrian, Raqqa revolutionaries, Unity Brigade, Kurdish Front </div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-88993316623919926952015-06-06T06:51:00.000-07:002015-06-06T19:32:29.243-07:00Interview by Jaime Ortega at The Daily Journalist with Ian Bach. <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<h2 style="text-align: center;">
</h2>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<a href="http://thedailyjournalist.com/the-expert/expert-answers-isil-al-qaeda-and-others-race-for-power-in-the-middle-east/" target="_blank"><span style="color: red;">Interview by Jaime Ortega with Ian Bach Original Post (click here) at The Daily Journalist.com</span></a></div>
<br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">1) Abu Sayyaf was killed a few days ago, how will that affect ISI operations in IRAQ and Syria?</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">Leadership
kills have little effect on overall effectiveness of ISIS as a fighting
unit. But if we get lucky then we may get some power struggles, and we
need to try to instigate and promote any in cohesion in their units.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">2)
ISIL just captured Ramadi, and are trying to expel Syrian Armed Forces
from Palmyra what message does that send to the those countries that
support logistically and militarily govern by Haider Al-Abadi and
Al-Assad?</span><br />
<br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">Ramadi
was a bit of a surprise to me. I expect many in the MIl and Intel
communities felt that same, but it should not have been. For sure there was insufficient preparations
to thwart the advances.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">Palmyra
is a sticky one. Syria wants this and if this was occupied by coalition
forces Assad would need to fight or bargain with those forces who take
Palmyra whether they are ISIS or Coalition forces. ATM I have heard
ISIS say because no Icons they are not planing to destroy Palmyra. This
maybe a stall as they do not have the man power ATM to destroy the city
and hold it militarily also. I except to see Syrian Gov Forces re-take
Palmyra. If coalition forces took Palmyra it would be a game changer as
this is the route for Syrian Gov forces to the East. For now ISIS will
likely Tax Syrian Gov for the use of the Roads to the East.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">3)
If ISIL theoretically defeated Assad’s Syrian Armed Forces, and
controlled mayor cities in Syria, will Jabat-Al-Nusra oppose an Islamic
Caliphate governed by Al-Baghdadi? Would they fight each other, despite
greeting their rhetorical alliance combating western forces?</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">Yes
They will be fighting each other and I would expect they will fight
each other before any ‘real’ assaults on Syrian Gov held areas. While
advances against Syrian Gov areas are great for public relations it has
been al Nusra who has made most of the gains on Assad. ISIS controls
some electrical, oil, and water commodities they sell to Syria’s regime.
So yes ISIS will be fighting al Nusra more and more. Their mentalities
and also recent bad blood between the two is most likely the thing that
will keep them from working together.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">The
Wahhabi mentality is found in both ISIS and al Qaeda (al Nusra) however
al Qaeda views the world much different, and their future goals are
also opposed to each others. There is some similarities but the
differences are what keeps them apart.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">4)
The US, and NATO, have financially supported Kurdish Pashmerga Troops,
to help fight against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, but without ground troops
are western forces doing enough?</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">The
support US, NATO, Germany, Italy have helped the Kurds with small arms.
but very little </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">medium arms, and no heavy arms. The support is so slim
and lacking that ammunition is used very sparsely. Also the West has not
given enough support to the Sunni militias and they are not getting
what they are suppose to get from the Iraqi Gov. US gives weapons/money
to Iraqi Gov but can not give it directly to militias, Sunnis, Shia, or
even the Kurds. Most of the weapons Kurds have are from Germany and
Italy.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">I
am not sure the world, US, or EU Gov’s want US troops to go in boots on
the ground. But the citizens of the west are a majority opposed. I
think we all know this must be done with local forces. Foreign forces
would most likely fuel the ISIS fire. I know ISIS and al Qaeda would
love to see the west set boots on the ground. ISIS and AQI recruitment
would skyrocket. Many in the West are blind to that fact.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">I
think the best thing the West can do is support the forces fighting
against ISIS (including Kurds, Sunni, Christian, and Shia with heavy
weapons. Personally I am against any support for anti Assad military
missions. The approval rating for Assad in Gov Held areas is 90% and 50%
in rebel held areas. 500,000 Syrian Gov military and another 250.000
National Defense Forces. The west of Syria has spoken loud and clear.
The problem is the Western Nations are not listening.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">The
west’s mission for 2015 is train more ‘moderate rebels’. However these
are not fresh soldiers. This is to give a current rebel an Ak-47, some
camouflaged uniform, boots and a couple months training in Qatar and
Jordan. Vetting is done in Jordan and Turkey. Then call the FSA? The FSA
is not an effective movement, it is a makeshift, a ragtag team of
loosely connected groups many of whom hate each other. </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">Their
was over 12 main groups in the FSA, now it is maybe 5? only a year
later? Many went to fight for the Syrian Gov, many went to Nusra’s
Front, and some went to ISIS. This helped ISIS a Lot, it gave them
access to US and EU advanced weapons including the famous TOW anti tank
missiles.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">5)
There is intelligence suggesting Recep Erdogan is supporting ISIL, with
the help of Intra-Secret/Service-Intelligence in Pakistan because of
their former ties with Saddam’s Bathist party who is entwined with ISIL
fighting Kurds. Is this possible?</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">I
think Erdogan is playing and working with many nefarious characters. It
is well documented that ISIS has been getting free medical services in
Turkey, ISIS smuggles oil out via Turkey, so there must be some
appeasement on Turkeys behalf to allow this, but it clearly is more
orchestrated than what we are allowed to know and realize. Erdogan’s
actions jailing, Kurdish Journalists, bans on wearing PKK uniforms, or
Kurdish Flags makes it clear how Erdogan feels about the Kurds. I am
worried that Erdogan will at a minimum take over Rojava in Northern
Syria.</span><br />
I have not seen any actual evidence yet of Paki -ISI working with
ISIS. It is possible elements within ISI is working with ISIS. But it
maybe for a variety of reasons. There is for Sure Wahhabi followers
within ISI. So it is just as likely that there is some at least
sympathetic towards ISIS since both have Wahhabi roots and a Large Saudi
backing. This is one reason ISI maybe have faction working with ISIS
secret agencies love money they can make off the books for their most
black programs. So for money, beliefs, and/or politics, and a variety of
other factors may lure ISI to assist ISIS.<br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">6)
Is their a race between Al-Qaeda and ISIL to regain more regional power
in the Middle East? The control of Libya is not only ISIL’s target, but
also Al-Qaeda’s?</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">Libya
is a GIANT nation with a lot of oil and minerals. So yes anyone would
love to own Libya. As far as a race, sure we see the race. But al Qaeda
is more patent and calculated. They will look for end result, delivery
message. However one could argue that if ISIS gets Libya first al Qaeda
will still have a win. The Top leadership of ISIS still have their al
Qaeda ties.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">7)
Is there any other group outside of ISIL and Al-Qaeda who can present a
serious hazard to western targets like the US or Europe?</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">The
Chechen are a serious threat and this past year working with Anonymous a
little in the online fight vs ISIS & AQ I have learned their online
capabilities are based in Chechnya and some say the Saudi’s have told
Putin flat out the Chechen’s work for them and if Putin didn’t stop
helping Syria they would let the Chechen’s lose. Some say that is who
killed the reporter that Putin got blame for the reporters death. So you
can see they obviously have very smart IT people and strategists. </span></span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">Also
Muslim Jihad movements in SE Asia are still leery of AQ and ISIS. So
the big 3 is ISIS, the various AQ, and the Chechen. Groups like those in
SE Asia and even the Taliban are only concerned with local attacks not
global wars. The Muslim Brotherhood is also dangerous but mostly in
North Africa to Turkey</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">8)
Democracy does not to suit well the Middle East, is it perhaps because
politics will never take over religion? Is western democracy an illusion
to reach in the Middle East?</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">Sure,
western style democracy does not fit well in the ME. However even the
US is having growing pains in the democracy department also. They need
electoral finance reform desperately, and an end to a bi-party system.
It would also effect their global standing in a positive way. But
separation of state and religion is the best path forward for the Middle
East. But it will likely be a long road.</span></span></span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">9)
A lot of children seem to adopt religious radicalism with danger. Will
the hate towards the west ever change the minds of these Middle Eastern
children, of is frantic radicalization a process that cannot be achieved
by democracy?</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">Democracy
will not end radicalization of youth. The number one thing that spreads
radicalization of youth is disenfranchisement. With no job and no
prospects for any real normal future many turn to radical views. ISIS
and AQ and others like Muslim Brotherhood have very savvy Media Wings.
We need to counter the media blitz, and change the conversation, before
we can change the outcome. Perhaps winning the Media War vs Jihadist is
the first step !!!</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">10)
History has shown that in 1258 the brutal seizure of Mongols in
Baghdad, gave lasting peaceful effects in the region up to 200 years. We
have adopted democracy, but an Iron fist seems to be a better
alternative to the sectarian violence shown in the Middle East. Has the
issue of extermination, historically seen in 12th century by mongol
troops ever been presented in congress as an alternative to defeat
global Yihadist to secure national and international interest
worldwide? </span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">You
have a good point there. The dictators seem to be much better at
creating secular nations that are safe for any religion, or ethnic
group. I was disappointed that the West did not view the actions of Sisi
in a better light. Morsi the Muslim Brotherhood and his call for Sharia
law in Egypt was nuts. I cheered for Sisi and the military and still
do.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">- Will the issue of extermination be seriously examined only after another 9-11 strikes the United States? </span><br />
<br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">There
has been many exterminations of ethnic groups, the Mongols, Assyrian,
the Great, Romans, Crusaders, Muslim, Christian, and on and on.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">I
do expect there will be another 9-11 style attack on USA but I do not
think that will cause them to think about past exterminations. Their
first thought will be who did it and how can we attack them back?</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: blue; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">11)
What is the best solution to resolve the Yihadist problem, considering
history shows brutal retaliation tames radicals, whereas democracy flaws
to give the same results?</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; line-height: 18.2000007629395px;">I
do think the Jihadist movement will be with us for at least another
20-40 years. It will die a slow death. The names of the groups will
change with time. Their leaders will come and go. But in the end it will
become passe. Perhaps the best way forward is to fight ISIS and AQ
mentality in the Media. We need to win the Media War before we can win
the fight against ISIS and AQ.</span></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-88458196750442088222015-06-06T06:08:00.000-07:002015-06-06T06:08:47.078-07:00The Threat Posed by Islamic State ISIS – Dr. David Kilcullen Aussie Counterinsurgency Expert<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="span9 pull-right" id="articleDisplayStory">
<div id="article_start">
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
David Kilcullen: It’s different in three
major ways. Firstly, it is much bigger and more militarily capable than
al-Qaida ever was. It has tanks, it has helicopters, it’s got very
large numbers of artillery pieces, it’s got more than 30,000 fighters,
so it’s significantly larger and more militarily capable. Secondly, it
controls about a third of Iraq and about a third of Syria, including a
network of very connected cities, economic installations that make it
about between $2 million and $3 million a day in terms of revenue, and
it’s really building a significant territorial state in the Middle East,
which is something that al-Qaida was never able to do. Thirdly, and,
actually, I think most importantly for people in Australia and New
Zealand, it’s having a very significant reinvigorating effect on
regional groups in South-east Asia, in Africa and the Middle East.
That’s really taking us back almost to square one in terms of
re-energizing a global jihad against the West. So I think all those
three things adding up together, it’s really a very, very significant
threat that’s somewhat larger than what we’ve really ever seen from
al-Qaida.</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
<strong><em>Lisa Owen: Now, you were in Iraq with
General Petraeus and helped to mastermind the troop surge there. That
seemed to bring a level of stability, so why do you think we now find
ourselves in this mess that we’re in?</em></strong></div>
<div class="count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
Well, it’s actually very simple. There
are two reasons, and you’re right, we did successfully stabilize Iraq,
and we successfully destroyed al-Qaida in Iraq, which is the predecessor
organization to ISIS, down to the point where it had less than 5
percent of its fighters left. But then the first reason is we pulled out
too quickly. We essentially cut the cord and left at the end of 2011
and put the Iraqis in a position where a lot of the deals that were put
in place as part of stabilizing Iraq between 2007 and 2010 just weren’t
followed through on, and different parties in Iraq felt that the others
weren’t acting in good faith, and the whole deal really fell apart, and
that’s allowed the re-invigoration of ISIS. The second very significant
reason is the Syrian civil war. So even though we had gotten ISIS down
to a shadow of its former self, when the war broke out in Syria and lots
of different groups turned against the Assad regime, Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi, at that time the head of ISIS, sent a number of his
fighters into Syria to join that fight. And by their success on the
ground against the Syrians, they’ve generated a lot of support within
Syria. So we’ve seen two big groups—</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
<strong><em>Can we now say looking at this that the West’s intervention in Iraq was a failure?</em></strong></div>
<div class="count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
No, I think that if you do something and
it works and then you stop doing and things go bad, that means that
what you did was working, not not working. What I think it tells us is
that our whole approach since 9/11, which has essentially been to pick
the most dangerous military aspect of Islamic jihadism worldwide and
focus military effort on that has been short-sighted. And I’m worried
that we’re about to make the same mistake again by switching targets
from al-Qaida to ISIS, which is the next, sort of, crocodile to the
canoe, if you like, instead of sitting back a little bit and saying,
‘What is it about these groups that makes them so appealing to people in
our own societies, and how can we deal with that threat without, in the
process, turning our own countries into police states?’ I think that’s
really the question that everyone needs to be engaging on now. The
military bit is important, but it’s not the forefront.</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
<strong><em>Okay, I want to come to that a bit
later, but I’m wondering – is it now time to start thinking about a
radical rejig in Iraq? Do we need three separate states there – Sunni,
Shiites? You know, do we need to be thinking about that direction?</em></strong></div>
<div class="count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
I think actually that ship has sailed.
We’re already looking at a de facto soft partition, if you like, of Iraq
into a sort of south-eastern part of the country that’s really
dominated heavily by Iran and is controlled by the Shia majority
government in Baghdad and then a Kurdish regional government that now
includes not only northern Iraq but significant parts of Syria, and then
you’ve got this sort of vacuum in the western part of the country where
ISIS is currently. And it’s still a little bit unclear what the future
of that part of Iraq is going to be, but I think the chance that it’s
ever going to be a one single unified country again is really a bit of a
fantasy at this point.</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
<strong><em>Okay, so let’s go back to the first principle question, then – should we, the West, be getting involved in this at all now?</em></strong></div>
<div class="count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
I do think we need to be getting
involved, and the reason I say that is because the reason that a
significant number of people are joining Islamic State from our own
societies is because they want to be part of something that’s
successful, that’s world historic, that seems to be making a significant
difference. And one of the most important things we can do to limit
that recruitment is to, sort of, take the shine off the Islamic State.
Does that mean we should be invading and occupying and trying to
restabilise Iraq? Absolutely not. So I think it’s a question of how much
is enough in terms of military effort to really set back Islamic State
as this attractive thing that people are turning to. But, you know,
that’s only part of the issue, as I said. There’s a lot of other stuff
that needs to happen in our own societies that, in my view, is actually
more important.</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
<strong><em>Yeah, so looking at the military effort,
then – what do we need to do? You’ve been critical, I think, of the air
strikes – the level of air strikes. Do we need boots on the ground?
What do you see as the way forward?</em></strong></div>
<div class="count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
I think that the way forward has been
relatively well set in terms of the tactics of it, which is that we’re
going to provide advisers, probably a limited number of special forces
for raiding and targeting of high-value targets and then people to
designate air strikes and control air power. So it is boots on the
ground, but it’s not independent combat units. The main Australia, New
Zealand, UK effort here is going to be in training Iraqis and possibly
Syrians to take the fight directly to ISIS, but that’s going to be a
matter of months, possibly years before those guys are ready to do that.
Then—</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
<strong><em>But who exactly are they training,
though? Because there are a lot of commentators that are saying, say,
for example, the Iraqi army is in complete disarray and has fallen
apart. So who exactly are they training?</em></strong></div>
<div class="count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
That’s not actually a good understanding
of what’s going on with the Iraqi military. The Iraqi special
operations forces and a number of the Iraqi combat units are actually in
pretty good shape. The problem is that over the intervening period
since 2011, a lot of the leadership were weeded out and replaced with in
some cases corrupt, in other cases sort of politically connected people
who were much more interested in the politics of Baghdad than in
actually building a viable military force. There’s a lot of potential in
the Iraqi military, and I think it won’t be too long before they are
able to come back. The real challenge is in Syria, and this puts its
finger on the heart of the problem, which is a lot of Syrians are not
willing to back a US-led effort unless it’s going to result in the
overthrow of Assad. And right now, we’re not focusing on that. We’re not
striking the Syrian regime, and there’s a worry that, sure, you can
strike ISIS, but all you’re going to do is create space that allows the
Assad regime to expand.</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
<strong><em>I want to just in the time we’ve got
left talk a little bit about New Zealand’s involvement in this. Our
Prime Minister says that we’re going to be behind the wire – that’s the
phrase he likes to use. So not in the front line, offering people to
train troops on the ground. But should we prepare ourselves for the
possibility of casualties, even though he likes to say we’re away from
the main action?</em></strong></div>
<div class="count_el">
<br /></div>
</div>
<div id="article_end">
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
It really depends where New Zealanders
end up. If they are not in Iraq, if they’re training people in Saudi
Arabia or elsewhere, then I think that they are relatively safe from
attack. It’s when you’re operating in Iraq or even in Syria that you’re
going to find yourself in an environment where there really is not front
line, and, sure, you can be inside the wire, but that doesn’t mean
you’re safe. If I were advising Kiwis, I’d be saying, ‘Look, prepare
yourselves for not only a significant military conflict but one that
could last quite some time, and prepare yourself for a domestic threat
within New Zealand.’ And that’s part of the challenge that we’re all
facing, which is this is not just restricted to the Middle East. It is
in our own societies, and it’s affecting public safety in big cities.</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
<strong><em>Well, when you mention the domestic
threat, again, the Prime Minister has released figures publicly that
says there are about 40 people who are on a watch list in New Zealand
for supporting Islamic State, 40 more than need investigation and about
five that have been fighting for Islamic State. Does that sound like
realistic numbers to you?</em></strong></div>
<div class="count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
I don’t have any better information than
what you have, but it sounds about right when you compare it to what
we’ve seen from the UK and Australia and Canada and the US. It’s about
on par with that, and I think it’s worth pointing out that the number of
foreign fighters who are going to join Islamic State is somewhere
between 10 and 12 times the scale of what we saw during the Iraq War.
It’s a very substantial number of people. I think the paradox again is
the vast majority of Muslims are not involved in anything like this, but
yet obviously 100 percent of people involved in the Islamic State are
Muslims, so there’s a danger here that we’re going to tar everybody with
the same brush and start looking at an entire subset of our own society
as a threat. And I think that’s a really important fine line that we
need to walk as we deal with the challenge.</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
<strong><em>But in saying that, how real is the threat on home turf? In New Zealand, say, that something could happen?</em></strong></div>
<div class="count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
So again, back to your very original
question – why is this more of a threat than al-Qaida? Al-Qaida’s style
of operating was to generate teams of terrorists who would go in a
pre-planned way to attack a target and so on. What we’re dealing with
now is something that’s a lot, sort of, lower level but is actually
rather more dangerous, which is this idea of remote radicalization so
that individuals who have a social media connectivity with the Islamic
State or they have friends over there becoming radicalized and
essentially taking to the streets and carrying out more or less random
acts of violence upon people in society. And the example that I point to
is what happened in Woolwich in London last year, where two men of
Nigerian descent ran down an off-duty British soldier on the street in a
car—</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
<strong><em>And beheaded him in the street.</em></strong></div>
<div class="count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
And then beheaded him in the street.
Now, you can’t really protect against that in the same way you can
protect against something like 9/11. The challenge for people—</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
<strong><em>So are you realistically saying, though, that that is something that could happen in New Zealand?</em></strong></div>
<div class="count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
Absolutely. Absolutely. But I think what
people need to say is how much surveillance, how much police protection
are we prepared to tolerate before we turn our own societies into a
police state? And you have to recognise that it’s a real risk and it
could happen, but is it worth the sort of mass surveillance and police
presence that governments may want to put in place to protect against
it?</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
<strong><em>Well, it’s funny that—</em></strong></div>
<div class="count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
And that’s something that every citizen needs to be involved in.</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
<strong><em>It’s funny that you raise that, because
our government is saying that they would like to bring in 48 hours of
warrantless surveillance so that they can watch people for 48 hours
without going to the court for a warrant and that they would like to put
cameras on private property. So how far or how much privacy should we
be prepared to give up? And is privacy something that we have a right to
now, or is that notion just gone?</em></strong></div>
<div class="count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
Well, I think if you want to continue to
live in a democracy that’s an open society, as New Zealand is, then it
has to be something that’s open for debate, and we have to be looking
very carefully at safeguards to the kinds of surveillance and security
measures that people are putting in place. In Australia, for example,
there’s been a debate where the Attorney General has said, ‘Well, look,
it’s okay. We’re not planning to use these regulations in order to, for
example, shut down journalists’, but once the regulations are on the
books, some future government can use them to do whatever it wants. So I
think we have to really be looking carefully at things like sunset
clauses, where these regulations are up for review on a regular basis,
and we have to be encouraging public debate and helping people see that
it’s not choice between perfect security and risk at the hands of groups
like ISIS. It’s about how much of your security or how much of your
privacy and freedom are you willing to give up, and is it worth doing
that in order to achieve security against this kind of risk? And, of
course, the answer to that is different in every different country, and
everyone needs to be part of the discussion, otherwise we’re likely to
find ourselves looking back on this and saying, ‘It looked like a good
idea at the time, but now we find ourselves living in a different
society from how we were originally’.</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
<strong><em>Dr Kilcullen, thank you. So interesting to talk to you this morning. Thank you for your time and for joining us on The Nation.</em></strong></div>
<div class="count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
Thank you. Thanks for having me.</div>
<div class="Interviewee count_el">
<br /></div>
<div class="count_el">
Transcript provided by Able. <a href="http://www.able.co.nz/" rel="nofollow">http://www.able.co.nz</a></div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
Read more: <a href="http://www.3news.co.nz/tvshows/thenation/interview-counter-insurgency-expert-david-kilcullen-2014111515#ixzz3cDF1e1zL">http://www.3news.co.nz/tvshows/thenation/interview-counter-insurgency-expert-david-kilcullen-2014111515#ixzz3cDF1e1zL</a></div>
<div>
——————————————————————————————————————-</div>
<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/b/7529bc35-c11e-4897-8de4-0117bccab136" rel="nofollow">http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/b/7529bc35-c11e-4897-8de4-0117bccab136</a><br />
Video Link Above to Charlie Rose Show</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-88318409314346819372015-06-05T09:53:00.000-07:002015-06-11T01:42:15.063-07:00Ramadi = Evidence Iraq Needs to Develope Rapid deployment force<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
by <b>Ian Bach June 5, 2015</b> <a data-mce-href="https://books.google.com/books?id=C17uxAfGKdIC&pg=PA111&lpg=PA111&dq=Quick+Reaction+Force+ww2&source=bl&ots=zkIz4UhxyU&sig=cH5K-dy8tLW13gqqbBIU0Lnu41U&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Hq5xVaW2Nou1yQTZ7YLoCg&ved=0CGQQ6AEwDA#v=onepage&q=Quick%20Reaction%20Force%20ww2&f=false" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=C17uxAfGKdIC&pg=PA111&lpg=PA111&dq=Quick+Reaction+Force+ww2&source=bl&ots=zkIz4UhxyU&sig=cH5K-dy8tLW13gqqbBIU0Lnu41U&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Hq5xVaW2Nou1yQTZ7YLoCg&ved=0CGQQ6AEwDA#v=onepage&q=Quick%20Reaction%20Force%20ww2&f=false" target="_blank" title="Quick Reaction Force ww2">Quick Reaction Force ww2</a><br />
A couple months News Orgs were reporting G2 involved in Iraq strategy
to retake Mosul - outlining the units needed, their make-up, and it
looked good, 8 or 10 Brigades 5 general army 2 counter insurgent /
counter terrorist 1 or 3 i forget policing & other local forces,
maybe a couple Sunni Militias would be best. But it also said
Coalition "was not going to rush in without a good plan." My fear was
they would drag their feet, and not do the correct thing = "Go for the
Jugular".<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-8kVLOAn06lA/VXHSz2TrTzI/AAAAAAAABQM/yfJM4v4af4U/s1600/US_82nd_AB.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="380" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-8kVLOAn06lA/VXHSz2TrTzI/AAAAAAAABQM/yfJM4v4af4U/s640/US_82nd_AB.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
So they did nothing but target retakes and some
defensive lines. But like in World War 2 with Norway the allies didn't
lose that battle, it was given away.<br />
<br />
Mosul could have been attacked a month or 2 ago - <a data-mce-href="http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=8d2_1231543229&comments=1" href="http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=8d2_1231543229&comments=1" target="_blank">"Cut the head of the Serpent" </a>even if it meant U.N. Units........... but I would not use U.S. Units.<br />
<br />
ISIS has been moving around doing stabbing attacks then fall back to
ISIS held areas. These pin pricks have at times been more than pin
pricks, and end up like Tikrit, Mosul, Raqqa, each city fell because
there was no effective quick deployment strategies. At least not an
effective one. If the American Generals wont help put it together, than
Iraq needs to find a partner who can assist in the implementation of a
effective response. For best effect America can make good use of the Air
Force, look back at the "Berlin Airlift". Humanitarian aide and Troop
transport, & aerial attacks on forces that follow suicide attacks,
It must be a large scale endeavor, as told in every COIN
(counterinsurgency) story book, but almost never implemented.<br />
<br />
I saw one ISIS post bragging that a ethnic Sunni tribe of 9 million has signed on with ISIS, eeeeerrrr NOT !....<br />
<br />
More like a peace treaty that reads <b>"<a data-mce-href="https://www.google.com/search?q=marine+corps+quick+reaction+force&biw=1440&bih=763&source=lnms&tbm=nws&sa=X&ei=Ta5xVZHsGIueyASr5ILgBw&ved=0CAYQ_AUoAQ#tbm=nws&q=%22We+won%27t+kill+your+Sheiks+if+you+let+us+run+everything%22" href="https://www.google.com/search?q=marine+corps+quick+reaction+force&biw=1440&bih=763&source=lnms&tbm=nws&sa=X&ei=Ta5xVZHsGIueyASr5ILgBw&ved=0CAYQ_AUoAQ#tbm=nws&q=%22We+won%27t+kill+your+Sheiks+if+you+let+us+run+everything%22" target="_blank">We won't kill your Sheiks if you let us run everything</a>"</b>. also if their is 9 million in that tribe I bet only 1-3 million in Iraq (rest in Saudi Arabia, <b><a data-mce-href="http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=19d_1428772512" href="http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=19d_1428772512" target="_blank">Egypt</a></b>, & elsewhere.) of 3 million how many soldiers can you get?<br />
<br />
The answer is about 20,000 to 40,000 by my estimates another 10-20k
accidental guerrillas, but you also get a 10 x that in people who they
can tax and control who works and who doesn't, they get into everything,
people hate these guys, for good reason. People flee towns when ISIS
comes knocking they don't cheer.. As long as that metric remains true,
than the enemy has not only lost the battle, but they have lost the War.<br />
<br />
I
am not sure who is running the Overall Military "show" in Iraq, but
they should be fired. If we don't even attempt to effectively counter
the enemies abilities, strategies, and tactics, then we have lost the
Battle, and the enemy will continue to gain ground, loot, kill rape,
destroy history, etc.<br />
<br />
<b>ISIS strategy</b> = Piss off
non Muslims and non Sunni Arabs get into a fight for land and politics
and minerals, make Money (prob #1 on their list) tax, tax, tax, also
they sell electricity, gas, &water to Syrian Gov. Now in Iraq they
can sell water to Iraqi Gov.with their Dam at <b><a data-mce-href="http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/04/middleeast/iraq-isis-ramadi/" href="http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/04/middleeast/iraq-isis-ramadi/" target="_blank" title="SIS fighters close Ramadi dam gates, cut off water to loyalist towns">Ramad</a>i,</b>
of course looting is another activity they love to do, rape pillage etc
etc, Their online strategy is mostly aimed at requirement,
indoctrinator (making it look cool to some disenfranchised youth or some<b> psycho</b><br />
<b>ISIS Tactics</b> = Fast attacks on Mass, lots of very large suicide tanker bombs, at
start of battle many other various suicide Attucks to target individuals
sheiks and communities,, kill scholars, any highly educated and looked
up to figures kill or their possessions, kill any brave outspken people
asap, after that the remaining citizens will pretty much do what you say
and pay your tax, they know they will be punished if they don't. The
money is used to fun "Global JIhad". This was a strategy that al Qaeda
had been pursuing long before ISIS. <br />
<br />
<b>Coalitions Strategy</b> = Sit wait and think of a really cool plan !!! (while the walls fall in)<br />
<b>Coalition Tactics</b>
= Wait until the enemy has had time to piss off the locals and find
some really cool hiding places !!! they will tunnel and they love to set
up lots of IEDs. SO expect Huge loses - because you waited till the
enemy had time to dig in, also higley restrict your air force from even
thinking about hitting any targets, unless Some overworked guy okays it.
I say over worked guy. Because from the number of strikes I see it must
be a one man show. We need thousands of people in that endeavor alone.
hundreds of eyes in the skies, and thousands of eyes on the ground. If
we do have that, then someone onm top must be sitting on his hands. - by
<b>Ian Bach June 5, 2015</b><br />
<a data-mce-href="https://books.google.com/books?id=C17uxAfGKdIC&pg=PA111&lpg=PA111&dq=Quick+Reaction+Force+ww2&source=bl&ots=zkIz4UhxyU&sig=cH5K-dy8tLW13gqqbBIU0Lnu41U&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Hq5xVaW2Nou1yQTZ7YLoCg&ved=0CGQQ6AEwDA#v=onepage&q=Quick%20Reaction%20Force%20ww2&f=false" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=C17uxAfGKdIC&pg=PA111&lpg=PA111&dq=Quick+Reaction+Force+ww2&source=bl&ots=zkIz4UhxyU&sig=cH5K-dy8tLW13gqqbBIU0Lnu41U&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Hq5xVaW2Nou1yQTZ7YLoCg&ved=0CGQQ6AEwDA#v=onepage&q=Quick%20Reaction%20Force%20ww2&f=false" target="_blank" title="Quick Reaction Force ww2">Quick Reaction Force ww2</a><br />
<a data-mce-href="https://books.google.com/books?id=C17uxAfGKdIC&pg=PA111&lpg=PA111&dq=Quick+Reaction+Force+ww2&source=bl&ots=zkIz4UhxyU&sig=cH5K-dy8tLW13gqqbBIU0Lnu41U&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Hq5xVaW2Nou1yQTZ7YLoCg&ved=0CGQQ6AEwDA#v=onepage&q=Quick%20Reaction%20Force%20ww2&f=false" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=C17uxAfGKdIC&pg=PA111&lpg=PA111&dq=Quick+Reaction+Force+ww2&source=bl&ots=zkIz4UhxyU&sig=cH5K-dy8tLW13gqqbBIU0Lnu41U&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Hq5xVaW2Nou1yQTZ7YLoCg&ved=0CGQQ6AEwDA#v=onepage&q=Quick%20Reaction%20Force%20ww2&f=false" target="_blank">Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G.S <span class="addmd">By Richard W. Harrison</span></a></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-28051224257964599012015-06-05T08:52:00.001-07:002015-06-05T08:52:22.041-07:00May 17th is Norwegian National Constitution Day, TAAC-N soldiers held a ceremony in tribute to their fallen #Afghan<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en"><div dir="ltr" lang="en">May 17th is Norwegian National Constitution Day, TAAC-N soldiers held a ceremony in tribute to their fallen <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Afghan?src=hash">#Afghan</a> <a href="http://t.co/Jy4GoNvMJ2">pic.twitter.com/Jy4GoNvMJ2</a></div>— Resolute Support (@ResoluteSupport) <a href="https://twitter.com/ResoluteSupport/status/600290061393862656">May 18, 2015</a></blockquote><script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script><br />
<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><br />
</div></div>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-37226583282297273492015-05-15T04:00:00.000-07:002015-05-15T04:00:35.597-07:00Guns & Girls on Twitter<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">
<div dir="ltr" lang="und">
<a href="http://t.co/KidGP3dkrW">pic.twitter.com/KidGP3dkrW</a></div>
— Gun&Girls (@GirlsGun) <a href="https://twitter.com/GirlsGun/status/597870942996406272">May 11, 2015</a></blockquote>
<script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script><br />
<br />
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" lang="en">
<div dir="ltr" lang="und">
<a href="http://t.co/JwuY6MOOiJ">pic.twitter.com/JwuY6MOOiJ</a></div>
— Gun&Girls (@GirlsGun) <a href="https://twitter.com/GirlsGun/status/599029396071002112">May 15, 2015</a></blockquote>
<script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script><br />
<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
guns, ammo, girls, guns and girls, girls and guns, women at war, war, women, girl, girl&guns, sexy,<span id="transmark"></span></div>
</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-65168158585136307692015-05-08T02:15:00.002-07:002015-05-08T02:16:48.956-07:00Sen. Cory Booker calls for action in online War vs ISIS<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<h1 class="entry-title">
<span style="font-size: small;">Sen. Cory Booker, D-N.J., backed his colleague’s appeal. “Look at
their fancy memes compared to what we’re not doing,” Booker said,
displaying examples of jihadist online postings.</span></h1>
<div class="ti-body">
“There’s an obvious piece of legislation that we need to start
working on,” Sen. Ron Johnson, R-Wisc., said during a Homeland Security
Committee hearing on “<a href="http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/jihad-20-social-media-in-the-next-evolution-of-terrorist-recruitment">Jihad 2.0</a>“.<br />
“Let’s face it: We invented the Internet. We invented the social
network sites. We’ve got Hollywood. We’ve got the capabilities… to blow
these guys out of the water from the standpoint of communications.”<br />
<br />
Booker is a <a href="https://twitter.com/corybooker">prolific user</a> of Twitter and a former <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/cory-booker-fire/">viral sensation</a>
in his own right, as mayor of Newark. He said he knows “something about
memes,” and added that “there are easy tactics how to get more voice,
virality to messaging that we’re not using as a government.”<br />
Instead, he lamented, the U.S. is spending “millions and millions of
dollars on old school forms of media,” like Voice of America.<br />
<br />
Sen. Cory Booker,, R-N.H., said that the private sector could play a
greater role working with the government in any counter-recruitment
initiative.<br />
Here’s a clip from the hearing:<br />
<span class="embed-youtube" style="display: block; text-align: center;"><iframe allowfullscreen="true" class="youtube-player" frameborder="0" height="338" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Sd7kMvn3Vhw?version=3&rel=1&fs=1&showsearch=0&showinfo=1&iv_load_policy=1&wmode=transparent" type="text/html" width="547"></iframe></span>Also
at the hearing, Peter Bergen, a senior New America Foundation national
security expert, testified in favor of more lenient treatment for
would-be fighters who reverse course before fully committing themselves.<br />
<br />
He noted that Muslim families who see a son or daughter radicalizing
online are deterred from reporting the matter to the FBI out of fear
that he or she will be thrown in jail for more than a decade.<br />
“If somebody is not actually indicted for a potential act of
terrorism, but merely for trying to go to Syria, we should be thinking
about off-ramps that aren’t 15 years in prisons,” Bergen said.<br />
<em>Sam Sacks is a writer and reporter living in Washington, D.C. He is the co-founder of the watchdog </em><br />
<em><br /></em>
<em>news site <a href="https://www.districtsentinel.com/">The District Sentinel</a>. </em><br />
<em>Photo: Screengrab of Cory Booker at Senate hearing</em></div>
<br />
<div class="contact">
Email the author: <a href="mailto:samsacks@districtsentinel.com">samsacks@districtsentinel.com</a></div>
</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-64330550948398723352015-05-03T21:11:00.001-07:002015-05-03T21:12:39.859-07:00Iraq January 5th 2015 - Maps<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-37514329181406950462015-05-03T06:48:00.000-07:002015-05-03T07:42:08.434-07:00Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: Books<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
<h2 class="s-lib-box-title" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: #cbe6fc; background-image: none; border-bottom-color: rgb(238, 238, 238); border-bottom-style: solid; border-bottom-width: 1px; border-radius: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; color: #004489; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, Verdana; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 700; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-top: 0px; orphans: auto; padding: 6px 8px; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 1; word-spacing: 0px;">
Selected Books from the NATO Multimedia Library</h2>
<div id="s-lg-box-collapse-921546" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; color: #555555; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, Verdana; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: 21px; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 1; word-spacing: 0px;">
<div class="s-lib-box-content" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding: 10px;">
<div class="" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<ul class="s-lg-link-list s-lg-link-list-5" id="s-lg-link-list-6467689" style="box-sizing: border-box; list-style-type: none; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px; padding-left: 20px;">
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-5813540" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-5813540" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/Details/Record.aspx?BibCode=52561697" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://syndetics.com/index.aspx?isbn=9780990447146/LC.GIF&client=springshare" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="Counterinsurgency in Eastern Afghanistan 2004-2008 : A Civilian Perspective" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/Details/Record.aspx?BibCode=52561697" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-5813540" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">Counterinsurgency in Eastern Afghanistan 2004-2008 : A Civilian Perspective</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-5813540" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">Robert KEMP</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-5813540" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-5813540" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 355.4 /01894<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2014)<br />
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-5813540" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-4262362" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-4262362" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3Aocn878921693%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://syndetics.com/index.aspx?isbn=9780198094883/LC.GIF&client=springshare" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="Policing Insurgencies : Cops as Counterinsurgents" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3Aocn878921693%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-4262362" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">Policing Insurgencies : Cops as Counterinsurgents</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-4262362" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">C. Christine FAIR (Editor); Sumit GANGULY (Editor)</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-4262362" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-4262362" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 355.4 /01886<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2014)<br />
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-4262353" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-4262353" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3Aocn832706208%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://syndetics.com/index.aspx?isbn=9780231164269/LC.GIF&client=springshare" style="border: 0px none; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="Counterinsurgency in Crisis : Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3Aocn832706208%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-4262353" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">Counterinsurgency in Crisis : Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-4262353" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">David H. UCKO; Robert EGNELL; Colin GRAY (Foreword by)</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-4262353" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-4262353" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 355.4 /01884<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2013)<br />
<br />
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1676182" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1676182" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A20152%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://syndetics.com/index.aspx?isbn=9780815724230/LC.GIF&client=springshare" style="border: 0px none; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="Afghan Lessons : Culture, Diplomacy, and Counterinsurgency" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A20152%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1676182" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">Afghan Lessons : Culture, Diplomacy, and Counterinsurgency</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1676182" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">Fernando GENTILINI; Angela ARNONE (Translator)</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1676182" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1676182" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 355.4 /01840<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2013)<br />
<br />
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1676161" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1676161" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A15728%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://syndetics.com/index.aspx?isbn=9781451642636/LC.GIF&client=springshare" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="The Insurgents : David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A15728%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1676161" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">The Insurgents : David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1676161" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">Fred KAPLAN</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1676161" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1676161" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 355.4 /01808<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2013)<br />
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1676161" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1676085" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1676085" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A31730%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://syndetics.com/index.aspx?isbn=9781780397801/LC.GIF&client=springshare" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="War, Will, and Warlords : Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A31730%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1676085" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">War, Will, and Warlords : Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1676085" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">Robert M. CASSIDY</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1676085" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1676085" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 355.4 /01836<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2012)<br />
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1676085" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1675880" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1675880" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A5035%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://syndetics.com/index.aspx?isbn=9781553393535/LC.GIF&client=springshare" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="Afghanistan in the Balance : Counterinsurgency, Comprehensive Approach, and Political Order" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A5035%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1675880" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">Afghanistan in the Balance : Counterinsurgency, Comprehensive Approach, and Political Order</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1675880" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">Hans-Georg EHRHART, Sven GAREIS & Charles PENTLAND (eds)</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1675880" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675880" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 341.2 /00502<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2012)<br />
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675880" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1675717" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1675717" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A32389%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://syndetics.com/index.aspx?isbn=9781594203183/LC.GIF&client=springshare" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="All In : The Education of General David Petraeus" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A32389%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1675717" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">All In : The Education of General David Petraeus</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1675717" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">Paula BROADWELL & Vernon LOEB</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1675717" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675717" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 92 PETR/00001<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2012)<br />
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675717" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675717" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1675469" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1675469" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A20278%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://syndetics.com/index.aspx?isbn=9780300166712/LC.GIF&client=springshare" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="Losing Small Wars: British military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A20278%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1675469" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">Losing Small Wars: British military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1675469" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">Frank LEDWIGE</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1675469" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675469" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 355.4/01748<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2011)</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675469" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675469" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675469" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1675440" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1675440" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A23432%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://syndetics.com/index.aspx?isbn=9781586487638/LC.GIF&client=springshare" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="The Wars of Afghanistan" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A23432%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1675440" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">The Wars of Afghanistan</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1675440" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">Peter TOMSEN</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1675440" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675440" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Location Library: 958 /00015<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2011)</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675440" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<br />
<br />
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675440" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1675267" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1675267" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A33822%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://syndetics.com/index.aspx?isbn=1400068738/LC.GIF&client=springshare" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="The Wrong War : Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan - Bing WEST" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A33822%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1675267" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">The Wrong War : Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan - Bing WEST</span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1675267" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;"></span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1675267" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675267" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 355.4/1711<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2011)<br />
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675267" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675267" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1675152" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1675152" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A41675%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://lgimages.s3.amazonaws.com/nc-sm.gif" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict : Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A41675%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1675152" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict : Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1675152" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">Idean SALEHYAN</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1675152" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675152" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 355.4 /01656<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2010)<br />
<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
*also available<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubid=971" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;">online</a><br />
</div>
</div>
</div>
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</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1675154" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1675154" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss?url=search-alias%3Daps&field-keywords=Bayley,%20David%20H.%20BAYLEY%20&%20Robert%20PERITO%20The%20Police%20in%20War%20:%20Fighting%20Insurgency,%20Terrorism,%20and%20Violent%20Crime" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/41xu5zhTLiL._SX200_.jpg" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="The Police in War : Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A37465%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1675154" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">The Police in War : Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1675154" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">Bayley, David H. BAYLEY & Robert PERITO</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1675154" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675154" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 351 /00050<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2010)<br />
<br />
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675154" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1675283" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1675283" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A28665%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://lgimages.s3.amazonaws.com/nc-sm.gif" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="Faut-il brûler la contre-insurrection ?" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A28665%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1675283" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">Faut-il brûler la contre-insurrection ?</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1675283" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">BRICET DES VALLONS, George-Henri (ed.)</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1675283" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675283" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 355.4 /01712<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2010)<br />
<br />
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675283" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675283" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1675150" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1675150" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A24879%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://lgimages.s3.amazonaws.com/nc-sm.gif" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="Shades of CORDS in the Kush : The False Hope of 'Unity of Effort' in American Counterinsurgency" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A24879%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1675150" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">Shades of CORDS in the Kush : The False Hope of 'Unity of Effort' in American Counterinsurgency</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1675150" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">Henry NUZUM</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1675150" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675150" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 355.4 /01660<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2010)<br />
<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
*also available<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=981" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;">online</a><br />
</div>
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</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1675145" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1675145" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A27480%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://syndetics.com/index.aspx?isbn=0815704097/LC.GIF&client=springshare" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="Toughing It Out in Afghanistan" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A27480%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1675145" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">Toughing It Out in Afghanistan</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1675145" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">Michael E. O'HANLON & Hassina SHERJAN</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1675145" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675145" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 355.4 /01650<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2010)<br />
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675145" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675145" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
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</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1675169" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1675169" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A33550%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://syndetics.com/index.aspx?isbn=1597974277/LC.GIF&client=springshare" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="The Other War : Winning and Losing in Afghanistan" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A33550%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1675169" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">The Other War : Winning and Losing in Afghanistan</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1675169" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">Ronald Eldredge NEUMANN</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1675169" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675169" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 341.2 /00429<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2009)<br />
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675169" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
<li class="" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-top: 5px;"><div class="s-lg-book clearfix" id="s-lg-content-1675171" style="box-sizing: border-box; padding-bottom: 10px;">
<div class="s-lg-book-cover" id="s-lg-book-cover-1675171" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A15939%3A" id="book_0" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" class="pull-left s-lg-book-cover-img-0" src="http://lgimages.s3.amazonaws.com/nc-sm.gif" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; max-width: 100%; vertical-align: middle; width: 90px;" title="L'enjeu afghan : la defaite interdite" /></a></div>
<div class="s-lg-book-props" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<a href="https://n10314uk.eos-intl.eu/N10314UK/OPAC/resolve.link?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_dat=CN%3A15939%3A" style="background-color: transparent; box-sizing: border-box; color: #2954d1; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><span class="s-lg-book-title" id="s-lg-book-title-1675171" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700;">L'enjeu afghan : la defaite interdite</span><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="s-lg-book-author" id="s-lg-book-author-1675171" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline;">Olivier HUBAC & Matthieu ANQUEZ</span></a><br />
<div class="s-lg-book-desc" id="s-lg-book-desc-1675171" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675171" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
Library Location: 355.4 /01666<br />
<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />
(2009)</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675171" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
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<br />
</div>
<div class="s-lg-link-desc" id="s-lg-link-desc-1675171" style="box-sizing: border-box;">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</li>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-64521828981295679792015-05-03T06:41:00.000-07:002015-05-03T06:41:08.492-07:00Every Insurgency Is Different<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<span class="byline" itemprop="author creator" itemscope="" itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: nyt-cheltenham-sh, georgia, 'times new roman', times, serif; font-size: 0.6875rem; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 700; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: 0.75rem; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 1; word-spacing: 0px;">By<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="byline-author" data-byline-name="PAUL STANILAND" itemprop="name">PAUL STANILAND</span></span><time class="dateline" datetime="2015-02-15" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: white; color: black; font-family: nyt-cheltenham-sh, georgia, 'times new roman', times, serif; font-size: 0.6875rem; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 300; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: 0.75rem; margin-left: 12px; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 1; word-spacing: 0px;">FEB. 15, 2015</time><br />
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CHICAGO — America faces a wide array of insurgencies across the globe, from the<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="meta-org" href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda_in_mesopotamia/index.html?inline=nyt-org" style="color: #326891; text-decoration: underline;" title="More articles about the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.">Islamic State in Iraq and Syria</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>to the<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="meta-org" href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/taliban/index.html?inline=nyt-org" style="color: #326891; text-decoration: underline;" title="More articles about the Taliban.">Taliban</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>in Afghanistan, each one different in its aims, structures and strategies. So why do the United States and its allies take pretty much the same approach to all?<br />
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A “surge” briefly stabilized Iraq, but the same strategy failed in Afghanistan. Internationally backed negotiations succeeded in Bosnia, but have so far failed in Syria. Israel’s targeting of Hamas leaders has not degraded the group, even as the deaths of factional leaders have sowed confusion within the Pakistani Taliban.<br />
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This track record is spotty because the insurgents themselves vary tremendously, particularly in the social networks among their leaders, and between those leaders and the local communities in which they operate. All insurgents are not created equal, and so strategies need to be matched to the specific strengths and weaknesses of a group.<br />
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That said, it is possible to categorize insurgent groups as one of three primary types. The first, what we might call “integrated groups,” like the Afghan Taliban, rely on robust social networks to link leaders to one another and to local communities. They are resilient and cohesive: Despite various local feuds and internal disagreements, the Afghan Taliban have never collapsed into internecine warfare.<br />
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That cohesion helps to explain why the huge, decade-long American investment in counterinsurgency in Afghanistan has largely failed. Integrated groups can survive many of the standard prescriptions of counterinsurgency doctrine, leading to long, bloody conflicts. Only intense, often brutal, warfare, like Sri Lanka’s campaign against the Tamil Tigers, is likely to destroy or contain them.<br />
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Because organizations like the Afghan Taliban are unlikely to collapse quickly, governments need to consider deal-making as an alternative to protracted warfare, even if the groups pursue undesirable goals. They are cohesive enough to bargain with the government or international community, allowing them to implement agreements without splintering.<br />
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Insurgent organizations in another category, “vanguard groups,” have a tight leadership core but weak pre-existing links to local communities. They often emerge when urban, elite or foreign fighters try to mobilize parts of society with which they have few ties. Their cohesion lets them move fast and effectively, as the Bolsheviks did in Russia in 1917, or as Al Qaeda in Iraq did in the first years after the American invasion.</div>
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But unless they quickly embed themselves in local communities, vanguards are vulnerable to dissent and disobedience from below. That’s why Al Qaeda in Iraq was so susceptible to the<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="meta-classifier" href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iraq/awakening_movement/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier" style="color: #326891; text-decoration: underline;" title="More articles about the Awakening Movement in Iraq.">Sunni Awakening</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>in 2007. Similarly, the Islamic State has been able to rapidly expand as a vanguard, but its major weakness remains the possibility of counterrevolt by wary local allies.<br />
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Vanguard groups are also vulnerable to a wider range of government strategies than integrated groups. If their leadership is quickly eliminated or politically co-opted, the organization crumbles. The key to counterinsurgency against them, then, is to quickly target leaders while preventing these groups from rebuilding.</div>
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Vanguards present difficult dilemmas for peace processes, however: Even if leaders agree to a deal, they may not be able to persuade their local units to go along. Negotiating partners therefore need to actively bolster the leadership of such groups in order to prevent dissension and encourage unity — in other words, peace may require that a government support the leaders of a group it has long been fighting.<br />
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Groups in a third type, “parochial insurgents,” have a fragmented leadership splintered across powerful factions, despite existing under a shared organizational banner. They often emerge from loose alliances among distinct local networks. Their local ties make them militarily formidable, but leadership divisions leave them prone to internal splits.<br />
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The Pakistani Taliban is a classic parochial insurgent group that has been plagued by infighting, side-switching and an inability to build and maintain coherent strategies, even as it has been able to impose heavy costs on Pakistan’s government and society. These internal rivalries have triggered brutal violence against civilians to try to show a faction’s power, as in the group’s recent attack on a school in Peshawar. (Parochial groups shouldn’t be confused with truly fragmented organizations, like some of the non-ISIS groups fighting in Syria; such groups are fatally undermined by the complete absence of central leadership and are easily marginalized.)<br />
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Dealing with parochial groups presents a distinct challenge. Targeting the overall leadership — whether through violence or negotiations — is not very productive, since central control is weak. Killing top leaders may affect only their own faction, not the broader organization. Counterinsurgents are instead forced into long and messy campaigns focused on imposing state control at the local level.<br />
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Peace is also hard to negotiate and implement with parochial groups. Because of the weakness of central leaderships, local factions must be approached individually, an often protracted and byzantine process. Rather than grand bargains or overarching settlements, peace with parochial groups is built through live-and-let-live deals, cease-fires and local accommodations.<br />
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This diversity among insurgent groups means that some strategies that work in one place might be counterproductive in another. There is no such thing as counterinsurgency doctrine; rather, doctrines and strategies have to be tailor-made to unique situations, based on a careful study of the groups and the political, social and economic contexts in which they operate. Only then can America and its allies hope to stabilize conflict-weary regions of the world.<br />
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<i><i>Paul Staniland<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></i>is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago and author of “Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse.”</i></div>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-89482788620232410662015-05-03T06:35:00.004-07:002015-05-03T06:35:43.566-07:00COIN worked in Afghanistan — at least tactically<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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Carter Malkesian,</div>
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<a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thoughts-from-garmser-and-kabul" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; color: #eb1414; font-family: inherit; font-size: 17px; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">interviewed</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>by Octavian Manea in<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: inherit; font-size: 17px; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: italic; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Small Wars Journal</em>:</div>
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“To say that counterinsurgency didn’t work is not a fair assessment. If you look at a variety of places in Iraq and Afghanistan you can see that counterinsurgency tactics — particularly the ones related to the use of military force, patrolling, advising, and small projects — worked in pushing insurgents out of a specific area. From a tactical perspective, counterinsurgency worked.</div>
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“The argument that counterinsurgency didn’t work has more weight from a strategic perspective. The Afghan surge ended with the government in control of more territory than any time since 2005 and in possession of large and competent security forces. As a result, the government may yet succeed. Nevertheless, the Afghan surge did not end with Afghanistan stabilized or the government ready to stand on its own. On top of that, counterinsurgency was expensive and demanded thousands for troops, facts that will always darken its story in Afghanistan.”</div>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-70372512928906297932015-05-03T06:27:00.001-07:002015-05-03T06:27:30.559-07:00Learning How Not to Scare People: The Paradox of Counterinsurgency<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2015/02/20/learning-how-not-to-scare-people-the-paradox-of-counterinsurgency/" rel="bookmark" style="color: #0a0a0a; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" title="Permanent Link to Learning How Not to Scare People: The Paradox of Counterinsurgency"><span class="post-meta" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: white; border-bottom-style: solid; border-bottom-width: 1px; border-color: rgb(10, 10, 10); color: #0a0a0a; display: block; font-family: 'Liberation Sans', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: 1px; margin: 0px 0px 25px; orphans: auto; padding: 0px 0px 50px; text-align: center; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: uppercase; white-space: normal; widows: 1; word-spacing: 0px;"><span class="pf-author"></span></span></a><a href="http://www.e-ir.info/author/lillian-figg-franzoi/" style="color: #0a0a0a; outline: none; text-decoration: none;">LILLIAN FIGG-FRANZOI</a>,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span class="pf-date date">FEB 20 2015</span><div class="entry" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: white; color: #0a0a0a; font-family: 'Liberation Sans', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: left; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 1; word-spacing: 0px;">
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With the official<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2014/12/nato-ceremony-marking-end-afghan-war-20141228592954303.html" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">closure of the NATO ISAF mission</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>at the start of the New Year in 2015, the West’s involvement in Afghanistan will demand analysis and reflection for decades to come. As one of the most important intervention exercises in modern history, it will be essential to reflect upon the Afghanistan campaign, and its gradual unravelling. As a small contribution to this discussion, I reflect here upon a concept that, in the first decade of the 2000s, dominated the intervention’s strategic paradigm, nominally referred to as the “cult of counterinsurgency”.</div>
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The phrase “cult of counterinsurgency” was made popular by former the UK Foreign Secretary’s Special Representative to Afghanistan, Sir Sherhard Cowper-Coles. In his<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/jun/16/cables-from-kabul-review" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">2011 memoir-policy-critique</a>,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>Cables From Kabul: The Inside Story of the West’s Afghanistan Campaign,</em><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>he outlined the axioms of counterinsurgency that may have contributed to stabilisation in Afghanistan from a security perspective, but through its domination of intervention strategy may have also contributed to the mission’s continued failures.</div>
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While the counterinsurgency doctrine helped war strategists<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/04summer/cassidy.pdf" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">adjust to street-conflict</a>, in contrast to conventional battlefield conflict, and while the doctrine also identified the characteristics of new kinetic warfare, it has arguably overstretched itself when dealing with the very real elements that constitute the necessary “3-D” responses to modern instability, namely, defense, diplomacy and development. As pointed out by Cowper-Coles, counterinsurgency quickly became a misguided goal rather than what it was designed to be, namely, a tactic. Yet, In the case of Afghanistan, we now realise that the strategy of the long-term operation should not have been a military one that primarily involved countering insurgents (Ringsmose & Thruelsen 2010; Mikolashek & Kalic 2011); such a strategy now appears to have been overstretched.</div>
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At this pivotal point in twenty-first century global policy, at the closure of one massive modern intervention mission and the possible cusp of many more, is necessary to reconsider how much counterinsurgency can achieve and has achieved. In this manner, it is important to reflect upon the degree to which counterinsurgency operational failures are due to the primacy that counterinsurgency has in Western intervention strategies. Afghanistan may be an excellent case study demonstrating how the balanced 3-D’s—and not merely defence—are central to modern intervention success.</div>
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<strong style="font-weight: 700;">Afghanistan</strong></div>
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Afghanistan is a distinct laboratory in conceptualising the 3D’s. Interlocking challenges of “state-collapse, radicalisation, population growth, social inequality and hopelessness” make necessary a future that includes a different posture than that which the armed forces adopted in the past (Surhke 2011, 10). The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was the de facto Western force in Afghanistan since 2001, acting as a multi-lateral, civilian-military organisation deployed to stabilise the country. Its mission was one of confusion, and even contention, between member-forces trying to negotiate and understand the soft and hard elements of their work.</div>
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It is important to understand the Afghanistan campaign within what is called a “New Wars” context. New Wars describes the modern form of warfare that places conflict within and amongst the people, so that battle-lines are not easily distinguishable.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/24" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">Mary Kaldor</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>coined the term New Wars in 1999 and scholar Mark Duffield egged on further analysis with his major work in 2001<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em><a class="ext-link" href="http://www.amazon.com/Global-Governance-New-Wars-Development/dp/1856497496" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">Global Governance and New Wars</a>.</em>The concept unyieldingly connects security with development. Through it, under-developed areas are understood as potential hot spots for conflict and tension, and the primacy of globalisation then classifies underdevelopment beyond a state’s borders as a potential domestic threat requiring potential action (intervention, or what we all came to know under President Bush’s Iraq’s invasion as “<a class="ext-link" href="http://www.cfr.org/world/bush-administrations-doctrine-preemption-prevention-/p6799" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">pre-emption</a>”). All this is clearly illustrated in the goals of the<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">NATO strategic concept</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>where it is recognised that</div>
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crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.</div>
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In the Afghanistan context, this “New Wars” paradigm was overwhelmingly evident. The<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">2006 Riga summit</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>clearly articulated NATO’s imperative that “there can be no security…without development, and no development without security” in Afghanistan. With development and security clearly intertwined, the question remained, what becomes the appropriate response. In theory, the popular response to New Wars was what became known as “3-D”, namely “Defense, Development and Diplomacy”.</div>
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In the context of Afghanistan, policymakers heavily relied on the Department of Defence to formulate and execute non-military tasks, which constituted elements of the non-defense 3-D approach. US military, in the<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63717/robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">words<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></a>of Former US Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates, must “kick down the door” and match its ability “to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterwards”. Scholar Mark Moyar described that “the military would do well to enlarge its own capabilities for funding and managing development programs, to meet the large demand in this war and to prepare for going it alone in the next” (Moyar 2011, 16).</div>
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However, such an approach to intervention in modern warfare can be identified as contributing to its failure. Afghanistan needed a 3D strategy “with a better balance and better division of labour between military<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span style="text-decoration: underline;">d</span>efence,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><span style="text-decoration: underline;">d</span>iplomacy, and<span style="text-decoration: underline;"><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>d</span>evelopment” (3D Security Initiative 2009 (underlines graciously original)). Former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton articulated this sentiment, that the 3D approach should be used by the US to strengthen its national security policy. But she also admitted that these “D”s were not being well balanced. In 2009, correcting the balance became a firmer part of the Obama administration’s approach in Afghanistan.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/18/obama.afghanistan.canada/index.html?iref=24hours" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">President Obama affirmed</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>that in the 21<sup style="font-size: 11.25px; line-height: 0; position: relative; top: -0.5em; vertical-align: baseline;">st</sup><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>century, “We’re going to have to use diplomacy, we’re going to have to use development.” Despite these sentiments, the Afghanistan campaign was dominated by the legacy of the military addressing the 3Ds through its “cult of counterinsurgency” which ultimately weakened the intervention’s success.</div>
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<strong style="font-weight: 700;">What is Counterinsurgency?</strong></div>
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Counterinsurgency as a popular military concept arose long before the 3Ds mainstreamed into foreign policy lingo. In fact, the entire idea of what was coined “New Wars” is based on experiences that arose throughout the post WWII environment, throughout Cold War developments.</div>
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Counterinsurgency is itself an elusive concept. In the words of one of its founding fathers,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://louisville.edu/armyrotc/files/Galula%20David%20-%20Counterinsurgency%20Warfare.pdf" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">David Galula</a>, it “cannot be defined except by reference to its cause”. Summarily, insurgents in a specific context generally try to undermine the legitimacy of a host government. The engagement between insurgents and the forces countering them revolves largely around who has the population’s trust (Wenneberg 2011; Chandrasekaran 2011). Counterinsurgency therefore involves a combination of kinetic (that is active military) engagement of insurgents<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>and</em><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>winning population support. Kinetic practices include night raids, targeted killings and air or drone strikes which are then coupled with<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://www.diplomatonline.com/pdf_files/npsia/2007-08/1_QIPs_Jon%20Baker_FINAL.pdf" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">quick impact projects</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>(QIPs) aimed towards<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/28/afghanistan.obama/index.html?_s=PM" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">winning hearts and minds</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>(WHAM),<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="https://publicintelligence.net/nato-peace-support-operations-doctrine/" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">peace support operations</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>(PSOs) and<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47da7da52.pdf" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">civilian and military coordination</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>(CIMIC) which aid in reconstruction and development. Through counterinsurgency, it becomes the role of the military and its soldiers to make the intervention, as a whole, a success.</div>
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<strong style="font-weight: 700;">Alphabet Soup for the Military</strong></div>
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The ever-expanding alphabet soup of counterinsurgency (QIPs, WHAM, PSOs and CIMIC) epitomise how soldiers are to take charge of a non-ending list of non-military work in their operations. Despite extensive modern training, the core issue here is whether soldiers are wholly unequipped to complete these assistance projects which in and of themselves are befuddling and contradictory.</div>
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Counterinsurgency doctrine places primary importance on “protecting populations”. According to US Special Operations Commander, Chief Admiral Eric Olson, counterinsurgency<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg61824/html/CHRG-111hhrg61824.htm" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">has become</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>“a euphemism for non-kinetic activities” like those listed in the alphabet soup above. Olson contends that counterinsurgency doctrine is an oxymoron, because it dilutes its kinetic value by attempting to involve all sorts of activities with which the military is unequipped to govern. This includes development work, humanitarian assistance and political engagement. He further states that there is a false assumption that the military has vast civilian-sector capabilities, which covers governance-enhancement, forming youth groups, infrastructure building, teaching locals and even what has been called<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">“armed social work”.</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>But frankly, soldiers are misplaced to fulfil jobs like those listed in US-FM 324’s Tactics’ chapter, where in-depth cultural awareness of local wages is expected to accompany guerrilla-sweeps. The doctrine ultimately expects soldiers to switch back and forth between development and combat work within days or hours, which understandably confuses both soldiers and the effected populations regarding the military’s goals and the primary objectives of the intervention as a whole.</div>
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The Afghan mission, like many modern interventions, was consistently in need of increased civilian capabilities (Benashel et al 2009). These, if provided, could have better contributed to organising the alphabet soup of politicised development. Yet the important point to make is that this additional capacity should not have been incorporated under the umbrella of counterinsurgency. Public diplomacy, capacity training, understanding local social fabric, and infrastructure development must be understood as tactics and knowledge separate from counterinsurgency.</div>
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<strong style="font-weight: 700;">Learning How Not to Scare People</strong></div>
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Fulfilling the duties of the alphabet soup should not only<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>not</em><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>be the responsibility of soldiers, but this expectation is also a fundamental problem. Soldiers should not be expected to commit to political engagement or be expected to affect Afghanistan’s social fabric. The<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/dr_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24x2.pdf" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">Field Manual 324</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>asserts that soldiers should “serve as a moral compass which extends beyond the coin force and into the community,” but this seems to be not only naïve but dangerous to military and development work by conflating and confusing the aims and goals of specific missions (see Waldman 2009). The directive that “many people find rifles, helmets and body armour intimidating” so soldiers should “learn how to not scare [these people]” is not only an incredible directive in a Field Manual, but wholly disconcerting.</div>
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In 2003, ISAF was increasingly frustrated by the inability of the civilian aid apparatus to deliver appropriate assistance that would counter the Taliban delivery of public goods and support central government capacity. The<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/Prism_65-76_Stavridis.pdf" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">2006 Comprehensive Approach</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>called for closer integration between development, governance and military strategy, putting the military in charge of delivering aid and public services. As Former Norwegian Defense Minister,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/aktuelt/taler_artikler/politisk_ledelse/statssekretaer_espen_barth_eide/2007/why-is-norway-in-afghanistan-how-can-we-.html?id=456378" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">Espen Barthe Eide said</a>, “we must not shy away from robust action when such action is called for.” And it is essential to recognise that many military-based efforts provide the necessary foundation for development, but development cannot be a tactic beneath counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency, with its short-term perspective of “secure and hold” is not conducive to building, which constitutes a long-term endeavour.</div>
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<strong style="font-weight: 700;">Rhetorics of War-fighting: Self-Fulfilling Prophecies</strong></div>
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Disagreements over the extent to which Afghanistan is or should have been primarily a development project, a “Responsibility 2 Protect” intervention, a peacekeeping mission, or a defensive military strike, are long-standing and still unsolved. In fact, it can be argued that each country involved in the NATO-ISAF operation had a distinct view of what kind of mission they were conducting. States like Norway and Canada considered it primarily a politicised development project (Cabrera 2006; Ravndal 2009), with the UK serving in a peacekeeping mission (Cooper-Coles 2011) and the US engaged in a muddled military strike and nation-building project (Dobbins 2009).</div>
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Defining Afghanistan as a development or humanitarian mission may make the project more palatable, because soft projects for peace are often easier for domestic populations to digest and politicians to advance. But again, as poignantly stated by Norwegian scholar and critic<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a class="ext-link" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=DTV3zvK9aw8C&pg=PA295&lpg=PA295&dq=to+die+for+a+development+project+is+hardly+acceptable&source=bl&ots=CZSwW07Msr&sig=eWcy9jyNghx4zbj5czy4yaqdf60&hl=en&sa=X&ei=SSHIVP2MOLSZsQSZyoKACA&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=to%20die%20for%20a%20development%20project%20is%20hardly%20acceptable&f=false" rel="external" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank" title="">Janne Haaland Matlary</a>, “to die for a development project is hardly acceptable.”</div>
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This sentiment highlights the reluctance of major powers to downplay the military aspects due to the need to defend the rationale for their troops’ presence in the conflict area, and why their citizens are dying. For smaller countries, governments find it especially difficult to justify to their citizens why their soldiers are dying for a mission classified primarily in development or peace support operations terms.</div>
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Clearly, Afghanistan was never merely a development project; indeed, rebels and fighters still disrupt security and governance on a daily basis. However, framing the mission as primarily a military strike complicated the work being conducted because it became too heavily driven by inappropriate military strategies, with actors misapplied to certain areas of work.</div>
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As argued here, counterinsurgency is not appropriate as a development strategy; it is incapable of delivering a political victory. The entire project is<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>both</em><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>humanitarian<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>and</em><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>military, where “the military tool is simply one ‘normal’ tool in the toolbox of democracy-building and stabilization” (Matlary 2006, 108). The simple fact is that the military is better equipped to deal in “stick” approaches, such as countering insurgents kinetically, while diplomatic or development approaches function better using “carrots”, such as building local capacity, enhancing spaces for political engagement, and helping with appropriate livelihood projects. If we acknowledge that Afghanistan was<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>not</em><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>merely humanitarian or military in nature, but both, we may then be better able to recognise the dangers that have arisen in this case regarding the experienced counterinsurgency-as-strategy approach. In essence, military engagements used for humanitarian and development projects often contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy, where the situation becomes over securitised, over-militarised, and politically constricted.</div>
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<strong style="font-weight: 700;">Admitting the Issue: Commitment and Prestige</strong></div>
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A central element of the Afghan mission’s continued failure was the lack of commitment by international actors. It does not matter whether the mission was dominated by a hubristic military viewpoint or a naive development paradigm when neither of these have the necessary resource-support from contributing donor governments. While coordination and balance within the mission in determining its goals and tactics was obviously a problem, arguably the greater problem was the commitment of actors to make decisions regarding the mission’s fundamental nature. Without agreement on what the mission was about, it was a forgone conclusion that the principal actors would fail in contributing the necessary funding, equipment, training, and long-term perspective in achieving semblance of success.</div>
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Distractions from neighbouring Iraq conflict, dwindling domestic support for military engagements abroad during the financial recession, and changing political leaders all contributed to failures in the massive and complex endeavour that was the Afghanistan intervention. While solving the coordination issue of balancing appropriate tactics and thinking about the conflict in a manner conducive to mission-success is important, the operation will always be at a loss unless international commitment to the project is increased and sustained.</div>
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In this vein, it is ultimately naïve to discuss the 3Ds in a way that implies that all have the same funding, limelight and prestige. Defense has historically been the central stage of any country’s foreign policy. The current New Wars context, while demanding a change in how security is implemented, does not automatically equate to principal actors realising the necessity of changing military strategies to complement but not supersede parallel work in campaigns. In the same vein, asking the military to step down its activities in a violent context to make room for development and diplomacy work is no simple task. Telling a military official that his or her work on countering insurgents in a security context is not the primary goal of the mission will not be easy when agencies, ministries and actors are competing for resources. Nor is this easy to do when lives are at stake.</div>
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This all being said, scaling down the revered cult of counterinsurgency in our future interventions, recognising counterinsurgency as a kinetic tactic contributing to an overarching political goal, may be the only way to provide similar missions with a sense of real international purpose. It will be important for this purpose to rise above not scaring the populations we are trying to help, but instead putting the welfare of these populations directly at the centre of our 3D approaches, by better reforming our strategies and tactics to contribute to intervention success.</div>
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<strong style="font-weight: 700;">References</strong></div>
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3D Security Initiative. (2009). “Civil society perspectives on US policy in Afghanistan”.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>3D Security Policy Brief.</em><span style="line-height: 1.5;"> </span></div>
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Cabrera, R. (2006). “Adjusting military forces to the new security environment: the case of three middle powers: Australia, the Netherlands and Norway”.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>Real Instituto Eleano. Area: Security & Defense.</em><span style="line-height: 1.5;"> </span></div>
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Chandrasekaran, R. (2011). “Is NATO’s Counterinsurgency strategy working in Afghanistan? A case study”.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>Centre for International Policy Studies. Policy Brief No 11</em><em> </em></div>
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Dobbins, J. F. (2009) “Nation-building and counterinsurgency after Iraq” in<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>Grimmingsrud, T. & Pedersen, H-. M. Small Nation, Big Difference: How the Norwegian armed forces should conduct counterinsurgency operations.</em><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Naval Postgraduate School.</div>
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Kaldor, M. (1999).<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era</em>. Cambridge: Polity Press.</div>
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Kalyvas, S. N. (2011). “New and Old Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?”<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>World Politics,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></em>Vol. 54 (1): 99-118.</div>
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Matlary, J. H. (2006). When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is and EU Strategic Culture Possible?<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>Security Dialogue,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></em>Vol. 37: 105-121.<em> </em></div>
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Mikolashek, J & Kalic, S. N. (2011). Deciphering Shades of Gray: understanding counterinsurgency.<em>Small Wars Journal.</em><em> </em></div>
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Moyar, M. (2011). “Development in Afghanistan’s Counterinsurgency: A new Guide”.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>Orbic Operations:</em>1- 17.</div>
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Ravndal, J. A. (2009). “Counterinsurgency- when theory meets reality: Seminar report”.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).</em></div>
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Richards, D. & Mills, G. (2011).<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>Victory Among People: Lessons from Countering Insurgency and Stabilising Fragile States</em>. London: RUSI Publications.<em> </em></div>
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Ringsmose, J., & Thruelsen, P. D. (2010). “NATO’s Counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan: Are classical doctrines suitable for alliances?”.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>UNISCI Discussion Paper<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></em>No 22: 56-77.</div>
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Suhrke, A. (2011). “Disjointed incrementalism: NATO in Afghanistan”.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>PRIO Policy Brief 11,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></em>no pagination specified.</div>
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(2007). “Democratization of a dependent state: the case of Afghanistan”.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em>Chr Michelsen Institute Working Papers.</em></div>
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Waldman, M. (2009). “Mission Impossible? Deconstructing Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan”. Talk given at Carr Centre 4 November.</div>
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Wenneberg, R. (2011). “‘NATOs nye counterinsurgensy doctrine: kan den etterleves av norske styrker?”.<em>Forsvarsakademiet Institut for Milit</em><em>ære Operationer Stabskursus 2010</em><em>-2011.</em></div>
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<div class="post_author" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background: rgb(255, 255, 255); border-top-color: rgb(10, 10, 10); border-top-style: solid; border-top-width: 1px; color: #0a0a0a; font-family: 'Liberation Sans', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: 22.1000003814697px; margin: 25px 0px 0px; orphans: auto; padding: 25px 0px 0px; text-align: left; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 1; word-spacing: 0px;">
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR (<a href="http://www.e-ir.info/author/lillian-figg-franzoi/" rel="author" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;" title="Posts by Lillian Figg-Franzoi">LILLIAN FIGG-FRANZOI</a>):</div>
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<strong style="font-weight: 700;">Lillian Figg-Franzoi</strong><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>currently works in the Peace and Security Cluster, a division within the United Nations Office for Project Services, where she supports logistics and management of projects engaging in post-conflict and conflict-intervention environments. She has previously worked with research institutes and non-profit organisations in development, gender and migration. Her publications include journal article,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10611-011-9326-1#page-1" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;">Malahat, the State and the People: Opium Use in the Republic of Iran</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>and online contributions on<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.gfmer.ch/srr/complexemergencies.htm" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;">Complex Emergencies: Programming Based on Sexual and Reproductive Rights</a>. She holds a MSc in Defense, Development and Diplomacy from Durham University (UK).</div>
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<span class="tag-links" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: white; border-top-color: rgb(10, 10, 10); border-top-style: solid; border-top-width: 1px; clear: both; color: #0a0a0a; display: block; float: none; font-family: 'Liberation Sans', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: 1px; line-height: 22.1000003814697px; margin: 25px 0px 0px; orphans: auto; padding: 25px 0px 0px; text-align: left; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: uppercase; white-space: normal; widows: 1; word-spacing: 0px;">TAGS:<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.e-ir.info/tag/afghanistan/" rel="tag" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;">AFGHANISTAN</a>,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.e-ir.info/tag/cimic/" rel="tag" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;">CIMIC</a>,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.e-ir.info/tag/counterinsurgency/" rel="tag" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;">COUNTERINSURGENCY</a>,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.e-ir.info/tag/international-security-assistance-force/" rel="tag" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;">INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE</a>,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.e-ir.info/tag/isaf/" rel="tag" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;">ISAF</a>,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.e-ir.info/tag/military/" rel="tag" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;">MILITARY</a>,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.e-ir.info/tag/nato/" rel="tag" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;">NATO</a>,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.e-ir.info/tag/psos/" rel="tag" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;">PSOS</a>,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.e-ir.info/tag/qips/" rel="tag" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;">QIPS</a>,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.e-ir.info/tag/war-fighting/" rel="tag" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;">WAR-FIGHTING</a>,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.e-ir.info/tag/wham/" rel="tag" style="color: #fa5541; outline: none; text-decoration: none;">WHAM</a></span></h1>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-821645941824054612015-05-03T06:25:00.000-07:002015-05-03T06:25:14.722-07:00The Strange Death of the Counter-insurgency Era<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<span style="font-size: small;">What lessons can we learn from the counter-insurgency era that spanned the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq? As M L R Smith and D M Jones see it, COIN was more of a narrative than an empirical concept, it concealed ideologically-tainted modernization projects that worked at cross purposes with actual needs, and much more.</span></div>
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<a href="http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=189557" target="_blank"><span style="font-size: small;">By MLR Smith and David Martin Jones for ISN</span></a></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">The notion of counter-insurgency is an elusive idea that in general terms simply denotes the attempt to confront a challenge to established authority, but which came to function as a synonym for long-term external armed interventions by Western states, most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the mid-2000s, ‘COIN’ was elevated to a position of explicit importance in defence thinking and became a source of endless fascination in analytical circles. The ‘classical’ thinkers of counter-insurgency were resurrected from a largely forgotten past and became an object of reverence. COIN became the defining military practice of the age.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">Since 2011 Western forces have been withdrawn from major theatres of operation. In 2014 Western nations ended their major combat roles in Afghanistan. Once heralded as an almost universal formula for success in complex interventions, the costs, consequences, and controversies associated with the counter-insurgency era have left an ambiguous and unfulfilled legacy. Analytical opinion has already moved on. The occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan that once loomed large in political life have already begun to fade from view, displaced by new and different crises on the world stage. Few have stopped to ponder the aftermath. Now that most of the troops have gone, what should we make of the ambiguous COIN era?</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">In particular, commentary still struggles to answer the most fundamental question: what, exactly, is counter-insurgency? COIN’s ambivalent character is partly explained by the lack of clarity of the term it is intended to counter: ‘insurgency’. Analysts and practitioners have deployed terms as various as small wars, irregular war, unconventional war, guerrilla or revolutionary war in an attempt to capture this indistinct phenomenon. These various terms have rarely succeeded in clarifying what precisely an insurgency is. Accordingly, the notion of counter-insurgency is rendered equally obscure and malleable, one that can cover anything from policing operations to large-scale military combat.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><strong style="color: #333333; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">COIN as narrative</strong></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">Dissecting the term counter-insurgency reveals not so much a concept as a<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em style="border: 0px none; color: inherit; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: italic; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">narrative</em>. Its actual meaning may be contested, but as an explanatory mechanism through which the past can be filtered, it becomes a powerful tool. For example, between 2007 and 2011, the COIN narrative maintained that the confusion and complexity of Iraq’s post-invasion civil strife could be reduced to a single understanding: ‘an insurgency’. This required applying the recently re-discovered tactics of classic population-centric Cold War counter-insurgency, distilling them into<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><em style="border: 0px none; color: inherit; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: italic; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual</em>. The decline in violence in Iraq after the 2007 ‘surge’ seemed to vindicate the approach. Irrespective of a genuine causal connection, Western militaries extolled the virtues of COIN. The counter-insurgency school became an intellectual movement, advancing through the corridors of power, think tanks and academe.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">The narrative power of COIN lay not only in that it offered a simple, if deceptive, explanation of the decrease in violence in Iraq after 2007 but that it purported to identify recurrent patterns of conflict that yielded enduring tactical lessons for operational conduct. This claim rested on the analysis of supposedly ‘classic’ counter-insurgency campaigns, most notably the British conduct of the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) and French practice during the Algerian War (1954–1962). Other cases also made appearances in the narrative, either as positive or negative examples. These included the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya (1952–1960), the Northern Ireland conflict (1968–1998) and Vietnam (1965–1975). The somewhat arbitrary conflation of these diverse conflicts under the rubric of COIN gave historical veracity to the narrative.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><strong style="color: #333333; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">COIN as apolitical science</strong></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">Thus, COIN’s centrality to contemporary debate over armed conflict derived from the apparent proof that past practice yielded lessons for current and future wars. That the theory identified a distinct form of conflict, characterised as insurgency, led naturally to the assertion that a series of palliative methods and core operational principles could be implemented that would, if correctly applied, ensure success. These practices invariably included: securing the loyalty of the population; grievance reduction; the integration of civic action plans; democracy and human rights promotion; and the minimum application of military force in overarching programmes described in terms of ‘clear, hold, and build’. This emphasis on technique, however, came at the expense of the contingency of political decision-making that always gives rise to war and which exerts a continuous influence over military operations.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">The methodology of COIN, therefore, reflected an attempt to scientifically rationalise warfare into a series of steps or procedures, promoting the technical ‘how’, over the political (and more complicated) ‘why’. The overriding concern for the ‘how’ of operational conduct thus pre-empted vital strategic questions about proportionality: for example, what crucial political values are at stake in interventions and what costs are worth incurring to defend them? The ‘why’ question is political and depends upon contingent circumstances. COIN theory not only had no answer to the question, it never saw fit to even pose it.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><strong style="color: #333333; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">The ideology of COIN</strong></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">This leads onto another of the characteristics of the COIN advocacy, that although it eschewed overtly political statements, it was, paradoxically, highly ideological. On the surface, COIN theory wished to present itself as apolitical: offering an historically proven set of techniques for action across time and space. According to this understanding, counter-insurgency responded to the timeless dynamics of insurgency with an equally timeless set of rules for action.<sup style="color: #333333; line-height: 0; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></sup>Such claims to universal applicability, however, concealed a normative project, namely, modernization.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">Though remaining unarticulated, the ultimate goal of counter-insurgency theory as it evolved in the United States and Europe after 2003, was to propel conflicted societies mired in customary practice or authoritarian political cultures along the road of socio-economic improvement and democratic development. Yet, the question of whether non-Western, tribal and ethno-religiously divided political cultures in the Middle East or South Asia were susceptible to such nation-building schemes and worth the long-term costs of Western efforts in modernizing them was never asked. Buried within Western counter-insurgency discourse was an ideology, which asserted that successful nation building would facilitate a liberal democratic ‘end of history.’</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><strong style="color: #333333; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">Mythologising the past</strong></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">This brings us to a final characteristic of counter-insurgency thinking, which is that its underlying end-of-history teleology exhibited a capacity to mythologise the past, disfigure historical understanding and obscure complexity. The promotion of an assumed British expertise in small war and counter-insurgency evinced all these limitations. Analysts repeatedly credited the British armed forces with an almost gnostic counter-insurgency expertise based on their experience with colonial warfare, particularly in winning over the population through techniques of minimum force and hearts and minds. Rarely was this reputation scrutinised. Commentators simply assumed the practice they needed to demonstrate.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">The British armed forces never officially extolled any innate expertise in COIN. Yet the constant repetition by external commentators of a British facility for this supposedly distinctive form of warfare meant that by the first decade of the twenty first century sections of the British military and political establishment came to assume that they did indeed possess a distinctive competence in this sphere. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the armed forces tended to view its colonial encounters in terms of orthodox demonstrations of hard power to curtail rebel activity. As a consequence of buying into this myth, when shortcomings in British military interventions became evident, most notably in southern Iraq in the mid-2000s, commentators expressed dismay at the demise of this non-existent tradition of COIN excellence.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">Such myth making, moreover, obscured a more prosaic but important reality, namely that Britain had prevailed in many of its ‘small’ wars, not solely because of innovative tactics on the ground, but primarily as a result of a government commitment to see these campaigns through so that stipulated political objectives were met. Ironically, COIN’s cherry picking of the historical record misrepresented the tactical proficiency that the British did possess. This proficiency, far from demonstrating a flair for minimum force, invariably exhibited a talent for escalation into the dark arts of intelligence-led Special Forces operations and the penetration of rebel networks—from Malaya to Northern Ireland to the back streets of Baghdad. This is where Britain’s capacities really lay and continue to reside.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;"><strong style="color: #333333; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">Conclusion</strong></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: small;">Ultimately, what a careful unpacking of counter-insurgency illustrates is a simple but important truth: COIN-think is symptomatic of a fallacy at the heart of much contemporary Western social inquiry, which is the attempt to impose a structure on the contingent complexity of the past. These structures of thought were never present at the time. In this respect, counterinsurgency ‘theory’ is little different from many other attempts to read the past through an understanding of a social or political ‘science’ as if it were possible to identify timeless patterns, lessons and principles. In this regard, counterinsurgency is a distorting lens that narrows an appreciation of the past, over-simplifies the present and over-determines the future. COIN is therefore a false narrative and should not be regarded as a formula for prescribing the principles of action to be used in future wars. COIN-centric readings of history, like all grand social science theorising, should be treated with scepticism.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">M.L.R. Smith holds the Chair in Strategic Theory, Department of War Studies, King’s College London. His book, co-authored with David Martin Jones, <em style="border: 0px none; color: inherit; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: italic; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency: Strategic Problems, Puzzles and Paradoxes</em><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>will be published in May 2015 by Columbia University Press.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">David Martin Jones is Visiting Professor, Department of War Studies, King’s College London. His book, co-authored with M.L.R. Smith, <em style="border: 0px none; color: inherit; font-family: inherit; font-stretch: inherit; font-style: italic; font-variant: inherit; font-weight: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency: Strategic Problems, Puzzles and Paradoxes</em><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>will be published in May 2015 by Columbia University Press.</span></div>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-54903348423900022022015-05-03T04:46:00.002-07:002015-05-03T04:46:16.427-07:00TALIBAN START SPRING OFFENSIVE<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<span style="font-size: large;"><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/world/asia/more-aggressive-role-by-us-military-is-seen-in-afghanistan.html?_r=0" target="_blank">Taliban Gains Pull U.S. Units Back Into Fight in Afghanistan</a></span></div>
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<span class="byline" itemid="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/a/azam_ahmed/index.html" itemprop="author creator" itemscope="" itemtype="http://schema.org/Person">By <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/a/azam_ahmed/index.html" rel="author" title="More Articles by AZAM AHMED"><span class="byline-author" data-byline-name="AZAM AHMED" itemprop="name">AZAM AHMED</span></a> and </span><span class="byline" itemid="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/g/joseph_goldstein/index.html" itemprop="author creator" itemscope="" itemtype="http://schema.org/Person"><a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/g/joseph_goldstein/index.html" rel="author" title="More Articles by JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN"><span class="byline-author" data-byline-name="JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN" itemprop="name">JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN</span></a></span><time class="dateline" datetime="2015-04-29">APRIL 29, 2015</time><br />
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KABUL, Afghanistan — Months after <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/o/barack_obama/index.html?inline=nyt-per" title="More articles about Barack Obama">President Obama</a> formally declared that the United States’ long <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/26/us/obama-addresses-afghan-wars-end-on-christmas-visit.html" title="Times article.">war against the Taliban was over</a> in <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/afghanistan/index.html?inline=nyt-geo" title="More news and information about Afghanistan.">Afghanistan</a>, the American military is regularly conducting airstrikes against low-level insurgent forces and sending Special Operations troops directly into harm’s way under the guise of “training and advising.”</div>
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In justifying the continued presence of the American forces in <a class="meta-loc" href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/afghanistan/index.html?inline=nyt-geo" title="More news and information about Afghanistan.">Afghanistan</a>, administration officials have insisted that the troops’ role is relegated to counterterrorism, defined as tracking down the remnants of <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda/index.html?inline=nyt-org" title="More articles about Al Qaeda.">Al Qaeda</a> and other global terrorist groups, and training and advising the Afghan security forces who have assumed the bulk of the fight.</div>
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In public, officials have emphasized that the <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/taliban/index.html?inline=nyt-org" title="More articles about the Taliban.">Taliban</a> are not being targeted unless it is for “force protection” — where the insurgents were immediately threatening American forces.</div>
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But interviews with American and Western officials in Kabul and Washington offer a picture of a more aggressive range of military operations against the <a class="meta-org" href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/taliban/index.html?inline=nyt-org" title="More articles about the Taliban.">Taliban</a> in recent months, as the insurgents have continued to make gains against struggling government forces.</div>
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<img alt="" class="media-viewer-candidate" data-mediaviewer-caption="Gen. John F. Campbell, center, the top American commander in Afghanistan, insisted that it is within his purview to target Taliban insurgents who pose a threat to not just American or NATO troops but to any Afghan security forces." data-mediaviewer-credit="Lucas Jackson/Reuters" data-mediaviewer-src="http://static01.nyt.com/images/2015/04/30/world/30taliban2/30taliban2-superJumbo.jpg" itemid="http://static01.nyt.com/images/2015/04/30/world/30taliban2/30taliban2-articleLarge.jpg" itemprop="url" src="http://static01.nyt.com/images/2015/04/30/world/30taliban2/30taliban2-articleLarge.jpg" /><div class="media-action-overlay">
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<figcaption class="caption" itemprop="caption description"><span class="caption-text">Gen. John F. Campbell, center, the top American commander in Afghanistan, insisted that it is within his purview to target Taliban insurgents who pose a threat to not just American or NATO troops but to any Afghan security forces.</span> <span class="credit" itemprop="copyrightHolder"><span class="visually-hidden">Credit</span> Lucas Jackson/Reuters </span> </figcaption></figure><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="311" data-total-count="1466" itemprop="articleBody">
Rather than ending the American war in Afghanistan, the military is using its wide latitude to instead transform it into a continuing campaign of airstrikes — mostly drone missions — and Special Operations raids that have in practice stretched or broken the parameters publicly described by the White House.</div>
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Western and military officials said that American and <a class="meta-org" href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/north_atlantic_treaty_organization/index.html?inline=nyt-org" title="More articles about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.">NATO</a> forces conducted 52 airstrikes in March, months after the official end of the combat mission. Many of these air assaults, which totaled 128 in the first three months of this year, targeted low- to midlevel Taliban commanders in the most remote reaches of Afghanistan.</div>
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As early as January, when officials in Washington were hailing the end of the combat mission, about 40 American Special Operations troops were deployed to Kunar Province to advise Afghan forces that were engaged with the Taliban over a handful of villages along the border with Pakistan.</div>
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With the troops on the ground, the command for the American-led coalition called in airstrikes under the authority of force protection, according to two Western military officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the details of the operation were not public.</div>
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“They are putting guys on the ground in places to justify the airstrikes,” one of the officials said. “It’s not force protection when they are going on the offensive.”</div>
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Commenting on the continuing military operations against the Taliban, the top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John F. Campbell, vehemently denied accusations that he was putting troops into harm’s way just to enable more airstrikes.</div>
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He has insisted that it is within his purview to target Taliban insurgents who pose a threat not just to American or NATO troops but to any Afghan security forces. And his options on the ground were clear, he said in an interview, even if Washington’s public description of them was not.</div>
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“Washington is going to have to say what they say politically for many different audiences, and I have no issue with that,” General Campbell said. “I understand my authorities and what I have to do with Afghanistan’s forces and my forces. And if that doesn’t sell good for a media piece then, again, I can’t worry about it.”</div>
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He added: “Combat and war and transition, as you know, it’s a very complex thing. For me, it’s not black and white.”</div>
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The operations are continuing during a troubling stretch for the Afghan security forces, as the Taliban are continuing to make gains. Members of the nation’s military and police forces were killed by the insurgents at a high rate last year. And in the first three months of this year, things already appeared worse: The casualty rate rose 54 percent over the same period last year, according to one Western and one Afghan official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the figures were not public.</div>
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The danger was highlighted in recent days in the northern province of Kunduz, where the Afghan Army has been forced to send thousands of reinforcements to beat back a major Taliban offensive. In addition to threatening to claim at least one district, the insurgents have come within a few miles of the provincial capital, officials in Kunduz said. Coalition forces deployed jets to the area in a show of force but no munitions were dropped, officials said.</div>
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In that environment, American military officials have been reluctant to let go of the war, arguing that their involvement remains necessary given the Taliban threat and changing regional factors.</div>
<div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="433" data-total-count="5117" itemprop="articleBody">
But in March, when Mr. Obama and President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan publicly announced that they had agreed to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2015/03/24/world/asia/24reuters-afghanistan-usa-obama.html" title="Slowing drawdown in Afghanistan">slow the withdrawal</a> of American troops, administration officials emphasized that counterterrorism and training were still the focus, not everyday combat missions against the Taliban. The idea of the extended timeline was to bolster the ability of Afghans to fight, officials said, not to directly fight on their behalf.</div>
<div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="215" data-total-count="5332" itemprop="articleBody">
Now, though, the distance seems to be widening between the administration’s public statements and what the military appears to be doing, whether at the behest of the White House or on its own, officials here said.</div>
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“What I’m thankful for is that I have the authority and flexibility to make those very tough decisions,” General Campbell said. “They could have said, ‘Every time you hit a target, you have to get approval.’ ”</div>
<div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="307" data-total-count="5862" itemprop="articleBody">
Beyond any discrepancy over mission descriptions, American airstrikes in Afghanistan have a fraught history. A high number of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/world/asia/two-deadly-attacks-in-afghanistan.html" title="Times article.">civilian casualties</a> in such strikes created increasing tensions with Afghan officials and the public, and in recent years those missions had been sharply restrained to cut the risk.</div>
<div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="290" data-total-count="6152" itemprop="articleBody">
Even though American officials argue that drone strikes are controlled and precise, in truth they have been far from trouble free — a fact highlighted last week when news surfaced that an American drone strike had <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/2-qaeda-hostages-were-accidentally-killed-in-us-raid-white-house-says.html" title="Times article.">accidentally killed American and Italian hostages</a> of <a class="meta-org" href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda/index.html?inline=nyt-org" title="More articles about Al Qaeda.">Al Qaeda</a> in Pakistan.</div>
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Still, General Campbell has found strong support from Mr. Ghani, who became the president in <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/international-home/ashraf-ghani-sworn-in-as-afghan-president.html" title="Times article.">September</a>. Many officials characterize their relationship as a strikingly close partnership: General Campbell visits the president nearly every day — more than any other Western official in the country — and the commander’s staff has been tasked with not only helping to write policy for the Afghan forces but also helping direct overall strategy, at a time when the war is meant to be entirely in the hands of the Afghans.</div>
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Mr. Ghani, who has yet to name a minister of defense, has in many ways outsourced much of the running of the war to General Campbell.</div>
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Some Western officials have privately expressed discomfort with the American role and questioned how prolonging the American strategy in Afghanistan would be more effective this year than it was in the past 13.</div>
<div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="162" data-total-count="7179" itemprop="articleBody">
“I’m not surprised they are continuing in this way,” said one Western diplomat living in Kabul. “What’s surprising is how much of it they’re doing.”</div>
<div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="332" data-total-count="7511" itemprop="articleBody">
Many of the strikes described by officials had no discernible basis for force protection or terrorist hunting. One included an attack in Kunar Province that wounded two miners; another in Ghazni killed several “common Taliban fighters,” and, at most, one Taliban commander, according to the head of the provincial peace council.</div>
<div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="277" data-total-count="7788" itemprop="articleBody">
In February, a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/10/world/asia/former-taliban-commander-who-joined-isis-is-said-to-be-killed-in-afghanistan.html">disaffected ex-Taliban leader was killed in a drone strike</a> in remote Helmand Province. Though the commander, Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim, had <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/world/asia/taliban-fissures-in-afghanistan-are-seen-as-an-opening-for-isis.html">pledged allegiance to the Islamic State</a>, there was no evidence he had been staging or even planning significant operations.</div>
<div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="230" data-total-count="8018" itemprop="articleBody">
When asked to justify the strike, the American military did not say it was for counterterrorism purposes but rather described it as force protection — despite there having been no American forces stationed in the area for years.</div>
<div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="152" data-total-count="8170" itemprop="articleBody">
When asked about that decision, General Campbell responded with a question of his own: “Do you know what was in his mind?” he said of Mullah Khadim.</div>
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The military has said that it is authorized to send out Special Forces trainers at the ground level, but that they are not to advance on the target with their Afghan counterparts. In hostile areas, however, those restrictions do not often mean very much.</div>
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This month, for example, an American Special Forces soldier was shot in the chest while advising Afghan commandos conducting an operation against the Taliban in restive Logar Province, according to the two Western military officials. The bullet struck the soldier’s body armor and he survived, the officials said.</div>
<div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="154" data-total-count="8893" itemprop="articleBody">
But when confronted with reports of a re-expanded American combat role in Afghanistan, Obama administration officials have vehemently rejected the claims.</div>
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One such case came in November when Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary, sought to discredit <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/us/politics/in-secret-obama-extends-us-role-in-afghan-combat.html">an article by The New York Times</a> reporting that Mr. Obama had quietly approved an expanded combat authorization for American forces in Afghanistan in 2015.</div>
<div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="384" data-total-count="9535" itemprop="articleBody">
“The U.S. military will not be engaged in specific operations targeting members of the Taliban just because they’re members of the Taliban,” <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/24/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest" title="Transcript of news briefing.">Mr. Earnest said at the time</a>. He laid out only two circumstances warranting continued combat operations: protection of American soldiers still stationed in Afghanistan and the counterterrorism mission against Al Qaeda and similar groups</div>
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On Sunday, however, a spokesman at the National Security Council issued a statement that appeared to broaden the circumstances, saying that American forces may provide combat support to Afghan troops “in limited circumstances to prevent detrimental strategic effects to these Afghan security forces.”</div>
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Reporting was contributed by Fatal Muzhary from Kabul; Khalid Alokozay from Jalalabad, Afghanistan; Farooq Jan Mangal from Khost, Afghanistan; and Naimatullah Karyab from Asadabad, Afghanistan.</div>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-7477601365122008112015-05-02T03:26:00.001-07:002015-05-02T03:31:48.501-07:00Learning from the CIA's Village Defense Program in South Vietnam<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Hr9P6Uk_mmk/VUSVES2DuNI/AAAAAAAABNA/u_MZ3hCMv2w/s1600/LIBBY8A%2B(web).jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Hr9P6Uk_mmk/VUSVES2DuNI/AAAAAAAABNA/u_MZ3hCMv2w/s1600/LIBBY8A%2B(web).jpg" height="454" width="640" /></a></div><h1 style="color: #474747; font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif; line-height: 1.4; margin: 0px 0px 1em; padding: 0px;"><span style="line-height: 1.4;"><span style="font-size: large;">Local defense forces and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: learning from the CIA's Village Defense Program in South Vietnam</span></span></h1><div><div class="clear" style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10px; line-height: 16px;"></div><div class="access accessmodule access_no" style="background: white; border: 5px solid rgb(96, 111, 219); float: right; font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10px; line-height: 16px; margin-top: 0px; padding: 1px; width: 140px;"><a class="preview" href="http://www.tandfonline.com/na101/home/literatum/publisher/tandf/journals/content/fswi20/2015/fswi20.v026.i01/09592318.2014.959772/20141211/09592318.2014.959772.fp.png_v03" style="background: url(http://www.tandfonline.com/imgJawr/cb40302413/templates/jsp/_style2/_tandf/images/txt.gif) 0% 50% no-repeat scroll transparent; border-bottom-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-bottom-width: 1px; color: #104083; display: block; font-weight: bold; line-height: 2; margin-bottom: 2px; padding-bottom: 2px; padding-left: 30px; text-decoration: none;">Preview</a><a class="txt" href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2014.959772#abstract" style="background: url(http://www.tandfonline.com/imgJawr/cb40302413/templates/jsp/_style2/_tandf/images/txt.gif) 0% 50% no-repeat scroll transparent; border-bottom-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); border-bottom-style: dotted; border-bottom-width: 1px; color: #104083; display: block; font-weight: bold; line-height: 2; margin-bottom: 2px; padding-bottom: 2px; padding-left: 30px; text-decoration: none;">View full text</a><a class="pdf last" href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592318.2014.959772" style="background: url(http://www.tandfonline.com/imgJawr/cb760281211/templates/jsp/_style2/_tandf/images/pdf.gif) 0% 50% no-repeat scroll transparent; border-bottom-width: 0px; color: #104083; display: block; font-weight: bold; line-height: 2; margin-bottom: 0px; padding-bottom: 2px; padding-left: 30px; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank">Download full text</a><a class="last accessIconLink" href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592318.2014.959772" style="border-bottom-width: 0px; color: #104083; display: block; font-weight: bold; line-height: 2; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><div class="accessIconWrapper access_no accessIcon" style="background: url(http://www.tandfonline.com/imgJawr/cb1042807562/templates/jsp/_style2/_tandf/images/access-open.jpg) 0% 100% repeat-x scroll rgb(96, 111, 219); border: none; color: white; font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif; font-size: 1.2em; font-stretch: normal; line-height: 2.2; margin-bottom: 0px; padding-bottom: 2px; text-align: center;">Access options</div></a></div><div class="doiMeta clear" style="clear: left; float: left; font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 10px; line-height: 16px; margin-top: 1em; width: 330px;"><br />
<dl style="border: 0px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><dt style="display: inline; margin: 0px;"><strong style="line-height: 1.4;">DOI:</strong></dt>
<dd style="display: inline; margin: 0px 0px 0px 3px; padding: 0px;">10.1080/09592318.2014.959772</dd></dl>Jon Strandquist<sup>a</sup><sup>*</sup><div class="pageRange"><div style="font-size: 1em; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;">pages 90-113</div></div><div><b><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/page/models-and-dates-explained" style="color: #104083; text-decoration: none;">Publishing models and article dates explained</a></b></div><div class="articleDates"><ul style="border: none; float: none; list-style: none; margin: 0px; padding: 5px 0px;"><li style="float: none; list-style: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">Received: 26 Jan 2013</li>
<li style="float: none; list-style: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">Accepted: 5 Jun 2013</li>
<li style="float: none; list-style: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">Published online: 12 Dec 2014</li>
</ul></div><div class="articleUsage" style="margin-top: 5px;"><strong style="line-height: 1.4;">Article Views:</strong> 190</div><div class="articleUsage" style="margin-top: 5px;"><div class="hd hasAbstract"><div class="gutter" style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); margin: 2px 8px 0px; padding: 8px 8px 0px;"><h2 style="color: #474747; font-family: 'Trebuchet MS', sans-serif; font-size: 1.8em; line-height: 1; margin: 0px; padding: 0px 0px 0.555em;">Abstract</h2></div></div><div class="bd"><div class="gutter" style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); margin: 0px 8px 9px; padding: 5px 8px 2px;"><div class="first last" style="font-size: 1em; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;">This research note makes the case that if the US and its international allies are to successfully use ‘Local Defence Forces’ (LDF) to overcome counterinsurgency constraints in Afghanistan, current initiatives need to be significantly modified. A key issue is that the Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) LDF program is unlikely to be effective in filling security gaps in rural Afghanistan because, much rhetoric to the contrary, it is essentially focused on militarily combating the insurgency rather than fully developing local communities as counterinsurgency resources by winning their support for the Afghan central government. The CIA's Village Defense Program in South Vietnam, a counterinsurgency program that has thus far received cursory attention in current LDF literature, provides a useful counterpoint. Through a comparison of the VDP and VSO/ALP operational patterns, implications are drawn for current and future US counterinsurgency practice employing LDF components.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br />
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</div><div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ycJ24ddk5uY/VUSUbfF1UuI/AAAAAAAABMo/P-gpj543qAM/s1600/Unusual-view-of-Long-Tieng-585x389.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: medium; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ycJ24ddk5uY/VUSUbfF1UuI/AAAAAAAABMo/P-gpj543qAM/s1600/Unusual-view-of-Long-Tieng-585x389.jpg" height="424" width="640" /></a></div><div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-d-SaKG1Z4OY/VUSUldiaYHI/AAAAAAAABMw/TMQXj-eqi_c/s1600/battle_plan_two_pages.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-d-SaKG1Z4OY/VUSUldiaYHI/AAAAAAAABMw/TMQXj-eqi_c/s1600/battle_plan_two_pages.jpg" height="513" width="640" /></a></div><h3 style="color: #474747; font-size: 1em; line-height: 1.4; margin: 0px; padding: 0px 0px 1em;">Keywords:</h3><ul class="keywords" style="list-style: none; margin: 0px 0px 1em; padding: 0px;"><li style="display: inline; list-style: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px 4px 0px 0px;"><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/action/doSearch?Keyword=local%20defence%20forces" style="color: #104083; text-decoration: none;">local defence forces</a>, </li>
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</ul><h3 id="notesTitle" style="color: #474747; font-size: 1em; line-height: 1.4; margin: 0px; padding: 5px 0px 0px;"></h3><h3 style="color: #474747; font-size: 1em; line-height: 1.4; margin: 0px; padding: 0px 0px 1em;">Related articles</h3><a class="searchRelatedLink" href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/09592318.2014.959772" style="color: #0c387a; text-decoration: none;">View all related articles</a></div></div></div></div></div></div>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-76230869497512006742015-04-30T05:46:00.001-07:002015-05-02T03:33:08.417-07:00Women Wage War on Islamic State<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><iframe frameborder="0" height="405" scrolling="no" src="//embed.widerimage.reuters.com/stories/women-wage-war-on-islamic-state" width="500"><br />
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an ideal that you’ll defend, come what may. <br />
<div class="widget widget-image widget-slider widget-slideshow"><div class="widget-header"><span class="slideshow-info"> <span class="slideshow-info-current">2</span> / <span class="slideshow-info-count">23</span> </span> <h3 class="widget-title">Slideshow</h3></div><div class="widget-content slideshow slick slick-enabled" data-type="slideshow"></div></div><div class="widget widget-image widget-slider widget-slideshow"><div class="widget-content slideshow slick slick-enabled" data-type="slideshow"></div></div><img alt="" height="425" src="http://cdn1.wi.gcs.trstatic.net/e9hyHkaRFZdDV_jLZuTS6qnZS4qu39_E5PRy72q_1SlczPRVPl2j7xBKfESaVAams2_68gnKzE1LQPVQOwA35A" width="640" /><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><br />
</div><iframe width="800" height="600" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/l5yQPV2KgLw" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe><br />
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</div>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-67570274822116114402015-04-30T04:55:00.001-07:002015-04-30T04:59:30.231-07:00HPG: Turkish military activity continues increasingly - Kurdish Info<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<a href="http://www.kurdishinfo.com/hpg-turkish-military-activity-continues-increasingly" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 28px; line-height: 34px;" target="_blank">HPG: Turkish military activity continues increasingly</a><br />
<div class="postmetadata" style="color: #555555; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 22px; margin: 6px 0px 12px;">
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<div class="postcontent" style="color: #555555; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, Tahoma, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; line-height: 22px;">
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<a href="http://www.kurdishinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/military-operation-in-kurdistan.jpg" style="color: #e78f25; text-decoration: none;"><img alt="military operation in kurdistan" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-5333" src="http://www.kurdishinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/military-operation-in-kurdistan.jpg" height="416" style="border: none; display: block; height: auto; margin-bottom: 14px; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; max-width: 610px; vertical-align: middle; width: auto;" width="650" /></a><span id="inserted180" style="font-size: 12px;">People’s Defence Forces (HPG) press and communication center has issued a written statement related to military activity of the Turkish army.</span></h2>
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The HPG reported in the statement that Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles performed reconnaissance flights over Xakurke area of Media Defence Zones between 4 pm April 28 and 4 am April 29.</div>
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Also, between 4 pm and 5 pm on April 28, an activity of warplanes took place.</div>
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Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles performed reconnaissance flights over;</div>
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– Mamreş territory of Şemdinli district of Hakkari province between 18.00 and 19.30 on April 28, and</div>
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– Şehit (Martyr) Gafur and Şuke areas of Avashin border line between 20.00 pm and 12.00 am on April 28.</div>
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Warplanes mobility took place over Şuke, Şehit Gafur and the border between 20.00 and 23.00 on April 28.</div>
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According to the statement, Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles performed intensive reconnaissance flights on 28 April over;</div>
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– Heftanin area of Media Defence Zones and border line between 14.30 and 16.00,</div>
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– Şkefta Bîrîndara, ÇÎyayê Reş, Ertuş, Cîloyê Piçuk areas of Zap region, border line areas between 16.00 and 22.00, and</div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 14px;">
– Metina area between 21.00 and 00.00.</div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 14px;">
Warplanes mobility was observed over Zap region between 20.00 and 21.00.</div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 14px;">
Military activity of the Turkish army continued increasingly far and wide between Çatak, Girê Sor guardhouse and Êzdînan regions of Van province at 09.30 am on April 29.</div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 14px;">
The Turkish army laid ambushes with armoured vehicles in Hêndiresê, Gewrê, Şêbê, Golik and Meledikê villages of Mazıdağı district of Mardin province between 19.30 on April 28 and 05.00 on April 29 (today).</div>
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Turkish state’s unmanned aerial vehicles performed reconnaissance flights over Şehit Baran area of Farqin district of Amed province between 20.00 pm and 23.30 pm on April 28.</div>
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In the recent days, Turkish troops have been deployed on a hill in Dêrunê village of Kocaköy (Qaraz) district of Amed province.</div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 14px;">
Turkish army lunched a military operation in Arel and Çakmaklı areas of Ovacık district of Dersim province in the morning hours on April 26. The operation was retreated after remaining inconclusive in the evening hours.”</div>
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Source: Firat News Agency</div>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-83490937249944335932015-04-30T02:16:00.003-07:002015-04-30T04:25:07.345-07:00KURDISTAN REGION TERRITORIES AND NATIONALITIES<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-dQ9-XpwUQgg/VUHi5vkFuAI/AAAAAAAABMU/tG02JuTqrpY/s1600/KRG-disputed-territories-and-nationalities.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">If anyone knows Original Poster I just Saw this today but lost the link<br /><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-dQ9-XpwUQgg/VUHi5vkFuAI/AAAAAAAABMU/tG02JuTqrpY/s1600/KRG-disputed-territories-and-nationalities.png" height="394" width="640" /></a></div>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-80791835968291128862015-04-29T08:40:00.000-07:002015-04-30T04:24:22.853-07:00IF THEY SHUT DOWN ALL THE ISIS WEB SITES DOESN'T THAT LIMIT INTEL?<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-cl5_NZvT5T8/VSvYUW_34pI/AAAAAAAABIw/23H9dBr2dZI/s1600/pic.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-cl5_NZvT5T8/VSvYUW_34pI/AAAAAAAABIw/23H9dBr2dZI/s1600/pic.jpg" height="201" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">The fact is the Web Sites we shut down are the Media machine not the actual First reporting sources. (i.e. the NOT the Actual Bad Guys) </span><a href="http://isishuntingclub.com/" style="font-size: x-large;" target="_blank">ISIS hunters</a><span style="font-size: large;"> and almost more so, normal everyday people report stuff to various Anonymous groups, to me (since 2007) and some contact Gov Orgs and Host directly. People like me and many of the Anon groups notify </span><a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDUQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fbi.gov%2Freport-threats-and-crime&ei=NvpAVYqKDqOwsASgqoGYDw&usg=AFQjCNEUx13tk9wCN9uT79Bx1zc17LnRnQ&sig2=K897ihxVfrInbdKJUWw2Lg&bvm=bv.92189499,d.cWc" style="font-size: x-large;" target="_blank">FBI</a><span style="font-size: large;">, </span><a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ic3.gov%2F&ei=WvpAVfCnHIqwsATuiYHQDw&usg=AFQjCNHfVPBD35Y-85yYYx8NU70fT4TyNg&sig2=_zfYNKsY8W-NBSZ69z97mA&bvm=bv.92189499,d.cWc" style="font-size: x-large;" target="_blank">IC3</a><span style="font-size: large;">, and/or </span><a href="https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/clandestine-service/careers/careers-operations-officer.html" style="font-size: x-large;" target="_blank">CIA</a><span style="font-size: large;"> or which ever of the Gov Org or Laws the web user or web site has broken.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span> <span style="font-size: large;">It is not the voice of the terrorist that we seek hide from or put our heads in the Sand and ask "please make the bad man go away". <br />
<br />
Instead when we have humans who report potential ISIS web sites and those are reviewed. Some are monitored others are sut down ASAP. If you see something I would be happy to look at it and let you know what I think it actually is. Often I have been amazed at things people have asked me to help with. in 2007/08 I was contacted 8 different times 8 different users about 8 fake Mil IDs on Yahoo that were saying very abusive stuff to military families. So the military families contacted me they pointed out the flaws the person made mistakes that a Lt. Col. would not have, (like in one Case). <br />
<br />
The Web sites we seek to shut down as soon as we can are the Gore web sites beheadings etc. These are pure Propaganda and the terrorist do it to provoke a reaction from the West. The Bad Guys are hoping the West will overreach and get a backlash. That will assist the Bad guys with a whole new group of people who become more disenfranchised by any overreach reaction.<br />
<br />
This is a true online battle for hearts and minds. So far the enemy is winning. ISIS is a Sunni Arab <a href="https://www.google.com/#q=Wahhabi" target="_blank">Wahhabi Supremacist</a></span><span style="font-size: large;"> movement the <a href="https://www.google.com/#q=Muslim+Brotherhood+threat+history" target="_blank">Muslim Brotherhood</a> and <a href="https://www.google.com/#q=al+Qaeda+history" target="_blank">al Qaeda</a> also follow the </span><a href="https://www.google.com/#q=Wahhabi" style="font-size: x-large;" target="_blank">Wahhabi</a><span style="font-size: large;"> warped view of the Quran that you hear the </span><a href="http://islamophobic/" style="font-size: x-large;" target="_blank">islamophobia</a><span style="font-size: large;"> quoting. We want to stop the Echo effect and the spread of the message. We have a few methods we can use. But it has to be done in a lawful way.</span><span style="font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<a href="https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/clandestine-service/careers/careers-operations-officer.html" target="_blank"><img alt=" CIA Jobs - Operations Officer" border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-OhJ3pbG8who/VUD44oAFHnI/AAAAAAAABKU/MiSDscaBjxY/s1600/cia%2Boperations%2Bofficer.png" /></a><span style="font-size: large;"><br />
<br />
The web sites we shut down. We do not shut down a suspected ISI or al Qaeda members sites (i.e., actual Bad guys web sites). People like me, Anonymous, and many Government Orgs monitor known ISIS and al Qaeda Web Sites.<br />
<br />
However the ones that are Just Wannabe ISIS or just repeaters/bots that reTweet it to their many followers, are the ones we seek to shut down often and ASAP, to limit the audience of the terrorist's message. These Web Sites are often Masked as News sites. That way they can claim "Freedom of Speech". Ask them if you get a chance do the people in Raqqa have :Freedom of Speech". We know n fastest is the followers. who </span><a href="http://www.jihadica.com/the-%E2%80%98who%E2%80%99s-who%E2%80%99-of-the-most-important-jihadi-accounts-on-twitter/" style="font-size: x-large;" target="_blank">the main Bad Guys</a><span style="font-size: large;"> are on Twitter. We also know Twitter is their main tool in their online propaganda machine. Many of the web sites are just Bot Accounts, that reTweet what the main accounts Tweet. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><br />
Some countries have Sedition Laws. Most Countries have had <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sedition" target="_blank">Sedition laws</a> in one form or another, most often in times of War.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span><span style="font-size: large;"><i><b>Below is some Top sources via Google Search for FBI & the ISIS threat and how to report something if you see it.</b></i></span><br />
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<a href="http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism" style="color: #660099; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">FBI — Terrorism</a></h3>
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<cite class="_Rm" style="color: #006621; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal;">www.<b>fbi</b>.<b>gov</b>/about-us/.../<b>terrorism</b></cite><br />
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<span style="color: #777777; font-size: 14px;">Federal Bureau of Investigation</span></div>
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<div class="crl" data-async-context="res:0;ri:;site:fbi.gov" data-async-trigger="cra-0-filled" data-ved="0CCMQ5CswAA" jsaction="crd.tglpop" style="color: #777777; cursor: pointer; display: inline-block; font-size: 14px;">
<span class="_Bs" style="border-color: rgb(170, 170, 170) transparent !important; border-style: solid; border-width: 4px 4px 0px; height: 0px; margin-left: 6px; margin-top: -3px; position: absolute; top: 8.5px; width: 0px;"></span></div>
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<span class="st" style="line-height: 1.4; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">Report</span> Threats; AZ Index; <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">Site</span> Map. Federal ... It's our top priority—protecting the U.S. from <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">terrorist</span> attacks. ... <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">Terrorist</span> Explosives Device Analytical Center</span><br />
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<a class="fl" href="http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition" style="color: #1a0dab; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">Terrorism Definition</a> - <a class="fl" href="http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/ayman-al-zawahiri" style="color: #1a0dab; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">Ayman Al-Zawahiri</a> - <a class="fl" href="http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2009/september/domterror_090709" style="color: #1a0dab; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">Domestic Terrorism Post-9/11</a></div>
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<a href="https://tips.fbi.gov/" style="color: #660099; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">FBI Tips and Public Leads</a></h3>
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<cite class="_Rm" style="color: #006621; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal;">https://tips.<b>fbi</b>.<b>gov</b>/</cite><br />
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<span style="color: #777777; font-size: 14px;">Federal Bureau of Investigation</span></div>
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<span class="_Bs" style="border-color: rgb(170, 170, 170) transparent !important; border-style: solid; border-width: 4px 4px 0px; height: 0px; margin-left: 6px; margin-top: -3px; position: absolute; top: 8.5px; width: 0px;"></span></div>
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<span class="st" style="line-height: 1.4; word-wrap: break-word;">Please use this <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">website</span> to <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">report</span> suspected <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">terrorism</span> or criminal activity. Your information will be reviewed promptly by an <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">FBI</span> special agent or a professional ...</span></div>
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<h3 class="r" style="font-size: 18px; font-weight: normal; margin: 0px; overflow: hidden; padding: 0px; text-overflow: ellipsis; white-space: nowrap;">
<a href="http://www.fbi.gov/" style="color: #660099; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">FBI — Homepage</a></h3>
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<cite class="_Rm" style="color: #006621; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal;">www.<b>fbi</b>.<b>gov</b>/</cite><br />
<div class="action-menu ab_ctl" style="-webkit-user-select: none; display: inline; margin: 0px 3px; position: relative; vertical-align: middle;">
<span style="color: #777777; font-size: 14px;">Federal Bureau of Investigation</span></div>
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<div class="crl" data-async-context="res:2;ri:;site:fbi.gov" data-async-trigger="cra-2-filled" data-ved="0CDUQ5CswAg" jsaction="crd.tglpop" style="color: #777777; cursor: pointer; display: inline-block; font-size: 14px;">
<span class="_Bs" style="border-color: rgb(170, 170, 170) transparent !important; border-style: solid; border-width: 4px 4px 0px; height: 0px; margin-left: 6px; margin-top: -3px; position: absolute; top: 8.5px; width: 0px;"></span></div>
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<span class="st" style="line-height: 1.4; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">FBI</span>.<span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">gov</span> looks back at the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building ... on April 19, 1995—the deadliest act of homegrown <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">terrorism</span> in the nation's history.</span><br />
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<a class="fl" href="http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us" style="color: #1a0dab; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">Contact Us</a> - <a class="fl" href="http://www.fbi.gov/wanted" style="color: #1a0dab; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">Most Wanted</a> - <a class="fl" href="http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/topten" style="color: #1a0dab; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">Ten Most Wanted</a> - <a class="fl" href="http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber" style="color: #1a0dab; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">Cyber Crime</a></div>
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<a data-href="http://www.fbi.gov/report-threats-and-crime" href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDwQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fbi.gov%2Freport-threats-and-crime&ei=R_lAVZ6_M83jsASx5IHwAQ&usg=AFQjCNEUx13tk9wCN9uT79Bx1zc17LnRnQ&sig2=29j5ta6oNZs3Ru6es0pWqw&bvm=bv.92189499,d.cWc" style="color: #660099; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">FBI — Report Threats and Crime</a></h3>
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<cite class="_Rm" style="color: #006621; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal;">www.<b>fbi</b>.<b>gov</b>/<b>report</b>-threats-and-crime</cite><br />
<div class="action-menu ab_ctl" style="-webkit-user-select: none; display: inline; margin: 0px 3px; position: relative; vertical-align: middle;">
<span style="color: #777777; font-size: 14px;">Federal Bureau of Investigation</span></div>
<div class="crc" style="display: inline-block; margin-left: 4px; position: relative;">
<div class="crl" data-async-context="res:3;ri:;site:fbi.gov" data-async-trigger="cra-3-filled" data-ved="0CEEQ5CswAw" jsaction="crd.tglpop" style="color: #777777; cursor: pointer; display: inline-block; font-size: 14px;">
<span class="_Bs" style="border-color: rgb(170, 170, 170) transparent !important; border-style: solid; border-width: 4px 4px 0px; height: 0px; margin-left: 6px; margin-top: -3px; position: absolute; top: 8.5px; width: 0px;"></span></div>
</div>
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<span class="st" style="line-height: 1.4; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">Report</span> Threats; AZ Index; <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">Site</span> Map ... Vetted members of law enforcement can <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">report</span>cyber or <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">terrorist</span> incidents through eGuardian on the Law Enforcement ...</span></div>
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<a href="http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us" style="color: #660099; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">FBI — Contact Us</a></h3>
<div class="s" style="color: #545454; line-height: 18px; max-width: 42em;">
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<cite class="_Rm" style="color: #006621; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal;">www.<b>fbi</b>.<b>gov</b>/contact-us</cite><br />
<div class="action-menu ab_ctl" style="-webkit-user-select: none; display: inline; margin: 0px 3px; position: relative; vertical-align: middle;">
<span style="color: #777777; font-size: 14px;">Federal Bureau of Investigation</span></div>
<div class="crc" style="display: inline-block; margin-left: 4px; position: relative;">
<div class="crl" data-async-context="res:4;ri:;site:fbi.gov" data-async-trigger="cra-4-filled" data-ved="0CEgQ5CswBA" jsaction="crd.tglpop" style="color: #777777; cursor: pointer; display: inline-block; font-size: 14px;">
<span class="_Bs" style="border-color: rgb(170, 170, 170) transparent !important; border-style: solid; border-width: 4px 4px 0px; height: 0px; margin-left: 6px; margin-top: -3px; position: absolute; top: 8.5px; width: 0px;"></span></div>
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<span class="st" style="line-height: 1.4; word-wrap: break-word;">Use our online form to <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">report</span> suspected <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">terrorism</span> or ... You can <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">report</span> violations of U.S. federal law or submit information in a criminal ... <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">FBI</span> Field Office <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">Websites</span>.</span></div>
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<a data-href="http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists" href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CEoQFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fbi.gov%2Fwanted%2Fwanted_terrorists&ei=R_lAVZ6_M83jsASx5IHwAQ&usg=AFQjCNErbE-x_STAfXYd8BEb7fhz5af47w&sig2=7MbijVl-ZOU_amkoVkxeLg&bvm=bv.92189499,d.cWc" style="color: #660099; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">FBI — Most Wanted Terrorists</a></h3>
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<cite class="_Rm bc" style="color: #006621; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal;">www.fbi.gov › Most Wanted</cite><br />
<div class="action-menu ab_ctl" style="-webkit-user-select: none; display: inline; margin: 0px 3px; position: relative; vertical-align: middle;">
<span style="color: #777777; font-size: 14px;">Federal Bureau of Investigation</span></div>
<div class="crc" style="display: inline-block; margin-left: 4px; position: relative;">
<div class="crl" data-async-context="res:5;ri:;site:fbi.gov" data-async-trigger="cra-5-filled" data-ved="0CFAQ5CswBQ" jsaction="crd.tglpop" style="color: #777777; cursor: pointer; display: inline-block; font-size: 14px;">
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<span class="st" style="line-height: 1.4; word-wrap: break-word;"><span class="f" style="color: grey;">Sep 29, 2010 - </span>Select the images of suspected <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">terrorists</span> to display more information. ... <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">Report</span> Threats · AZ Index · <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">Site</span> Map · Federal Bureau of Investigation ...</span></div>
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<a data-href="http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications" href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CFMQFjAG&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fbi.gov%2Fstats-services%2Fpublications&ei=R_lAVZ6_M83jsASx5IHwAQ&usg=AFQjCNEI6wVPXb3TSRUMTARzS3jYAYB3zA&sig2=u6DVhqOQUBh7aaWI-hpIDA&bvm=bv.92189499,d.cWc" style="color: #660099; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">FBI — Reports and Publications</a></h3>
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<cite class="_Rm bc" style="color: #006621; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal;">www.fbi.gov › Stats & Services</cite><br />
<div class="action-menu ab_ctl" style="-webkit-user-select: none; display: inline; margin: 0px 3px; position: relative; vertical-align: middle;">
<span style="color: #777777; font-size: 14px;">Federal Bureau of Investigation</span></div>
<div class="crc" style="display: inline-block; margin-left: 4px; position: relative;">
<div class="crl" data-async-context="res:6;ri:;site:fbi.gov" data-async-trigger="cra-6-filled" data-ved="0CFkQ5CswBg" jsaction="crd.tglpop" style="color: #777777; cursor: pointer; display: inline-block; font-size: 14px;">
<span class="_Bs" style="border-color: rgb(170, 170, 170) transparent !important; border-style: solid; border-width: 4px 4px 0px; height: 0px; margin-left: 6px; margin-top: -3px; position: absolute; top: 8.5px; width: 0px;"></span></div>
</div>
</div>
<span class="st" style="line-height: 1.4; word-wrap: break-word;"><span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">Report</span> Threats; AZ Index; <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">Site</span> Map ... On <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">terrorism</span>. ... CJIS Link; Criminal Justice Information Services Division Annual <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">Report</span>: 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | 2010 ...</span></div>
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<h3 class="r" style="font-size: 18px; font-weight: normal; margin: 0px; overflow: hidden; padding: 0px; text-overflow: ellipsis; white-space: nowrap;">
<a data-href="http://www.fbi.gov/wanted" href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CFsQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fbi.gov%2Fwanted&ei=R_lAVZ6_M83jsASx5IHwAQ&usg=AFQjCNGrmE7ZSx2te6TTzk6SwAFBEHi4uw&sig2=wAMmBkuSTPjidMwLQJXjCw&bvm=bv.92189499,d.cWc" style="color: #660099; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: none;">FBI — Be part of the solution.</a></h3>
<div class="s" style="color: #545454; line-height: 18px; max-width: 42em;">
<div class="f kv _SWb" style="color: grey; height: 17px; line-height: 16px; white-space: nowrap;">
<cite class="_Rm" style="color: #006621; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal;">www.<b>fbi</b>.<b>gov</b>/wanted</cite><br />
<div class="action-menu ab_ctl" style="-webkit-user-select: none; display: inline; margin: 0px 3px; position: relative; vertical-align: middle;">
<span style="color: #777777; font-size: 14px;">Federal Bureau of Investigation</span></div>
<div class="crc" style="display: inline-block; margin-left: 4px; position: relative;">
<div class="crl" data-async-context="res:7;ri:;site:fbi.gov" data-async-trigger="cra-7-filled" data-ved="0CGAQ5CswBw" jsaction="crd.tglpop" style="color: #777777; cursor: pointer; display: inline-block; font-size: 14px;">
<span class="_Bs" style="border-color: rgb(170, 170, 170) transparent !important; border-style: solid; border-width: 4px 4px 0px; height: 0px; margin-left: 6px; margin-top: -3px; position: absolute; top: 8.5px; width: 0px;"></span></div>
</div>
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<span class="st" style="line-height: 1.4; word-wrap: break-word;">Protect your family, your local community, and the nation by helping the <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">FBI</span> catch wanted <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">terrorists</span> and fugitives. You can ... <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">Report</span> Threats; AZ Index; <span style="color: #6a6a6a; font-weight: bold;">Site</span> Map.</span></div>
</div>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-81910755586085189282015-04-29T02:41:00.001-07:002015-07-05T01:51:32.276-07:00Fight ISIS online - Beginners Guide<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<span style="font-size: x-large;">Beginner Level</span><br />
Click on the Images in this Post to go to those Web Sites & Links<br />
These are tools for the ISIS Hunters Toolbox<br />
<br />
This method requires no knowledge of the issue. They have a online Data Base of known ISIS members web sites. it is a updated constantly 24/7. When a ISIS site goes down it is removed form the list. Read the details on their web site below for more info on how you can help by simply click on the twitter link and send report and then block it.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://zenmate.com/" style="text-align: left;" target="_blank"></a></div>
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;">
<b style="color: red;"><br /></b><a href="http://luckytroll.club/" target="_blank">Lucky Troll Club</a><br />
<br />
<b style="color: red;">"WARNING: Profiles may contain extremely disturbing graphic images/"</b><br />
This is a very helpful web site lots of helpful links. The link to the left * <a href="http://luckytroll.club/daesh/Isisblock.htm" target="_blank"><b>Here is the ISIS Block list</b></a>. the following text is from that link<br />
<br />
<i><span style="color: blue;">The following is the complete list of active suspected ISIS accounts from this site's database. It is a subset of the much larger databases maintained by <a href="https://twitter.com/@CtrlSec" target="_blank">@CtrlSec</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/@Iridium_Blacker" target="_blank">@Iridium_Blacker</a>.If, after viewing an active acount on this list, you feel that it is the account of an ISIS supporter, please <a href="http://luckytroll.club/howto.htm" target="_blank">report it to Twitter</a> for violating Twitter<a href="https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules" target="_blank"> content policies.</a></span></i></div>
<br />
<div class="" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<i><span style="color: blue;">If you are going to evaluate/report accounts using the links provided here, please start at the top and work your way down. The more people that report an account, the more likely it is that it will be suspended. Suspended accounts are removed from the list at least once a day.</span></i><b style="color: red;">WARNING: Profiles may contain extremely disturbing graphic images.</b><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://luckytroll.club/" target="_blank"><img alt="ISIS Block List - Lucky Troll Club" border="0" height="228" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/--siBDJIfJjk/VUCg_z5SBzI/AAAAAAAABJY/nICEMPQlLFI/s1600/Lucky%2BTrool%2BClub.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
<a href="https://newblood.anonops.com/" style="font-size: xx-large; text-align: center;" target="_blank">OpNewBlood</a><span style="font-size: x-large; text-align: center;"> </span><br />
This is a great source to really get up to speed on how to surf the internet safely. Everyoone who uses the internet should learn and know these basics/<br />
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<div class="content">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://newblood.anonops.com/" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;" target="_blank"><img alt=" OpNewBlood" border="0" height="254" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-0lET-uKezI4/VUCpiVOCLjI/AAAAAAAABJ0/LK_opIxSy7A/s1600/opNewBlood.png" width="400" /></a></div>
<h4>
Virtual Private Network (VPN) <span style="font-weight: normal;">A virtual private network is a connection from your computer to
another network. Some of you may be familiar with these type of
connections as they are widely used by businesses to handle their
internal communications needs and to allow employees to access systems
from remote locations. Setup properly, they can also be used by anyone
to create a safer connection to the internet and have the added benefit
of disguising your true location. Click the link below for a short
tutorial on the different types of <br />VPN connections and encryption. </span><a href="https://newblood.anonops.com/vpn.html">Virtual Private Networks</a></h4>
</div>
<div class="content">
<h4>
The Onion Network (TOR) <span style="font-weight: normal;">The Tor (The Onion Router) Network is a means of relaying your
traffic to either an exit node (whereby your traffic then exits the
network and into the open web) or to a hidden service/site maintained
within the network itself. The traffic is routed through an 'untrusted'
relay circuit, whereby each relay node only knows the node before it
and the node after, thus no complete list of nodes used to route your
traffic can be enumerated. The network exhibits end-to-end encryption
but only within itself: if your traffic is not encrypted in the first
place, any person data-sniffing the exit node will be able to see where
you are then going and what you are doing while there. </span><a href="https://newblood.anonops.com/tor.html">Tor Information</a></h4>
</div>
<div class="content">
<h4>
Security <span style="font-weight: normal;">Security online is a very long and involved subject. The various
possibilities and methods of securing your client computer are combined
by you to suit your unique environment. No one solution is good for
every internet user. The reason for this is simple: We all use the
internet in different ways. Some surf the web and read emails. Others
spend their days on social media sites and twitter. Most do some degree
of business online, either paying bills or making purchases. For these
reasons, we cannot possibly cover every aspect of online life and we
will make no attempt to cover every situation. We can give you a start
and from there, we can assist you more once you are connected to the
network. Click the link below and read the information, as many times as
you have to until you have a basic understand then we can move to the
next phase.</span> <a href="https://newblood.anonops.com/security.html">Security Handbook</a></h4>
</div>
<div class="content">
<h4>
Encryption <span style="font-weight: normal;">Recent news of how extensive the NSA's efforts to compromise internet
security might make privacy seem impossible, but there is still hope.
Edward Snowden said it in an online Q&A soon after he made his first
document public: "Encryption works. Properly implemented strong crypto
systems are one of the few things that you can rely on." We've put
together a short primer to help get you started with more secure email
(and files). </span><a href="https://newblood.anonops.com/securemail.html">Email Encryption Basics</a></h4>
</div>
<div class="content">
<h4>
IRC Clients <span style="font-weight: normal;">The IRC client is the application that allows you to connect to the
IRC servers. The clients are free, easy to use but the initial setup can
be confusing. Each of the links below contain the basic information to
get connected to our network. If you cannot connect to the network after
following the guide use the webchat link further down the page.</span></h4>
<a href="https://newblood.anonops.com/hexchat.html">Windows</a> -
<a href="https://newblood.anonops.com/mac.html">Mac OS X</a> -
<a href="https://newblood.anonops.com/hexchat.html">Linux</a> -
<a href="https://newblood.anonops.com/droid.html">Android</a> -
<a href="https://newblood.anonops.com/irssi.html">Irssi</a>
</div>
</div>
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</div>
<div class="content-container">
<h3>
Connecting to IRC <a href="https://newblood.anonops.com/basics.html">Connect to IRC</a></h3>
</div>
</div>
</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-31889034403613982812015-04-28T23:11:00.001-07:002015-04-28T23:11:15.140-07:00 Turmoil among the #Afghan Military’s Leadership - Stars & Stripes<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div class="TX Body">
This is a <a href="http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghan-military-prepares-for-major-counterinsurgency-operation-in-north-1.340066#" target="_blank">good article by "Starts and Stripes" </a>on Afghanistan and her current and upcoming situation.<br /></div>
<div class="TX Body">
<a href="http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghan-military-prepares-for-major-counterinsurgency-operation-in-north-1.340066#" target="_blank">Afghan military prepares for major counterinsurgency operation in north</a></div>
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<div class="dateLine">
<span class="author">
By
Carlo Munoz
</span>
<div class="organization">
Stars and Stripes</div>
<div class="date">
Published: April 14, 2015</div>
</div>
<div class="TX Body">
<br /><span style="font-size: large;"><i>"The <a href="http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghan-military-prepares-for-major-counterinsurgency-operation-in-north-1.340066#" target="_blank">insurgent attacks in the north</a>, regarded as one of Afghanistan’s
more secure regions, mark the opening salvos of what promises to be an
intense fighting season across the country.</i></span></div>
<div class="TX Body">
<span style="font-size: large;"><i>
Analysts say problems within the government’s national security
apparatus could leave Afghan forces unprepared for increased insurgent
activity.</i></span></div>
<div class="TX Body">
<span style="font-size: large;"><i><br />" The failure by President Ashraf Ghani’s administration to name a
permanent defense minister has created turmoil among the Afghan
military’s leadership, Karimi told lawmakers on Tuesday.</i></span></div>
<div class="TX Body">
<span style="font-size: large;"><i>
That, combined with the shrinking role of U.S. and coalition forces in
the country, has caused serious capability gaps in the government’s
security forces that Taliban and other groups will use to their
advantage, analysts said.</i></span></div>
<div class="TX Body">
<span style="font-size: large;"><i>
“Sooner or later there will be more attacks targeting people in
Badakhshan,” Fawzia told Stars and Stripes on Tuesday. “The Taliban know
these weaknesses and will take advantage of them” as the fighting
season progresses.</i></span></div>
<br />
<div class="TX Body">
<span style="font-size: large;"><i>
Reports of the growing influence of the Islamic State group in northern Afghanistan only highlight those concerns."</i></span></div>
<div class="TX Body">
<span style="font-size: large;"><i><br /></i></span></div>
<div class="TX Body">
<span style="font-size: large;"><i><a href="http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghan-military-prepares-for-major-counterinsurgency-operation-in-north-1.340066#" target="_blank">Read the Article Click here</a></i></span></div>
<div class="TX Body">
<span style="font-size: large;"><i><br /></i></span></div>
<div class="TX Body">
<span style="font-size: large;"><i><br /><br /></i></span></div>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-77976638868143142892015-04-23T04:15:00.004-07:002015-07-05T02:54:49.870-07:00How to Help fight ISIS Instruction Manual by Shir Panjshir<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-WcnEdUvygcM/VOmH37453mI/AAAAAAAAArE/C52cM1v2KVc/s1600/what%2Bare%2Bwe%2Bfighting%2Bfor.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="315" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-WcnEdUvygcM/VOmH37453mI/AAAAAAAAArE/C52cM1v2KVc/s1600/what%2Bare%2Bwe%2Bfighting%2Bfor.png" width="320" /></a></div>
<span style="font-family: Consolas, Menlo, Monaco, Lucida Console, Liberation Mono, DejaVu Sans Mono, Bitstream Vera Sans Mono, monospace, serif; font-size: x-large;"><span style="line-height: 21px;"><b><br /></b></span></span>
<span style="font-family: Consolas, Menlo, Monaco, Lucida Console, Liberation Mono, DejaVu Sans Mono, Bitstream Vera Sans Mono, monospace, serif; font-size: x-large;"><span style="line-height: 21px;"><b>OPERATION ISIS</b></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Consolas, Menlo, Monaco, Lucida Console, Liberation Mono, DejaVu Sans Mono, Bitstream Vera Sans Mono, monospace, serif; font-size: x-large;"><span style="line-height: 21px;"><br /></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: large;"><a href="https://twitter.com/OpMopUpISIS" target="_blank">By OpMopUpISIS & Shir Panjshir</a></span><br />
<div style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif; font-size: 14px; font-stretch: normal; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: 22px; margin: 12px 0px; orphans: auto; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: normal; widows: 1; word-spacing: 0px;">
<i style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: italic; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><br /></i><br /><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="border: 0px none; font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px none; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">Original Post is located – <a href="https://fightisis.wordpress.com/2015/04/23/opmopupisis-describe-new-plans/">here</a><br />This is a simple how to instructions for average persons who want to help us fight ISIS online. Most of the Web sites you find will be wannabees, or people who are into ISIS but not active on the ground. When you do find ones that look to truly be in the fight, or planing attacks etc. that’s a big win and we want to help give you a place and friends who know how to handle the most extreme cases. Some of the worse sites do not go down right away. Often they need to be observed. Fake US military IDs, Fake NYC cop ID and a flew plots in the Works are all things we helped shut down in 2007. I Personally Shut down 3,000 web sites in 2007. About 30 of those the FBI IC3 and CIA were notified about. The rest the server/host shut down after we pointed out what it was on their websites, mostly violations of User Agreement is how we shut most of them down.</span></span><br />
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<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">So here is what to do:</b><br />
First you have to ask yourself<br />
Do you want to report known targets? or do you want to find new Targets and look for actionable Intel.<br />
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<div style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif; font-size: 14px; font-stretch: normal; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: 22px; margin: 12px 0px; orphans: auto; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: normal; widows: 1; word-spacing: 0px;">
<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">REPORT TARGETS:</b><br />
<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">Whats is Needed</b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>– Any Twitter account can be used, even with no virus protection. If you do not click on the bad guys links ,do not interact via Tweets, replies. favs, retweets, or direct message any Bad Guys. But we do always recommend have anti virus and firewall and do not click on bad guys links EVER !!! You can copy the link then report it to<a href="http://ghostsec.org/" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">GhostSec.org</a><br />
here is our page on<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">How to Report targets</b></div>
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<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">How to Report Targets</b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>– (click here to learn how to report targets) – Find Targets by using the search function in Twitter,<br />
or once you find a target you can check who do they follow the first 25 or so you should look at most.</div>
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<span style="border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: underline; vertical-align: baseline;">You can Search various Hash Tags in Twitter</span></div>
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<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">Our Operations uses:</b><br />
<a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23MUI_United&src=typd" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">#MUI_United</a> <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23MUI_Persian&src=typd" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">#MUI_Persian</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span> <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23MUI_Arabic&src=typd" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">#MUI_Arabic</a></div>
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<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">Other Operations uses:</b><br />
<a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23IceISIS&src=typd" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">#IceISIS</a> <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23AntiISIS&src=typd" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">#AntiISIS</a> <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23Targets&src=typd" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">#Targets</a> <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23No2ISIS&src=typd" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">#No2ISIS</a></div>
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<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">HUNT & REPORT TARGETS:</b></div>
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Make a New Twitter or Facebook account (Twitter is the main site ISIS uses) Do not friend your grandmother or something be sure it is friends who are ok with you fighting ISIS, or who may be a potential ISIS hunters, we have many nice people you can join in this fight. Feel free to friend other people who are fighting ISIS, these will be a great asset and they can help show you the ropes, and all the ISIS sites they find. I recommend new hunters start out just doing reporting and re-Tweeting of targets.<br />
Here is an Example of a Tweet from<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="https://twitter.com/OpMopUpISIS" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">@OpMopUpISIS</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>with<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23ISIS&src=typd" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">#ISIS</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23Targets&src=typd" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">#Targets </a></div>
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<a href="https://twitter.com/OpMopUpISIS/status/613641089707159553" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank"><img alt="MUI_United Target" class="alignnone wp-image-1665" height="305" src="https://ianbachusa.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/mui_united-target.jpg?w=433&h=214" style="border: 0px none; clear: both; display: block; margin-bottom: 12px; max-width: 100%;" width="640" /></a></div>
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After you have reported targets for a while you should get idea of what the enemy targets look like and how to find them. Be sure to speak up and others will help you learn all kinds of things. If you would rather just<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://pastebin.com/UWWyaPRX" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">Donate to help GhostSec fight ISIS online</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>see end of this Post.</div>
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<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">HOW TO SURF THE WEB SAFELY</b><br />
If you can use a Linux machine that is the safest way to be online.<br />
But no matter what broswer computer or device you are you are using, be sure to get a VPN (Virtual Private Network).<br />
Use a VPN Virtual Private Network<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="https://zenmate.com/" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">ZenMate</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>is a good one. Do not click on WebSites Unless you know it is reliable, dont add add-ons or extensions unless you check out reviews and trust the provider, use Avast anti-virus,<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="https://www.malwarebytes.org/mwb-download/" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">malwarebytes</a>, and<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=scan+for+Bots&oq=scan+for+Bots&aqs=chrome..69i57.1792j0j8&sourceid=chrome&es_sm=122&ie=UTF-8" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">scan for Bots</a>, don’t click-on or download pictures unless you are sure it is from your real friends and safe. Some can contain tracking info. Also use seperate browsers one for normal stuff one for fighting ISIS. or even 3 or 4 different browsers. ZenMate works on Firefox Chrome and Opera browsers.<br />
(Leave comments below to help add to the ?how to surf safe” section of this post. I will update and add contribution info.)</div>
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You create your own data base<br />
Use WinPad or NotePad or basic word doc program.<br />
Columns should include at least:</div>
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<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">User ID # or Link with using ID Violation Details Profile Photo Targets 1st 25 Friends</b></div>
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<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">How to find someones User ID?</b><br />
<a href="http://tweeterid.com/" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank"><b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">http://tweeterid.com/</b></a></div>
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Then upload the word file to pastebin<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://pastebin.com/" rel="nofollow" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">http://pastebin.com/</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>or use<br />
<a href="https://justpaste.it/" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">https://justpaste.it/</a></div>
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<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">SECRET – SILENT METHOD – Direct Messaging</b><br />
You can form a DM group of friends or join an existing Direct Message (DM) Group and all you need is a few if you each have several acounts. Each person reports targets they find to the group and group members report theirs and other members targets.</div>
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<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">VISIBLE METHOD – Tweeting Targets</b><br />
You can Tweet it and use @Usernames(from above) & Hashtags like #OpISIS #IceISIS #targets #OpMopUpISIS<br />
If you Tweet it ( a less visible to target method is )<br />
You can take a picture of the user ID violation and details. (screenshot cut & paste)<br />
Then use the text area of tweet to make hashtags #IceISIS #OpISIS #IceISIS #OpMopUpISIS #Targets</div>
<div style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif; font-size: 14px; font-stretch: normal; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: 22px; margin: 12px 0px; orphans: auto; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: normal; widows: 1; word-spacing: 0px;">
<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">Individual user IDs you can report anonymously at:<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://ghostsec.org/" style="border: 0px; color: #835504; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank">http://ghostsec.org/</a></b></div>
<div style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif; font-size: 14px; font-stretch: normal; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: 22px; margin: 12px 0px; orphans: auto; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: normal; widows: 1; word-spacing: 0px;">
<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">Direct Threats Attack planing bombs, recruitment, material support, etc</b><br />
To report Users talking about wanting to set up a bombing or other terrorist event these need to be tracked by professionals<br />
use hastags #OpMOpUPISIS #OpISIS #GhostSec #IceISIS #targets for this type that need tracked please include these as well @CIA @FBI Report these type accounts and tweets ASAP.. Try make your repoort short and concise. 2 to 5 sentences should be sufficient. Make sure you are polite and also make sure to list is this a known ISIS member a Wanabee or ? also is this user ID likely to have actionable intel and what type? how likely will it have actionable intel? Be sure to include a link to the actual tweet, not just the users page. So if they have a tweet talking about making a bomb = right click on the time of Post (that has the link to the actual post) click on “Copy Link Address”</div>
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<b style="border: 0px; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14px; font-style: inherit; font-weight: bold; margin: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; text-shadow: rgb(204, 255, 255) 2px 2px 2px; vertical-align: baseline;">Violations of twitter agreement</b><br />
That includes harassment, beheadings, terrorist speech, porn, & other abuses. Include in your report or tweet the type of violation,<br />
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<b>Additional Info for Hunters and Fighters - by OpMopUpISIS</b></div>
Epilogue
- I want to address the most common responses we see to ISIS propaganda
is anti Muslim posts, comments, etc. This however is not addressing the
problem in a manner that helps us fight propaganda. By posting anti
Muslim comments etc this further alienates Muslims especially in Western
Countries were they are a minority. ISIS and al-Qaeda have a game plan
and it does involve making non-Muslims fear or hate all Muslims. This
gives the enemy a larger pool of people to recruit from to serve their
militant urges. By comment on #ISIS Tweets, Blogs, Posts, etc. you open
yourself and your friend list up for retaliation and harassment.<br />
<b>FIRST things FIRST</b><br />
I would like to point out that we recommend making a 2ndry online ID to
use for fighting ISIS online. Make sure it does not give away info or
pictures about yourself. Also when you see a post or comment made by
Jihadists do not respond to their comments. If you do want to be part of
the Harass ISIS campaigns like #OpISIS #OpIceISIS #<br />
I recommend
simply copy paste the various examples we will give you. I am going to
be making various Links to Cartoons, Text, and Pictures to post onto
ISIS sites and #hashtags. If you chat with a jihadists you will only
get mad and have a bad day. It is much better to take the high-ground
and properly address jihadists comments, Bogs Pictures Videos Etc, by
reporting harassing comments, photos of beheading,, hangings
crucifixions etc. these are all things that most Web services like
Google, YouTube, Yahoo, Twitter etc. Therefore it is relatively easy to
create a very bad day for many many ISIS and ISIS wannabees accounts
online.<br />
<b>1. MAIN fight is - Report ISIS harassment, ISIS web sites (accounts), and ISIS wannabee's web sites.</b><br />
This
phase is also to report Harassment by ISIS and their followers. they
often are dumb enough to tweet things in comments / replies like "Nice
photo it will look even better when I cut your head off with my Knife"
This makes it easy to ban, suspend, and even delete their accounts.<br />
Q. What type of web sites should we report? A. ISIS Blogs, Pictures,
Video,s Etc, photos of beheading,, hangings crucifixions, etc........
these are all things that most Web services like Google, YouTube, Yahoo,
Twitter etc. Therefore it is relatively easy to create a very bad day
for many many ISIS and ISIS wannabees accounts online.<br />
<span data-mce-style="text-decoration: underline;" style="text-decoration: underline;">a. If you are on Twitter YouTube or other social media</span> <br />
Be sure tyo report bad targets there as wlel to theHost/Server like YouTube, Twitter, Facebook Etc.<span data-mce-style="text-decoration: underline;" style="text-decoration: underline;"><br /> </span><br />
(If
you locate a Islamic State account report it and Block it and encourage
your friends to also report and block it, The more who do so, the more
likely the web site will be closed down.) <br />
<br />
<span data-mce-style="text-decoration: underline;" style="text-decoration: underline;">b. What should my Twitter hunter account look like?</span>We
recommend you consider that the more followers you have and close
friends the more will rpeort on targets that you tweet. So it maybe best
to think of a hobby or other thing you know well and tailor your
accounts to fit that, and to find more followers and friends.<span data-mce-style="text-decoration: underline;" style="text-decoration: underline;"><br /></span><br />
<span data-mce-style="text-decoration: underline;" style="text-decoration: underline;">c. If on YouTube, Blogger, +Gplus, yahoo....etc.</span><br />
Then you should contact the Host (i.e. Yahoo, YouTube, etc.) Use the report abuse button or other contact they recommend.<br />
<span data-mce-style="text-decoration: underline;" style="text-decoration: underline;">e. <a data-mce-href="http://www.ic3.gov/complaint/default.aspx" href="http://www.ic3.gov/complaint/default.aspx" target="_blank">FBI IC3</a> http://www.ic3.gov/complaint/default.aspx <a data-mce-href="http://www.ic3.gov/faq/default.aspx" href="http://www.ic3.gov/faq/default.aspx" target="_blank">(IC3 FAQ)</a></span><br />
If it is a Fake U.S. military ID then you can also report it to FBI IC3
(internet crimes division) You can also contact FBI IC3 if you get
riped-off online via any kind of scam. Be sure to keep your report to 1 -
2 short sentences. Make it clear and concise like "this uses appears to
be a Fake US military ID. (then a short sentence why you think it is
fake. Most of these are brought to my attention by friends or family of
US military troops accounts, that are being harassed by people with fake
IDs.<br />
f. <a data-mce-href="http://www.ic3.gov/faq/default.aspx" href="http://www.ic3.gov/faq/default.aspx" target="_blank">Report Potential Terrorists Web sites or accounts to FBI</a><br />
If it is a terrorist web sites and Fake U.S. military IDs. Report it to FBI as well as the Server - Contact <a data-mce-href="http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field" href="http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field">your local FBI field office</a> or <a data-mce-href="http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/legat" href="http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/legat">closest international office</a>.
To report suspicious activity involving chemical, biological, or
radiological materials, call (toll-free): 855-TELL-FBI or
855-835-5324. Report an <a data-mce-href="http://www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/e-scams/e-scams" href="http://www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/e-scams/e-scams">online scam or e-mail hoax</a> by filing a complaint online with our <a data-mce-href="http://www.ic3.gov/complaint/default.aspx" href="http://www.ic3.gov/complaint/default.aspx">Internet Crime Complaint Center</a> or by using our online Tips and Public Leads form<br />
<b>2. Moderate Difficulty - HARASS AND HOUND STRATEGIES - The next Big push is to Harass ISIS/ISIL</b><br />
<b>2.a. </b><b>Point out the realities of what happens to people who join ISIS (or other al-Qaeda like groups)<br /> </b><span data-mce-style="line-height: 1.5;" style="line-height: 1.5;">Post
comments, tweets, etc. that point out how the bad guys use most
foreigners (esp western, and southeast Asia) as cannon fodder and
suicide bombers. We will be making a page that helps and gives
examples.</span><br />
<b>2.b. Post cartoons that depict makes fun of ISIS<br /> </b>Be
sure to remember we do not want to make a potential ISIS follower
decide because you pissed them off now they gonna go Join ISIS. So be
almost polite about how you do it. Comedy also seems to work good.<br />
<b>2.c. Post quranic verses that contradict ISIS Wahabbi, Jihadi, Salafi teachings.<br /> </b>I haven't had a chance to work on this one yet please check back soon. If you have some examples to share please do. Thanks<br />
<b>3. Experts Only - Denial of Service Attacks on ISIS / ISIL</b><b>Twitter - Flood #IslamicStateMedia - this can disrupt their tweets and result in downtime for the bad guys </b>This is a much more <span data-mce-style="line-height: 1.5;" style="line-height: 1.5;">aggressive
approach to fighting ISIS/ISIL will include having groups of people to
flood the ISIS hashtags like #IslamicStateMedia @IslamicStateMedia.
During the flood attack sessions we recommend those doing it favorite
and re-tweets all the tweets that are countering the enemy's propaganda.</span><br />
<b> 4. Experts Only - Seek and track movements and chat on Jihadi and ISIS web sites / forums, chats.</b><br />
This
is the most aggressive of ways to attack ISIS online. Only persons well
trained in internet security and using secure methods (like
using accounts designate for only fighting ISIS - DO NOT use your normal
profile names images etc) . Here is a <a data-mce-href="https://ianbachusa.wordpress.com/2007/12/01/mom-by-day-terrorist-hunter-by-night/" href="https://ianbachusa.wordpress.com/2007/12/01/mom-by-day-terrorist-hunter-by-night/" target="_blank">link to a Mom who did this in her off hours</a>, and she is one of the very successful terrorist hunters in chat rooms.<br />
-============================================================================-<br />
Edit - Additions April 3rd 2015<br />
<a class="ot-hashtag aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23OpMopUpISIS" href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23OpMopUpISIS" rel="nofollow">#OpMopUpISIS</a><br />
We are looking for people who want to infiltrate ISIS ranks online in
Twitter and Facebook. We want to find out the Hashtags they use for
communication, We also track their IPs and in some cases we send the
local Gov or the Kurds to go get em.<br />
Or you can help us by finding and reporting <a class="ot-hashtag aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23ISIS" href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23ISIS" rel="nofollow">#ISIS</a> accounts<br />
It is easy just make a separate/new account on twitter (do not put
normal friends in your friend list or they target them) and use the
following <a class="ot-hashtag aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23Hashtags" href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23Hashtags" rel="nofollow">#Hashtags</a> = <a class="ot-hashtag aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23OpISIS" href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23OpISIS" rel="nofollow">#OpISIS</a> <a class="ot-hashtag aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23OpIceISIS" href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23OpIceISIS" rel="nofollow">#OpIceISIS</a> <a class="ot-hashtag aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23OpISISMopUp" href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23OpISISMopUp" rel="nofollow">#OpISISMopUp</a> #IceISIS <br />
Include the person's Account/Link you are reporting on<br />
and brief detail like "Suspect ISIS", <a class="ot-hashtag aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23Beheadings" href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23Beheadings" rel="nofollow">#Beheadings</a> <a class="ot-hashtag aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23Daeshbags" href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23Daeshbags" rel="nofollow">#Daeshbags</a> etc.<br />
Here is an example:<br />
☢ The Doctor ☢@iridium_black · 9m 9 minutes ago<br />
Daeshbags:<br />
<a class="ot-anchor aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://twitter.com/_luluIS_" href="https://twitter.com/_luluIS_" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://twitter.com/_luluIS_</a> (new)<br />
<a class="ot-anchor aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://twitter.com/saddaa19999" href="https://twitter.com/saddaa19999" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://twitter.com/saddaa19999</a> *new)<br />
<a class="ot-anchor aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://twitter.com/okatoka7" href="https://twitter.com/okatoka7" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://twitter.com/okatoka7</a> (new)<br />
<a class="ot-hashtag aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23IceISIS" href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23IceISIS" rel="nofollow">#IceISIS</a> <a class="ot-hashtag aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23targets" href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23targets" rel="nofollow">#targets</a><br />
On FaceBook use Hasghtag <a class="ot-hashtag aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23IceIisis" href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23IceIisis" rel="nofollow">#IceIisis</a> <a class="ot-hashtag aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23IceISIS" href="https://plus.google.com/s/%23IceISIS" rel="nofollow">#IceISIS</a> #OpISIS<br />
fighters from Anonymous review these hashtags and shut em down<br />
<a class="ot-anchor aaTEdf" data-mce-href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100009535500895" href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100009535500895" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100009535500895</a></div>
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<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-cl5_NZvT5T8/VSvYUW_34pI/AAAAAAAABIs/9H61Wx0e8dM/s1600/pic.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="201" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-cl5_NZvT5T8/VSvYUW_34pI/AAAAAAAABIs/9H61Wx0e8dM/s1600/pic.jpg" width="400" /></a><br />
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<span style="color: #acacac; font-family: Consolas, Menlo, Monaco, Lucida Console, Liberation Mono, DejaVu Sans Mono, Bitstream Vera Sans Mono, monospace, serif;"><span style="font-size: 12px; line-height: 21px;"> </span></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: large;"><a href="http://t.co/a2XphgksLU" target="_blank">Info From</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/GhostSec?src=hash" target="_blank">#GhostSec</a> </span></b></div>
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Many individuals have showed an amazing amount of support in regards to Operation ISIS and have asked how they can contribute to our cause. The steps below can be used to track Islamic State Twiiter accounts and their websites.</div>
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<b>1- Locating an Islamic State Twitter account.</b></div>
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If you are new to this locating an Islamic State militant account can prove to be difficult however after locating your first account you will be able to find thousands more following these steps. ISIS militants and their supporters feed off of attention and publicity commonly using Twitter hash tags such as #IslamicState among others. Run a Twitter search using this hash tag and you will find your first Islamic State account. If you are still having difficulty locating an account Twitter search #CtrlSec or #OpISIS</div>
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<b>2- I have located my first Islamic State Twitter account.</b></div>
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Now that you have located your first Islamic State Twitter account you will now be able to collect many more and form a vast network of information. With the account you initially located review all of their following and followers collecting Twitter account names as you move forward. When you are collecting account names you must retrieve their Twitter ID by visiting <b><a href="http://tweeterid.com/" target="_blank">Click here to find a user's ID</a></b> If you do not collect the account ID they can easily change their account name to evade you as they commonly do once detected. As you are collecting Islamic State Twitter accounts check each bio and their tweets for website URLS and log the information. With the data you have compiled visit <a href="http://pastebin.com/">http://pastebin.com</a> and publish a paste of your findings. </div>
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<b>3- I have a list of Islamic State Twitter accounts and URLS</b>.</div>
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Now that you have collected this information you can take action against them by reporting them to Anonymous, authorities and Twitter. If your paste link contains Islamic State Twitter accounts you can tweet your paste making sure to use the hash tag #CtrlSec<br />
If your paste link contains Islamic State website URLS tweet them using the hash tag #GhostSec so their operatives can collect intelligence and disable the websites. If you have concerns for your personal safety you can alternatively email us with your information at <a href="mailto:ghostsec@riseup.net" target="_blank">ghostsec@riseup.net</a> using a anonymous mailer service such as <b><a href="https://www.google.com/#q=anonymous+mail+service" target="_blank">Click here to learn how to email Anonymously</a></b></div>
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<li class="li1" style="-webkit-user-select: none;"><h3>
If your paste link contains Islamic State website URLS tweet them
using the hash tag #GhostSec so their operatives can collect
intelligence and disable the websites. If you have concerns for your
personal safety you can alternatively email us with your information at
ghostsec@riseup.net using a anonymous mailer service such as Click here
to learn how to email Anonymously</h3>
<h3 class="de1">
<b>If you
would like to contribute to #CtrlSec or #GhostSec via donation our
Bitcoin address can be found below. All funds received will go towards
server maintenance expenses and hardware to combat the Islamic State.</b></h3>
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<b><a data-mce-href="http://pastebin.com/UWWyaPRX" href="http://pastebin.com/UWWyaPRX" target="_blank">Ghost Security Bitcoin Address: </a>1KDkYapMUiwzHuCzNp32EGJY8c6eX6Hn6U</b></h3>
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<b> Your contributions to our cause are immensely appreciated and this could never be achieved without your unyielding support.</b></h3>
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<a data-mce-href="http://pastebin.com/UWWyaPRX" href="http://pastebin.com/UWWyaPRX" target="_blank"><b> <span data-mce-style="color: #0000ff;" style="color: blue;">Ghost Security</span></b></a></h3>
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<b>We are the ghosts that you have created.</b></h3>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-55339135286313649922015-04-19T00:42:00.000-07:002015-04-19T00:42:08.951-07:00Afghanistan - Attack by ISIS in Jalalabad kills 33 injures more than 100<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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Afghan policemen inspect the site of the suicide bombing in Jalalabad on
Saturday morning. Photograph: Xinhua/Landov/Barcroft Media
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<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/18/afghanistan-suicide-bombing-kills-dozens-jalalabad-islamic-state" target="_blank">Afghanistan president blames Islamic State for Jalalabad suicide bombing</a></h1>
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Ashraf Ghani says Isis militants were behind blast that killed at least 33 people and injured more than 100<br />
A suicide bomber in Afghanistan’s eastern city of Jalalabad killed at
least 33 people and injured more than 100 after setting off a blast
outside a bank where government workers collect salaries, the city’s
police chief has said. <br />
The Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani, blamed <a class=" u-underline" data-component="auto-linked-tag" data-link-name="auto-linked-tag" href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/isis">Islamic State</a>
militants, without giving further details. If true, it would be the
first such major attack carried out by the group in Afghanistan, marking
a significant step in its expansion into south Asia. <br />
Up until now militants claiming allegiance to Isis in <a class=" u-underline" data-component="auto-linked-tag" data-link-name="auto-linked-tag" href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/afghanistan">Afghanistan</a>
have been widely identified as former Taliban fighters disillusioned
with their leadership. The Taliban itself condemned Saturday’s attack as
“evil”.<br />
The explosion smashed windows and sent debris flying across a tree-lined street, filling the air with smoke and dust. <br />
“It was a suicide attack,” police chief Fazel Ahmad Sherzad told a
press conference. He added that officials were investigating witness
reports of a second explosion after people had rushed to the area to
help the wounded. <br />
Police said a later blast that shook Jalalabad was a controlled
detonation after experts discovered a further bomb close to the scene of
the initial explosion. <br />
Local media said a former spokesman for the Pakistani <a class=" u-underline" data-component="auto-linked-tag" data-link-name="auto-linked-tag" href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/taliban">Taliban</a> had claimed responsibility on behalf of Isis in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.<br />
Islamist militants of various hues already hold sway across unsettled
and impoverished areas of south Asia, but Isis has started to draw
support from younger fighters in the region, impressed by its rapid
capture of territory in Syria and Iraq.<br />
Ghani visited the US last month and warned that Isis posed a “terrible threat” to his country. <br />
Taliban insurgents denied responsibility and did not comment on the
alleged Isis link. The militants, who were ousted from power by a US-led
invasion in 2001, rarely claim attacks that kill large groups of
civilians, saying they target foreigners or the Afghan military and
government. <br />
<br />
“It was an evil act. We strongly condemn it,” a Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, told Reuters. </div>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-15548365070229716182015-04-13T13:53:00.002-07:002015-04-13T13:53:49.161-07:0032 Years of Struggle: PKK’s fight to defend an “Unknown Language and People”<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<h2 style="font-family: Verdana, Geneva, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 14.3000001907349px;">
<li style="color: #003366; display: inline; font-size: 10px; margin-right: 20px;">KurdishMedia.com - By Hadi Elis</li>
<li style="color: #003366; display: inline; font-size: 10px; margin-right: 20px;">09/12/2010 00:00:00 <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-4AzK8j2iDbM/VSwsD0D0d0I/AAAAAAAABJA/gUwGFZ795mA/s1600/qar5f4BX_400x400.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-4AzK8j2iDbM/VSwsD0D0d0I/AAAAAAAABJA/gUwGFZ795mA/s1600/qar5f4BX_400x400.jpeg" height="200" width="200" /></a></div>
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<div style="font-family: Verdana, Geneva, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11px;">
<b>Introduction</b></div>
<div style="font-family: Verdana, Geneva, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11px;">
The PKK, as it is known in its Kurdish acronym stands for <i>Partia Karkeren Kurdistan</i>, wrongly translated to English in many studies and official texts as Kurdish Workers’ Party; in fact it is <i>Kurdistan Workers’ Party</i>. For PKK, Kurdistan as a concept is totality of people, language, culture and the history; Kurdistan is the word represents anything and everything about Kurdishness.</div>
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For PKK, the establishment of Republic of Turkey, and her denial policies of Kurds & Kurdistan since 1923 is the problem of facing extinction for Kurdish people. Essentially criminalization of usage of Kurdish language is illegitimate and immoral.</div>
<div style="font-family: Verdana, Geneva, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11px;">
Kurdish people as being natives of the land of Kurdistan since the time immemorial, lives in the region called Middle East by Europeans, is the largest nation without a state, and Kurdistan is the most partitioned and longest occupied country in the World, currently between four Nation-states.</div>
<span style="font-family: Verdana, Geneva, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 11px;">Kurdistan Workers’ Party emerged after maturation of Kurdish students’ protests movement into a political movement in late 60s, and intellectual voyage of questioning this reality in the mid 1970s. The earlier Kurdish uprisings studied and discussed intensively, socio-political and socio-economic situation of Kurdistan analyzed for composing political theory of National Liberation. In its Party program, accepted at 27-28 November 1978, in Amed, in North Kurdistan, it presents itself as National Liberation Movement guided with Socialist ideology and aimed at making the Revolution in Kurdistan in order to be able to change the international statuesque, named it as Turkish Colonialism supported by the West, Feudal Social and Economic conditions of Kurdistan. Mr. Abdullah Ocalan was elected as its Chairman in this meeting.</span></span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana, Geneva, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 11px;">Article Originally Posted </span><span style="font-size: 11px;">at </span><a href="http://kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=16554" style="font-size: 11px;" target="_blank">KurdishMedia</a></span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana, Geneva, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 11px;"><a href="http://kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=16554">http://kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=16554</a><br /></span></span><br />
<h2 style="font-family: Verdana, Geneva, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 14.3000001907349px;">
<li style="color: #003366; display: inline; font-size: 10px; margin-right: 20px;">Hadi Elis Twitter Page here <a href="https://twitter.com/hadi_elis">https://twitter.com/hadi_elis</a></li>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641215368488732677.post-54149764235820184442015-04-13T10:30:00.001-07:002015-04-13T10:30:56.364-07:00SELF-DETERMINATION Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
REPORT FROM A ROUNDTABLE HELD IN CONJUNCTION WITH
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S POLICY PLANNING STAFF<br /><br />SELF-DETERMINATION
Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and
the Right to Secession
<br />by Patricia Carley
<br /><br />UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE OF PEACE<br /><br /><a href="http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/pwks7.pdf" target="_blank">PDF File Click here to read or Download</a><br />
<br />
Summary v
Preface ix
1 Introduction 1
2 A History of the Self-Determination Concept 3
3 The Rise of Contemporary Self-Determination
Movements 5
4 The Self-Determination Principle: Legal Definitions
and Obligations 8
5 A Specific Case: The Crisis in Chechnya 11
6 U.S. Interests and Possible Policy Options 13
7 Conclusion 18
About the Author 19
About the Institute 20
CONTENTS
he right to self-determination has become
one of the most complex issues for U.S. foreign
policymakers and the international
community at large. Confusion over the issue
stems not so much from whether there exists a
right to self-determination, which is included in
many international human rights documents, but
from the failure of those documents to define exactly
who is entitled to claim this right—a group, a
people, or a nation—and what exactly the right confers.
At the same time, the international system,
particularly in the post–World War II era, has
steadfastly defended the inviolability of existing
nation-states’ borders, regardless of how and when
they were determined.
In recent years, many groups that constitute minorities
in their states have invoked the “right to
self-determination” in their demands for autonomy—or,
in some cases, secession—and have resorted
to violence to pursue their aims. These
groups typically justify their demand for self-determination
as a way to end years of repression and
human rights violations by the majority ethnic
group or the central government. The absence of a</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10101571347632268803noreply@blogger.com0