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Sunday, March 15, 2015

COIN US Army Manual – Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations

Originally posted on How to Fight ISIS Online:
Afghan-Troops-do-COIN

from The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual

Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be Counterinsurgency (COIN) presents a complex and often unfamiliar set of missions and considerations. In many ways, the conduct of COIN is counterintuitive to the traditional U.S. view of war—although COIN operations have actually formed a substantial part of the U.S. military experience. Some representative paradoxes of COIN are presented here as examples of the different mindset required. These paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit it. The applicability of the thoughts behind the paradoxes depends on a sense of the local situation and, in particular, the state of the insurgency. For example, the admonition “Sometimes, the More Force Used, the Less Effective It Is” does not apply when the enemy is “coming over the barricades”; however, that thought is applicable when increased security is achieved in an area…
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